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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
DINNER WITH WILMA. ON THE RELATION BETWEEN (INTER) 
SUBJECTIVITY, MEMORY AND EMOTION MANAGEMENT IN MIGRANT-IN-
THE-FAMILY INTERACTIONS 
 
This  thesis  reports  on  the  findings  of  a  heuristic  study  on  participants’ 
communicative  means  of  co-constructing  (inter)subjective  remembering  in 
interactions  with  an  Alzheimer’s patient.  The  case  study  presented  in  this  thesis 
reflects a typical German ‘migrant-in-the-family’ home care arrangement, consisting 
of  a  number  of  family  carers  and  nursing  service  employees  alongside  the  frail 
elderly  and  a  migrant  live-in.  Oral  data  were  collected  through  ethnographic 
fieldwork. Over a period of six months, for approximately four days a week, three 
hours a day, interactions were audio recorded that involve one Alzheimer’s patient 
(‘Wilma’), three Polish live-ins, three of Wilma’s five children, and seven employees 
of the local nursing service. In the existing literature on the ‘migrant-in-the-family’ 
model, the scholarly focus in sociology is on the devaluation of domestic work. In 
particular, Arlie Hochschild’s framework for the analysis of ‘emotion management’ 
is  used  to  outline  the  strategies  individuals  use  to  create  ‘appropriate’  feeling 
displays, as well as the emotional costs of doing so. Categorising feeling displays 
either as surface acting (feigning emotion) or deep acting (authentic emotion), this 
approach treats ‘emotion management’ as a subjective and cognitive process. Taking 
on board an interactional perspective, this thesis approaches ‘emotion management’ 
as situated and distributed social practice and not only as cognitive achievement. In 
the spirit of Sacks’s ‘any-direction’ approach to analysis, this thesis’s data analysis 
draws on research in cognitive and social psychology, as well as neuroscience to gain 
a deeper understanding of the meaning-making processes. The general framework 
for analysis are Sacks’s lectures on story-telling in conversations. Findings show that 
participants’ schema-consistent  actions can  achieve  affective  coherence  regarding 
the individual’s goals. However, this can, as a side effect, provoke a relationship 
mismatch. Consequently, it is argued that schema-related feeling displays of internal 
emotion  management  simultaneously  affect  negotiations  of  positions  within  the 
relationship. This way, participants’ conflicting frames concerning the home care 
situation potentially explain dysfunctional communication in terms of overall aims 
and the setup of Wilma’s care. Yet, my analysis shows that frames and schemata are 
subject  to  an  on-going  adaptive  learning  process  as  emotion  management  is 
distributed within the participation framework. Table of Contents 
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1 
All you need is Love1 
The migrant-in-the-family model of home eldercare in Germany 
 
 
 
 
The ability to care runs in their blood. They are warm- hearted 
and loving. They care for the elderly person the way a family 
member would do – 24 hours each day. Besides, they are much 
cheaper than nursing homes. 
 
Beata is mom’s sunshine – and I can also afford her. 
 
Without Grazyna mummy would have to live in a nursing home. 
 
 
 
 
 
Contemporary Germany is one of Europe’s fastest ageing countries. As far as 
care  for  the  elderly  is  concerned,  the  buzzword  in  public  and  political 
discussions about the nature and quality of professional care is ‘care crisis’ 
(‘Pflegenotstand’2).  The  national  care  system  is  frequently  reported  to  be 
marked  by  severe  deficits  in  every  respect,  ranging  from  a  lack  of 
                                                 
1 Parts of this chapter have been published in Engfer (2011). 
2 This political buzzword dates back to the 1960s and was originally used to describe the 
serious consequences of staff shortage in hospitals only (see Fussek & Loerzer, 2005).    2 
modernisation3 of the interplay between public interventions and families (as 
regulated  through  the  long -term  care  insurance  system)  to  abuses  and 
human rights violations in nursing homes 4.  In order to circumvent these 
problems, an ever-increasing number of elderly people are being cared for in 
their own homes by live -in care workers from Poland and other Eastern 
European countries. 
 
This thesis looks in -depth at one such home care arrangement  –  in  the 
following referred to as the ‘migrant-in-the-family’ model (Bettio et al., 2006) 
– which, according to a recent study conducted by the National Institute for 
Ageing Research, in Germany typically consists of a number of family carers 
and nursing service employees alongside the elderly in need of care, and a 
migrant  live-in  (see  Neuhaus,  2009).  The  purpose  of  this  introductory 
chapter is to provide the necessary background and to give an overview of 
this thesis’s objectives, research design, and structure. This chapter begins 
with a short outline of the demographic environment in Germany, which puts 
into context the so-called ‘care crisis’ and its relevance for research on the 
migrant-in-the-family model in Germany. This section will be followed by a 
short introduction into existing research. Having identified significant gaps 
in  the  literature,  I  will  then  outline  the  motivation  for  this  study,  its 
objectives, and structure.   
 
 
 
 
1.1. Demographic background 
 
With 82 million inhabitants in 2009, Germany has the largest population 
among all 27 EU member states. This population, however, is marked by an 
ageing society, with death rates continuously exceeding the low birth rate of 
approximately 1.4 children per mother (Lanzieri, 2009; Destatis, 2010).  
                                                 
3 See Reimer & Merold (2008) for a comprehensive overview of the changes made to the care 
insurance system in 2008 and Brandenburg (2010) for a critique.  
4  In  summer  2008  a  disturbingly  high  number  of  stories  like  the  following  made  the 
headlines: ‘Grandpa found dead in nursing home only 10 days later’ (‘Opa liegt 10 Tage tot 
im Seniorenheim’, BILD, 30.8.2008).      3 
According to the 2006 census, 98% of Germans between 65 and 84 years live 
in  private  households,  of  which  one  third  are  single  person  households. 
Merely one fifth (18%) of those who are older than 85 years live in nursing 
homes (see Hoffmann & Nachtmann, 2007: 4). In 2003, 1.44 million people 
of those living in private households were in need of care. These individuals 
were almost exclusively (92%) cared for by family members, with 28% of the 
families  receiving  additional  professional  help  from  nursing  services  (see 
report of the Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth, henceforth BMFSFJ, 2005:  313). In 1995, the German government 
implemented  a  new  long-term  care  insurance  system.  This  gave  rise  to  a 
number  of  benefits  including  community-based  care,  payment  to  family 
carers and payment to nursing homes. It particularly emphasizes the filial 
obligation to organise eldercare, and as we can see with regard to the figures 
mentioned above, home care is by-far the most popular solution in Germany.   
 
Thus, upon considering the estimated demographic scenario for Germany, 
including both population ageing and changing family structures, it can be 
expected that non-familial networks will become increasingly important in 
the future to arrange home care. At the same time, it is anticipated that by 
2030  the  number  of  people  with  so-called  ‘Fourth  Age’  (Baltes  &  Smith, 
2003)  diseases  will  double  (see  BMFSFJ,  2005:  318).  A  growing  body  of 
research provides evidence that the oldest-old, or individuals in their ‘Fourth 
Age’ (aged 85+), are more likely to be multi-morbid, depressed and demented 
(Baltes & Mayer, 1999). In public Discourse5, in particular the Alzheimer’s 
disease embodies the vulnerabilities of very old age. Although the existing 
body of knowledge about forms of dementia has already been translated into 
specific care techniques and state-of-the-art dementia units, the vast majority 
of  individuals  suffering  from  dementia  now  is  cared  for  at  home  (see 
BMFSFJ, 2005: 318). Professional nursing services in Germany, however, are 
expensive, more expensive than the ‘do it yourself solution’ of migrant-in-
the-family care (Lamura et al., 2008). Accordingly, recent estimates say that 
                                                 
5  I follow Gee (1990) in his distinction between discourse and Discourse. While the former is 
used for “connected stretches of language” (1990: 142), Gee argues that “Discourse with a big 
‘D’ is always more than just language” (ibid). He defines Discourse as an ‘identity kit’ that 
“comes complete with the appropriate costume and instructions on how to act, talk, and 
often write, so as to take on a particular social role that others will recognize” (ibid).   4 
approximately 50.000 to 60.000 Polish live-ins assist in German home care 
today (see BMFSFJ, 2005: 316). It is assumed that the actual number is much 
higher, with the majority of migrants not being registered for work. 
 
 
 
 
1.2. Rationale and Research Questions 
 
While a number of ground-breaking studies have been dedicated to migrant 
care workers in the Mediterranean area (Lamura et al., 2008; Degiuli, 2007; 
Bettio  et  al.,  2006;  Anderson,  2000;  Anderson  &  Phizacklea,  1997),  in 
Germany,  this  topic  has  so  far  received  little  attention.  Predominantly, 
sociologists in gender and migration studies have been contributing research, 
in  particular  with  regard  to  the  legal  status  of  employment  (Karakayali, 
2007),  and  the  New  Maid  as  a  challenge  to  gender  studies  (Lutz,  2002a, 
2002b, 2007; Lutz & Lenz, 2002; Lutz & Koser, 1998; Odierna, 2000). No 
interactional  data  and  research  is  available  so  far  on  the  communicative 
aspects, and in particular the everyday life interactions between all parties 
concerned: the live-in, the cared-for, his or her family members, as well as 
external care providers. 
 
The  case  study  presented  in  this  thesis’s  main  body  therefore  provides 
interactional  data  of  a  migrant-in-the-family  home  care  arrangement  that 
includes family caregivers, as well as nursing service employees, migrant live-
ins and the person in need of care. Furthermore, acknowledging  the high 
number of individuals with dementia being cared for in this model of home 
eldercare, as well as the future scenario outlined above, the person receiving 
care in this case study suffers from the Alzheimer’s disease. The Alzheimer’s 
patient, Wilma, was diagnosed6 with this disease in 2006 when she was 74 
                                                 
6  Despite  the  fact  that  there  is  consensus  that  a  diagnosis  is  only  possible  post-mortem, 
Wilma’s GP diagnosed her on the basis of the very same symptoms listed in this section. 
Although Wilma’s daughter Gudrun who accompanied her doubted the GP’s diagnosis, which 
according to her was not backed up by any extensive tests, the whole family consistently used 
the  term  ‘Alzheimer’s’  when  talking  about  Wilma’s  condition.  Because  of  the  fact  that 
participants themselves use this term, it is used in the description of Wilma in this study as 
well. However, accepting this label has serious consequences, as I will outline in chapter 4.   5 
years old. After a brief stay at a psychiatric unit, her oldest daughter, Gudrun, 
hired the Polish nurse Elisabeta through an agency in spring 2007 (all names 
are pseudonyms).  By  the time of the  participant observation  in  2007  and 
2008,  Wilma  exhibited  many  symptoms  of  advanced  stage  Alzheimer’s 
disease,  including  incontinence,  weight  loss,  wandering,  tremors,  and 
sundowning (a range of ‘abnormal’ behaviours such as wandering or mood 
swings  that  occur  in  the  late  afternoon  or  evening).  Wilma  also  exhibited 
severe  speech  disorders  as  well  as  noticeable  declines  in  reasoning  and 
memory skills. All of these symptoms are commonly associated with a rapid 
decline in cognitive functions (Scarmeas et al., 2007). Describing Wilma in 
this  fashion  portrays  her  as  a  patient  suffering  from  progressive  neuro-
degenerative brain disorder – someone whose existence has been stigmatized 
as “drifting towards the threshold of unbeing” (Kitwood & Bredin, 1992: 285). 
Taking  linguistic  degradation  as  a  hallmark  feature  of  dementia,  the 
dementia patient’s declining ability to communicate with others about past 
and present events has led some authors to hypothesize an “internal loss of 
self in dementia” (Small et al., 1998: 292). According to Cohen and Eisdorfer 
(1986: 22), “the victim of Alzheimer’s disease must eventually come to terms 
with the complete loss of self”. This representation of selfhood is itself the 
legacy  of  Western  philosophy's  tendency  to  split  mind  from  body  in  a 
Cartesian fashion, and to position the former as superior to the latter. There 
are thus deep philosophical roots to the prevalent assumption that cognitive 
impairment implies a loss of selfhood. In this sense, the presumed 'existential 
erosion  of  selfhood'  with  Alzheimer's  disease  is  not  simply  the  result  of 
neuropathology, but is, to a large extent, also the consequence of a certain 
philosophical inheritance (see Kontos, 2006).  
 
In her works, Pia Kontos challenges the mind/body dualism that underlies 
the  assumed  loss  of  selfhood  in  the  current  construction  of  Alzheimer's 
disease,  endorsing  a  theoretical  framework  of  embodiment  (Kontos  2003, 
2004,  2005,  2006).  In  her  seminal  ethnographic  study  of  an  Orthodox 
Jewish  Alzheimer's  support  unit  in  Canada  (2004,  2005,  2006),  Kontos 
explores the notion of selfhood in the face of severe cognitive impairment. 
Drawing in particular on the works of Merleau-Ponty (1962), an embodied 
understanding of cognition is manifest in her perspective. Kontos approaches   6 
the body focusing on  its "concrete, spatial,  and pre-reflective  directedness 
toward the lived world" (Kontos, 2006: 203), endorsing an understanding of 
the  "active  presence  of  the  past  in  the  body  itself"  (ibid:  209).  From  this 
perspective,  contrary  to  the  medicalised  view  on  Alzheimer’s  introduced 
above, the construction of self is not reliant on language per se, but can be 
"enacted in the actual movements of the body" (ibid: 209). 
 
Furthermore,  a  focus  on  narratives  and  the  discursive  properties  of 
communication with dementia patients has identified a number of external 
influences on the preservation of ‘self’ or personhood in dementia (Kitwood & 
Bredin, 1992; Sabat & Harré, 1992; Hamilton, 2011, Ryan & Schindel Martin, 
2011). In contrast to the previously mentioned studies and their focus on the 
internal, neuropathological and neuropsychological decline, studies such as 
the one by Kitwood (1993) analyse the role of external, social-psychological 
factors  in  maintaining  personhood.  Acknowledging  assumptions  that  self-
identity  is  constituted  by  and  through  social  interaction  (Coupland  et  al., 
1993;  Mead,  1934),  these  studies  have  shown  that  the  way  other  people 
interact with a dementia patient has a significant impact on that individual’s 
sense of identity and well-being. 
 
The present study endorses this latter, interactive approach to Alzheimer’s 
disease while taking on board an embodied and distributed understanding of 
cognition that builds on the research of Pia Kontos, as well as on research 
findings  in  developmental  psychology  (see  chapter  4).  This  stance  on 
Alzheimer’s, and cognition in general, first of all, expresses and emphasizes 
the  critical  perspective  underlying  this  study’s  methodological  framework 
which is highly skeptical of the idea that social practice is merely an effect of 
structurally given forms. As part of this endeavour, this thesis therefore raises 
questions  concerning  the  dominance  of  discourse-centred  studies  on  the 
‘migrant-in-the-family’ model and with Alzheimer’s patients. In the following 
chapter, as well as in chapter 4, selected studies will be discussed to show 
that researchers have to be careful not to confuse the discursive constructs of 
reality, with the actual physical reality (see Deleuze, 1988).  
   7 
Secondly,  as  cognition  is  not  disembodied,  separate  from  perception  and 
action  (see  for  instance,  Hutchins,  1995;  Cowley  &  Love,  2006;  Barsalou, 
2008;  Cowley,  2009;  Steffensen  &  Cowley,  2010),  the  general  aim  of  this 
study is to put the focus on behavioural processes (including verbal language) 
underlying and embodying the acquisition of that type of knowledge, which 
in contemporary sociological research on the ‘migrant-in-the-family’ model is 
described as ‘emotion management’ (Hochschild, 1983; see chapter 2). In her 
seminal book The Managed Heart (1983), Hochschild studied the training, 
as  well  as  daily  routine  of  PanAm  flight  attendants.  She  focused  in  her 
analysis on the strategies flight attendants learned as part of their training, or 
developed themselves on the job, to manage their emotions in order to create 
the  feeling  expressions  (e.g.,  smiles)  that  the  employers  and  customers 
expect. Here, Hochschild borrows the terms surface acting, or feigning, and 
deep acting, or feeling,  from Erving Goffman (1959), as well as classical and 
method acting (see Krasner, 2000). Based on these two categories, she draws 
attention to the negative psychological implications of emotional dissonance, 
which  she  defines  as  the  condition  of  “maintaining  a  difference  between 
feeling and feigning” (1983: 90), respectively being not allowed to show the 
feeling expression that matches the emotion one feels (for instance, show a 
smiling face but feel angry).   
Taking  on  board  an  interactional  and  embodied  perspective,  this  thesis 
approaches  ‘emotion  management’  not  only  as  an  individual’s  cognitive 
achievement but also as distributed social practice. My goal is therefore to 
produce  an  explorative  study  that  hopes  to  contribute  to  the  discussion 
concerning  the  relative  contribution  of  individual  cognition  and  situated 
collaborative action in the observed care practices. At the centre of interest is 
the  crucial  role  of  experience  and  the  activity  of  remembering  in  doing 
‘emotion management’. This thesis therefore also problematizes the classical 
assumption that memory is an individual cognitive resource and activity. 
The first hypothesis underlying this study is thus that the recorded actions 
and  physical  signs  of  affection  potentially  give  insight  into  individual 
cognition,  as  well  as  the  situated,  distributed  organisation  of  actions. 
Participants build action by assembling a range of quite different kinds of   8 
sign  systems  in  different  media  to  build  multi-modal  contextual 
configurations (Goodwin, 2000). So, rather than being coded entirely in a 
single  semiotic  system,  i.e.,  verbal  language,  meaning  and  action  are 
constituted through the mutual elaboration of these different kinds of sign 
systems.  
 
The  second  hypothesis  underlying  this  thesis’s  data  analysis  is  that  as 
participants  co-construct  actions  and  emotions,  emotion  management 
strategies are not entirely pre-existent prior to the setup of a ‘migrant-in-the-
family’ care network, but are constant learning processes. An extract from my 
own data exemplifies this:  
 
 
“Of course, the care worker belongs to my mother like a husband! 
And this is why she certainly attends all family parties and events. 
She is a family member” (Donna, online diaries, 11/2007). 
 
1  year  later:  “Unfortunately,  in  the  meantime  9  care  workers, 
among  them  4  Polish  women  have  "run  away".  The  relationship 
between the care workers and my mother is indescribable. They are 
all annoyed, stressed and want to go home. My mother’s disease 
(Parkinson)  uncovers  viciousness  in  her,  no  one  can  cope  with. 
From my perspective, I don’t want the care workers to treat the one 
they care for like their own mother. Because I myself have reached 
the point that I no longer know what to do. We try everything to 
make her life easier, but she always finds a way to make things bad. 
My mother thinks that the care workers, my granddaughter and I 
are  100%  her  property.  Everything  has  to  be  done  the  way  she 
wants it to be done. My almost 5 year-old grandson found the right 
words  to  describe  this:  we  are  slaves”  (Donna,  online  diaries, 
11/2008). 
 
 
The literature review in chapter 2 will provide the necessary context for this 
quote,  and  in  particular  discuss  the  idea  of  innateness  that  is  anticipated 
here. The next chapter will provide evidence that a number of studies base 
their  analysis  on  this  assumption.  In  line  with  the  critical  perspective 
summarised  so  far,  this  study  rather  aims  to  gain  insight  into  a)  how   9 
participants  subjectively  describe,  b)  how  they  interactionally/ 
intersubjectively co-construct ‘emotion management’, and c) in which ways 
this  affects  their  relationships.  To  gain  knowledge  about  the  subjective 
understandings, attitudes and experiences,  as well as the interactional co-
construction of ‘emotion management’, is therefore at the centre of interest.  
 
Out of these aims three broad research questions emerge which motivate and 
guide this study: 
 
1.  How  do  the  individual  participants  describe  subjective  emotion 
management? 
2.  How are emotion management strategies embodied in interactions? 
3.  What impact do these strategies have for the manner in which  care  is 
provided  for  an  Alzheimer’s  patient  who  is  in  the  late  stages  of  the 
disease? 
 
The following chapter overview will briefly introduce the selected theories 
deemed  to  be  essential  in  order  to  contextualise  this  study’s  research 
questions,  leading  up  to  the  introduction  of  the  methods  used  for  data 
analysis and the results obtained.  
 
 
1.3. Chapter Overview 
A  review  of  existing  literature  (or  rather  texts)  in  chapter  2  will  trace 
contemporary  Discourses  on  the  ‘migrant-in-the-family’  model  in  the 
marketing and academic sphere. A look at the marketing Discourse created 
and  perpetuated  by  those  agencies  specialised  in  the  provision  of  Eastern 
European migrant care workers reveals that there are very specific images 
and definitions of the relationships and interactions in this home care model. 
Their web-based marketing commonly invokes the stereotypical Polish warm 
heart as a strategy to ‘commodify love’ (Hochschild, 1983). Polish women, 
like Eastern European women in general, are framed as helpers who are able   10 
to  make  up,  both  physically  and  emotionally,  for  absent  family  members 
because of their warm heart, their supposedly innate ability to care.  
The second part of chapter 2 traces the origins of research on the migrant-in-
the-family model that date back to 1970s and 1980s feminist sociology, in 
particular eminent studies on the devaluation of domestic work. Two recent 
studies on the migrant-in-the-family model of home eldercare (Ibarra, 2002; 
Degiuli, 2007) will then be discussed in the light of this research tradition 
and also in their specific application and understanding of Arlie Hochschild’s 
‘emotion management strategies’ (1983). As mentioned earlier, Hochschild 
proposes  the  techniques  of  surface  acting  (‘feigning  emotions’)  and  deep 
acting  (‘authentic  emotions’)  to  show  how  individuals  create  ‘appropriate’ 
feeling displays on the job and the emotional costs of doing so. Ibarra (2002) 
and Degiuli (2007), who apply this approach to research on migrant live-ins 
in home eldercare in Italy and the US, exemplify how this framework can be 
used to demonstrate the physical, as well as psychological exhaustion that 
migrant live-ins  experience. However, the  critical discussion will  highlight 
certain methodological and analytical practices which although considered 
mainstream  in  this  research  field,  are  considered  to  be  inappropriate  and 
even detrimental to this study’s research design. This chapter concludes that 
there  are  striking  similarities  between  both  Discourses.  This  concerns  the 
cognitive  architecture  set  up,  the  one-sided  representation  of  emotion 
management  in  face-to-face  interaction,  and  the  idea  of  innate  emotions 
underlying and guiding social interaction. 
Moving on from the shortcomings outlined in chapter 2, chapter 3 will look at 
the growing body of research on emotion management in work psychology. 
There is consensus to date that human beings use more than 100 strategies to 
regulate  their  own  and  other  people’s  emotions.  Emotion  management  is 
thus  considered  to  be  a  highly  interactional  enterprise.  In  spite  of  this,  a 
number  of  studies  in  psychology,  and  also  those  studies  in  sociology 
introduced in chapter 2, focus on the isolated verbal reports of individuals. 
The crucial question this chapter raises is to what extent a discursive analysis 
is at all appropriate to conduct research on emotions and cognition. 
   11 
Therefore, chapter 4 discusses different scholarly attitudes in conversation 
analysis (CA) and discursive psychology (DP) to discourse as the object of 
research in studies that aim to shed light on certain cognitive functions. We 
will see that this discussion revolves around the two paradigms, ‘cognitivist’ 
versus ‘anti-cognitivist’. This thesis, however, pursues a conciliatory path that 
will show that both positions are not necessarily in opposition to each other. 
Testing DP’s and CA’s outspoken anti-cognitivist agenda, this chapter looks 
in  its  second  half  at  selected  CA  studies  with  Alzheimer’s  patients.  This 
review  concludes  that  these  studies  share  the  same  methodological  short-
comings identified in chapter 2. In acknowledging the dominant, medicalised 
Discourse  on  Alzheimer’s,  which  regards  the  self  as  ‘unbecoming’,  these 
studies are expressions of mentalist thinking and ultimately help perpetuate 
this stigmatising image of Alzheimer’s. 
 
Chapter 5 will then have a close look at Harvey Sacks and his ideas on the 
mind since it is in particular his research that marked the beginning of what 
became  the  field  of  CA.  With  his  outspokenly  social  cognitive  stance  on 
memory and remembering, I argue that the studies presented in chapter 4 
have  very  little  in  common  with  Sacks’s  work  and  falsely  claim  to  be  his 
legacy.  In  fact,  his  lectures,  discussed  in  the  broader  context  of  early 
ethnomethodology in the fashion of Garfinkel, Goffman, and Mead, offer the 
framework  for  data  analysis  deemed  appropriate  to  test  this  study’s 
hypotheses and provide answers to the research questions. 
Chapter 6 then outlines this study’s methodology, including data collection 
methods,  transcription  and  methods  for  analysis.  Data  analysis  follows 
Harvey  Sacks’s  thoughts  on  how  participants  ‘do  remembering’.  More 
specifically the focus is on how participants ‘bring their minds to each other’ 
early  on  in  and  over  the  course  of  conversations.  This  analysis  will  be 
embedded within Harvey Sacks’s framework for story-telling and also draws 
on  research  in  cognitive  and  social  psychology  to  gain  a  deeper 
understanding of the meaning-making processes, and to argue that contrary 
to the way interactions are conceptualised in the marketing and academic 
Discourses, situated meanings are not static.    12 
Based  on  the  assumption  that  communication,  emotion  and  cognition 
depend on how activities are integrated in and across time, my analysis will 
shed  light  on  the  spectrum  of  the  participants’  frames,  schemata  and 
alignment  in  situational  meaning-construction  processes.  Schemata  are, 
however,  understood  as  ‘interactive  schemata’:  subjectively  based  on  the 
individual’s unique appraisal - however, the context in which this happens is 
interactionally  and  intersubjectively  co-constructed.  With  regard  to  the 
participants’  inter-  and  intrapersonal  aims,  the  communicational  and 
emotional  effects  of  the  individual  grounding  strategies  will  be  analysed 
through  embodied  affective  reactions,  including  (linguistic)  actions  and 
feeling expressions. Data analysis therefore draws on appraisal theories in 
psychology  that  cue  bodily  actions  and  feeling  expressions  with  internal 
feedback and coping strategies in emotion-generation processes. This toolkit 
should allow for a heuristic analysis of the possible causes for an emotion and 
its interrelation with the expressive reactions observed as actions unfold.  
The purpose of chapter 7 is to understand the development of the emotion-
related  emergence  of  specific  care  practices.  In  order  to  examine  these 
activities, my analysis connects the perspective of subjective experience and 
beliefs to the shared activity of feeding Wilma dinner. The first step of data 
analysis will discuss the recorded interactions in the light of the interviews 
conducted  prior  to  the  observation  where  participants  reported  how  they 
consciously frame their situation. Wilma’s daughter Gudrun claimed that her 
experience of Wilma’s stay at a psychiatric unit is engrained in the strategy to 
treat her mother in a ‘loving and calm way’. The Polish live-in Elisabeta, by 
contrast,  consciously  manages  interactions  with  regard  to  her  work 
experience  as  a  nurse.  Borrowing  the  concept  of  affective  coherence 
(Centerbar et al., 2008) from psychology, analysis in this chapter will show 
that the strategies both women were reported to use allow for conclusions on 
the  extent  to  which  their  actions  are  specific  to  their  own  goals  and  the 
overall aim to achieve intrapersonal coherence. Hence, considering frames 
and  schemata  as  mental  representations  of  experiences,  the  analysis  will 
show  that  participants’  schema-consistent  actions  can  achieve  affective 
coherence regarding the individual’s goals. However, this can, as a side effect, 
provoke  a  relationship  mismatch.  Consequently,  it  is  argued  that  schema-  13 
related  feeling  displays  of  internal  emotion  management  simultaneously 
affect negotiations of status and positions within the relationship. This way, 
participants’  conflicting  frames  concerning  the  home  care  situation 
potentially explain dysfunctional communication in terms of overall aims and 
the  setup  of  Wilma’s  care.  Yet,  the  analysis  will  show  that  the  frames 
participants  apply  are  subject  to  an  on-going  adaptive  learning  process. 
While discussing the spectrum of an individual’s own-goal-related actions, 
this chapter provides at the same time evidence that emotion management 
takes  place  within  a  participation  framework  and  is  distributed  among 
participants.   
 
Building on the findings of chapter 7, chapter 8 further pursues a distributed 
understanding of emotion management. Chapter 8, first of all, focuses on the 
relevance of internal feedback which is discussed in chapter 7 in the light of 
conscious  achievement  of  intrapersonal  affective  coherence.  Presenting 
interactions between Wilma and one nursing service employee (Edeltraud), I 
argue that that there is a clash between Edeltraud’s proclaimed motivation 
and her internal feedback. Using Edeltraud’s story about the day she had to 
take Wilma to the podiatrist as a ‘compass’ to understand how she perceives 
the present situation, an analysis in line with Dalgleish and Power’s emotion 
appraisal model (2007) will reveal that her subsequent actions are grounded 
in and significantly affected by fear appraisal. In particular, analysis in this 
chapter will argue that Edeltraud’s attention is fixed on specific, partly highly 
personal fear-inducing cues and thus narrowed in such way that she not only 
misses out on Wilma’s actions which clearly signal that she is also scared, but 
reacts in a way that potentially borders on violent behaviour once the conflict 
between the two women peaks.  
 
Focussing on Wilma’s position in Edeltraud’s story, we learn that the feeling 
of fear on that day at the podiatrist’s was mutual. With the two women facing 
each other while Edeltraud narrates how she recalls this specific day, Wilma’s 
reactions to the linguistic and visible cues Edeltraud provides, and vice versa, 
build up a set of cues which analysis in this chapter cautiously treats as the 
set of cues of their shared embodied fear appraisal. As the interaction that 
follows the conclusion of the story unfolds, the analysis hence draws on the   14 
meaning attached to these cues by participants themselves. This way analysis 
suggests that the two women co-construct the highly emotional and stressful 
conflict that occurs within minutes after Edeltraud finished her story as a re-
enactment of their shared fear appraisal. Although Wilma’s possibilities for 
speech are limited, she demonstrates through her visible bodily participation 
an on-going analysis of the emotionally charged context changes in the events 
she  is  engaged  in.  Therefore,  this  chapter  also  provides  evidence  that 
challenge  the  dominant  Discourse’s  construction  of  total  memory  loss  in 
Alzheimer’s patients. 
 
Chapter  9  discusses  findings  and  offer  conclusions  concerning  potential 
future research, as well as methodological issues which arise from distributed 
thinking - the perspective that forms this thesis’s backbone.  
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2 
 
Love is just a four-letter word7 
The migrant-in-the-family model in marketing 
and academic Discourses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A brief analysis of contemporary semiotic representations of the migrant-in-
the-family  model  of  home  eldercare  in  the  German  marketing  Discourse 
forms the first part of this chapter. Focussing on the two leading employment 
agencies in Germany, analysis will carve out how their web-based marketing 
relates  to  the  political-economic  and  socio-cultural  context  in  Germany 
sketched  out  in  the  previous  chapter.  A  closer  look  at  the  commercial 
strategies of two distinct Internet employment agencies will then not only 
shed  light  on  specific  cultural  aspects,  but  will  also  reveal  more  general 
statements which this Discourse makes about human interaction. The second 
part of this chapter will then present existing research on the migrant-in-the-
                                                 
7 Parts of this chapter have been published in Engfer (2009, 2011).     16 
family model and is organised in the following way. First, a short overview of 
the  dominant  research  strands  and  historical  development  shall  form  the 
introduction. Evolving out of this overview, this chapter focuses specifically 
on Arlie Hochschild’s notion of emotional labour and her framework for the 
analysis of ‘emotion management’. This will then be followed by a critical discussion 
of two studies that adopt Hochschild’s framework for the study of care practices migrant live-
ins develop in home eldercare. This chapter concludes that despite the fact, that 
care  work  is  considered  to  be  ‘interactive  in  nature’  (Timonen  &  Doyle, 
2009), an interactional perspective is notably missing. Acknowledging that 
this  study  is  in  particular  interested  in  interactions  with  an  Alzheimer’s 
patient, situating this study within the existing research is difficult because 
this thesis’s critical perspective is incompatible with the methodology of the 
studies presented in this chapter, and more importantly with the cognitive 
architecture they imply.  
 
 
 
 
2.1. The migrant-in-the-family model in the marketing  
        Discourse 
 
A look at the marketing Discourse created and perpetuated by those agencies 
specialised  in  the  provision  of  Eastern  European  migrant  care  workers 
reveals that there are very specific images and definitions of the relationships 
and interactions in this home care model. As we will see further down, their 
web-based marketing commonly invokes the stereotypical Polish warm heart 
as  a  strategy  to  ‘commodify  love’  (Hochschild,  1983).  Polish  women,  like 
Eastern European women in general, are framed as helpers who are able to 
make  up,  both  physically  and  emotionally,  for  absent  family  members 
because of their warm heart, their supposedly innate ability to care. Thus, 
according to the agency seniocare24,  
 
‘[t]he ability to care runs  in their blood. They are warm-hearted and loving. 
They care for the elderly person in the same way a family member would do – 
24 hours each day. Besides, they are much cheaper than nursing homes.’    17 
 
In traditional marketing research a large number of publications is dedicated 
to  the  multimodal  affordances  of  websites  in  emotion  marketing 
(O’Shaughnessy & O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Robinette, Lenz, Brand, 2000), and 
the textualisation of emotion in advertising language (Haig, 2001; Janoschka, 
2004). At the centre of interest is to study how people design, but also how 
potential customers interpret the resulting semiotic systems, and how this 
process is shaped by ideological and social interests (see for instance, Hodge 
& Kress, 1988).  
 
Links can thus be made between the branding decisions and the political and 
cultural Discourse on home care. As we have seen earlier, the sign-making 
process  in  Germany  is  embedded  in  a  specific  culture  that  highly  values 
familial  care.  Therefore,  the  selected  forms  and  symbols  will  express  the 
social meanings specific to this particular culture. At the same time, we have 
to keep in mind that they are chosen and arranged for their potential to mean 
by a web designer. However, the visitor’s interest determines where he or she 
wishes to enter the page. The same applies to the ‘reading path’ which the 
visitor  wishes  to  construct.  Thus,  the  designers  of  websites  cannot  be 
considered ‘authors’ of a fixed text. Rather, they are providers of material 
arranged in relation to the assumed characteristics of the imagined audience. 
As Hodge & Kress (1988) state, “[e]ach producer of a message relies on its 
recipients for it to function as intended” (1988: 4). For the visitor, however, 
“information is material which is selected by individuals to be transformed by 
them into knowledge  to solve a problem  in their life-world” (Böck, 2004: 
281).  
 
Since the websites are usually the first point of contact with the agencies, it is 
assumed that potential clients will make their ‘purchase’ decision to a certain 
extent on the basis of their impression. It has been found that in particular an 
emotional connection on the part of the consumer with a particular product 
or service has several implications: it can  stimulate buying interest,  guide 
choices,  arouse  buying  intentions,  and  influence  future  buying  decisions 
(O’Shaughnessy  &  O’Shaughnessy,  2003).  Emotions  have  thus  been 
identified as a major catalyst in the consumer decision-making process.    18 
 
I  will  therefore  predominantly  focus  on  the  nonverbal  and  linguistic 
emotional  cues  we  can  find  on  the  following  two  screenshots  (taken  on 
17.10.2008) of the two leading agencies’ websites: Seniocare24 (Fig. 1) and 
GKT-Serwis (Fig 2): 
 
 
Fig. 1 
 
 
Fig. 2 
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Both  agencies  provide  very  similar  information  on  their  websites,  ranging 
from  currency  converters  to  addresses  of  local  nursing  services  they 
cooperate with. However, we will see in the following that they frame their 
services in two very distinct ways. On both websites two specific pictures are 
likely to catch a visitor’s attention upon first visiting it. Analysing these in 
terms of presumed entry points, both websites immediately employ specific 
local, as well as universal cultural symbolisms. Whereas the use of a universal 
icon (red heart) on seniocare.de is potentially tailored to German clients’, as 
well as Eastern European caregivers’ concerns, the uniform yellow t-shirts we 
can see on GKT-Serwis’s website fulfil the double function of appealing to 
local cultural depictions of nursing service employees in Germany, while at 
the  same  time  exploiting  this  dress  code’s  universal  semiotic  meaning 
potential  framing  these  women  as  nurses,  or  medically  trained  staff  in 
general. This is further supported by the strip of four images underneath the 
banner to which I will come back further down. Focusing exclusively on the 
images so far, it can be concluded that GKT-Serwis’s website conforms with, 
and  supports,  existing  cultural  concepts  of  home  care,  hence  achieving 
‘cultural  congruity’,  which  Williamson  (1994)  lists  as  one  of  the  most 
successful strategies commercial websites employ.   
 
Considering  these  two  websites  in  the  light  of  the  ‘care  crisis’  Discourse 
introduced in the previous chapter, the strip of images placed underneath 
GKT-Serwis’s  banner  gives  insight  into  the detailed  shaping  of  home  care 
practices.  Based  upon  the  initial  framing  of  their  employees  as  medically 
trained care workers, the four pictures provide the corresponding semiotic 
practices. We can see the same person performing a number of recognisable 
tasks, i.e. feeding, or cleaning a frail person. For the time being, I want to 
highlight  here  that  on  GKT-Serwis’s  website  we  learn  about  very  specific 
tasks immanent to homecare, and which potentially require medical training. 
In  the  following  we  will  see  that  a  very  decisive  part  of  both  websites’ 
marketing is ‘outsourced’; both agencies heavily rely on the national printing 
press  and  television  to  not  only  disseminate,  but  to  supplement  their 
individual  framing  strategies.  However,  before  I  come  to  this  we  need  to 
analyse seniocare’s marketing strategy.    20 
So far, I have stressed that this agency does not employ local symbolism. It 
can also be stated, at least at first glance, that the chosen universal symbol, 
the heart, does not immediately evoke the kind of associations that situate the 
text within a specific national Discourse. Rather, the symbol of a heart only 
unfolds its specific meaning in combination with the written text which is 
provided right next to the image. Here, the agency owner herself confronts 
the visitor with a hypothetical question, asking what happens in old age when 
one can no longer do all of the things one used to be able to do. In contrast to 
GKT-Serwis, where the attention is drawn to specific tasks one may need help 
with, the personalised text on seniocare starts a discussion about values. We 
learn that in old age individuals still want to be treated in a respectful and 
loving way. According to the agency, these values can be translated into care 
practices,  namely  the  way  family  members  care  for  each  other.  Having 
established  this  context,  it  is  here  that  we  can  find  the  above-mentioned 
quote,  
 
‘[t]he ability to care runs  in their blood. They are warm-hearted and loving. 
They care for the elderly person in the same way a family member would do – 
24 hours each day. Besides, they are much cheaper than nursing homes.’  
 
We can see that both marketing strategies - live-in replaces kin and live-in is 
skilled nurse - are interdiscursively connected with the national ‘care crisis’ 
Discourse.  The  previous  chapter  established  that  the  preferred  form  of 
eldercare  in  Germany  is  familial  care.  This  is  not  only  reflected  in  the 
numbers of people cared for at home, but also in the design of the national 
long-term care  insurance system. At the same time, a growing number of 
people in their ‘Fourth Age’ are cared for at home. Therefore, professional 
assistance is potentially crucial in order to realise, or keep up this form of 
care arrangement. However, 24h care provided by local nursing services is 
considered expensive. 
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2.1.1. The migrant-in-the-family model in the media Discourse 
 
An examination of media representations of the migrant-in-the-family model 
will further elaborate the two strategies, as a high number of articles and TV 
shows are created with the help of the agencies, and are also disseminated via 
their websites. Thus, both websites have an archive of press material. As with 
the layout of the websites, the articles one can find on seniocare.de and GTK-
Serwis are very similarly structured. However, since the agencies are involved 
in the creation, subtle details do reflect the two different framing strategies 
outlined above. Also, the newspaper and magazine articles usually provide 
basic  information  about  the  legal  situation,  the  services,  and  the  contact 
details of the respective agency. In general, articles reporting on the-migrant-
in-the-family model are personal accounts of either live-ins or the German 
family members, and very rarely one can also find the voices of those cared-
for. Accordingly, the headlines are: “Beata is mom’s sunshine – and I can also 
afford her” (“Beata ist Mamas Sonnenschein – und ich kann sie mir auch 
leisten”, Lisa (34) 2007), “Without Grazyna mummy would have to live in a 
nursing  home“  (“Ohne  Grazyna  müsste  Mutti  ins  Heim”,  Superillu  (46) 
2007), or “Without Ivona we would have to live in a nursing home” (“Ohne 
Ivona müssen wir ins Heim”, BILD 13.9. 2007).   
 
Keeping  in  mind  the  distinctive  way  the  agencies  frame  their  employees 
either as fictive kin or nurses on their websites, two images shall briefly be 
analysed with regard to their complementary effect and role in the complex 
marketing machine. Fig.3 is featured on seniocare.de, Fig.4 refers the reader 
to GTK-Serwis: 
 
Fig. 3 
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Fig. 4 
 
First,  I  will  look  at  the  role  of  those  individuals  whose  voices  are 
predominantly featured in these articles  – German family members – but 
who are notably absent on the websites. Whereas seniocare indirectly refers 
to  them,  framing  in  particular  the  Polish  care  workers  as  fictive  kin  or  a 
replacement for absent family members, on GTK-Serwis’s website (Fig. 2) we 
can find a picture that is very similar to Fig. 4, only that the woman on the 
right, presumably the daughter, is missing. A potential reader can therefore 
conclude, reading the article online in the context of this website, that the 
woman on the left is a migrant care worker because she is wearing the same 
typical yellow t-shirt we can see in the banner.   
 
In the following, I will propose a very basic analysis of the composition of the 
two images, which shall serve the following purpose. Having established the 
two distinct marketing strategies, I argue that the images not only support 
the  framing  one  can  find  on  the  respective  websites,  but  make  actual 
statements about the social interactions in this homecare model. Fig.3 can be 
found on seniocare.de who frame their employees as fictive kin. Focussing on 
the composition of the three bodies in this picture, certain strategies evoke a 
perceived synchrony. This is, first of all, achieved through similar clothing 
and age of the two younger women. Only because of the fact that the one in 
the middle helps the elderly person, one can guess that she is the migrant 
care worker.  
 
Secondly, synchrony is expressed in the way vertical and horizontal lines are 
arranged in this  image (for instance both women stretching forward their 
hands). The window in the back further enhances this impression, providing   23 
a ‘solid frame’ with the care worker in the middle, linking the daughter to her 
mother. In contrast to this composition, the daughter in Fig. 4 is literally 
closer  to  her  mother  than  the  care  worker.  Here,  the  daughter  is  actively 
involved in caring for her mother, in contrast to Fig. 3 where we can see the 
daughter patting her dog instead. Furthermore, the care worker in Fig. 4 is 
only  assisting  the  daughter,  which  resembles  more  the  role  of  a  nursing 
service employee than a family member. Also, a hierarchy is implied. There is 
a striking difference in the images when it comes to portraying the frailty of 
those in need of care. Whilst the elderly woman in Fig. 3 seems to need very 
little  help,  the  woman  on  the  right  seems  to  need  a  lot  more,  and  also 
professional help, which according to the statistics quoted  earlier, is  a lot 
closer to reality. 
 
The  analytical  step  I  propose  is  that  one  can  see  here  the  interrelation 
between the schemata the symbols on both websites activate, and what is 
assumed  to  be  real-life  everyday  interaction  in  a  migrant-in-the-family 
household. While supporting the individual strategies of the agencies, these 
articles also validate and confirm the expectations raised with regard to how 
the care workers are framed.  GTK-Serwis’s employees not only differ from 
kin in the nurse-like uniforms they are wearing, but they also do what nurses 
do. Thus, in combining the web marketing with Fig.4, GTK-Serwis promises 
coherence among topographically different behaviours: someone who is good 
at feeding the person is also good at cleaning them, for instance. Seniocare, 
on  the  other,  framing  their  employees  as  fictive  kin,  alludes  to  coherence 
among semantically different traits: someone who is ‘warm-hearted’ is also 
patient, for instance. These sorts of conclusions one can arrive at about the 
situational behaviours of individuals based on specific traits are common in 
personality  psychology,  a  subdiscipline  of  social  psychology  –  or  rather  I 
should say before the late 1960s. 
 
In the 1960s, there was a shift away from a concern for identifying a set of 
fixed personality traits, or motivational dispositions, toward a concern for 
behavioural contexts and cognitive processes. In particular, Walter Mischel 
was  responsible  for  a  paradigm  crisis  in  personality  psychology.  He 
challenged  the  assumption,  so  prevalent  in  Western  psychology,  that   24 
personality  dispositions,  or  traits,  are  relatively  stable,  highly  consistent 
attributes that exert widely generalised causal effects on behaviour. Rather, 
he came to the conclusion that the data he compared in his extensive review 
(1968) simply do not support the hypothesis that individuals exhibit marked 
cross-situational consistencies in behaviour. Mischel asserted that the notion 
of ‘typical’ behaviour has lead psychometricians and trait theorists to view 
situational variability as a form of error. He advocated a situational view of 
dynamics, which “rather than being exclusively intra-psychic, focuses on the 
relations between behaviour and the conditions in which it occurs, and on 
how an individual’s behaviour in any one condition is functionally related to 
what he does on another occasion” (1968: 198).  
 
Hence,  a  psychodynamic  view  on  personality  variables  as  the  main 
determinants  of  behaviour  is  no  longer  sufficient.  Rather,  situationist 
research also aims at understanding behavioural reactions to various kinds 
and intensities of external stimulation. Accordingly, one of the outcomes of 
the so-called ‘person v. situation debate’ in psychology led to the Doctrine of 
Reciprocal  Determination  (Bandura,  1978).  This  social  cognitive  view  on 
personality  states  that  the  person,  the  environment,  and  the  behaviour 
constitute a dynamic system in which each element is both a cause and an 
effect  of  the  others  (triadic  reciprocality).  If  everything  is  a  cause  and  an 
effect,  sometimes  simultaneous,  sometimes  unfolding  over  time,  Bandura 
makes  a  strong  point  that  an  analytic  decomposition  of  this  reciprocal 
determination that exclusively considers a unidirectional connection between 
person and behaviour is hardly able to explain the complexity of everyday 
social interaction.  
 
This  paradigm  shift  has  also  impacted  on  theories  about  adaptive  and 
learning processes. In framing migrant live-ins as ‘warm-hearted’, or fictive 
kin,  one  of  the  pitfalls  is  that  analysis  of  adaptive,  or  learned  behaviour 
(which is at the centre of interest in modern live-in research and analysed in 
terms of ‘emotion management’, as we will see in the following) that focuses 
on  one  particular  trait  which  is  ascribed  cross-situational  consistency 
potentially ignores subtle differences in behaviour and situations. 
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In terms of data analysis, mapping discourse objects (e.g.,‘warm-hearted’) to 
emotional  experience  (e.g.,  ‘replace  absent  family  members’,  ‘innate  love’) 
has to be carefully tested, as it potentially performs the very same step. We 
will see in the following, however, that this has to be considered mainstream 
practice in modern research on migrant live-ins.  
 
 
 
 
2.2. Name it and claim it - The migrant-in-the-family model in  
         academic Discourse 
 
As  already  mentioned  in  the  previous  chapter,  a  number  of  German 
sociologists  have  contributed  research  on  migrant  domestic  workers  in 
Germany,  predominantly  with  regard  to  changes  in  informal  work  and 
networks  (Irek,  1998;  Alt,  2003;  Pfau-Effinger,  2005;  Mischke,  2008; 
Tießler-Marenda,  2002;  Rüßler,  2007),  the  legal  status  of  evolving  new 
networks (see Karakayali, 2010 for a focus on web-based agencies; Weinkopf, 
2006), the feminisation of migration (Koser, Lutz, Koser, 1998), and the New 
Maid as a challenge to gender studies (Lutz, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Lutz & 
Lenz, 2002; Lutz & Koser, 1998; Odierna, 2000). However, a general lack of 
research  on  migrant  live-ins  in  German  home  eldercare  has  been  stated 
(Lutz, 2007; Karakayali, 2010).  
 
Within  the  wider,  international  scope,  there  exist  a  small  but  growing 
number  of  studies  on  the  migrant-in-the-family-model  of  home  eldercare 
(Degiuli, 2007; Glucksmann & Lyon, 2006; Himmelweit, 1999; Ibarra, 2002; 
Lan  2001).  These  studies  build  upon  research  on  the  ‘commodification  of 
love’  (Hochschild,  1983,  2005;  Hochschild  &  Ehrenreich,  2002;  Parreñas, 
2001, 2005) which is rooted in Feminist research of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Rejecting the prevalent understanding which embedded domestic and care 
work within a Discourse that viewed it as ‘labour of love’ (Ungerson, 1984), it 
was argued that a rethinking of domestic and care work is needed that goes 
beyond  the  normative  gendered  label  ‘labour  of  love’.  Apart  from  the 
gendered  nature  of  the  concept,  attention  was  also  drawn  to  the  power   26 
dynamic  engraved  in  the  normative  categorisation,  which  “overstates  the 
subordination of the carer to the needs of the care recipient” (Leira, 1994: 
189). Ungerson therefore suggested splitting the concept of  care into two: 
care understood as paid work and care understood as feeling (see Ungerson, 
1984,  2005).  Hence,  the  meaning  of  care  was  deconstructed  in  order  to 
theoretically grasp the increasing ‘commodification of care’ (Ungerson, 1997; 
Hochschild, 1983).  
 
As  logical  as  this  development  may  sound,  I  cautiously  argue  that  the 
research field’s admirable political appeal and agenda potentially interferes, 
or  guides  data  analysis  in  a  way  that  is  not  unlike  the  above-outlined 
marketing strategies. In their seminal work Global woman (2002), pioneers 
Ehrenreich and Hochschild provide a definition of ‘global care chains’: “[T]he 
wealthy  parts  of  the  world  are  running  short  on  precious  emotional  and 
sexual resources and have had to turn to poorer regions for fresh supplies” 
(ibid.:  4; see  also Yeates, 2004 for a  critical reflection). They explain this 
shortage stating that “women in Western countries have increasingly taken 
on  paid  work,  and  hence  need  other  –  paid  domestics  and  caretakers  for 
children and elderly people – to replace them” (ibid.: 7, emphasis added).  
 
Whereas one might argue that the phrase ‘to replace them’ literally refers to 
the gaps working mothers have created, a look at one of Hochschild’s data 
analyses reveals how she contextualises this expression. In her essay  Love 
and Gold (2002a), Hochschild quotes nanny Rowena who says: “I give Noa 
what I can’t give to my children. (…) She makes me feel like a mother” (ibid: 
16). In her interpretation Hochschild then labels the emotion expressed as 
“real maternal affection” (ibid: 16), portraying Rowena’s story as one of many 
examples  of  what  she  calls  the  ‘global  heart  transplant’.  Arlie  Hochschild 
concludes that Rowena feels ‘real maternal affection’ because she stated that 
the  US  American  child  she  cares  for  makes  her  ‘feel  like  a  mother’.  In 
performing the analytical step to conclude that Rowena feels ‘real maternal 
love’ because she says her employer’s child makes her feel like a mother, we 
find here the very same tapping of emotions to verbal reports that we have 
encountered in the marketing Discourse. In chapter 4, we will see that the 
question  concerning  the  implications  of  this  analytical  step  is  a  ‘bone  of   27 
contention’ that is not only discussed across disciplinary boundaries, but also 
divides whole disciplines. 
 
One can derive from Hochschild’s interview with nanny Rowena that kinship 
terms play a crucial role in the analytical process. It can be argued that these 
have  been  systematically  established  as  one  of  the  main  markers  of 
exploitation, following the line of argumentation that “the ‘part of the family’ 
rhetoric  obscures  (…)  that  relations  in  paid  care  are  (…)  asymmetrical” 
(Anderson, 2000: 123). Anderson further elaborates that “while the worker is 
expected  to  have  familial  interest  in  the  employing  families,  this  is  not 
reciprocated” (ibid: 123). This tradition possibly explains the high number of 
studies  that  frame  migrant  care  workers  as  fictive  kin.  Fictive  kin  are 
understood to be those “who provide care like family and do what family does 
(…) the labour of kin with its attendant affection, rights, and obligations” 
(Karner,  1998:  70).  However,  with  regard  to  Hochschild’s  analysis  of  her 
interview with Rowena, it should become apparent that there is a danger of 
analysing caregivers’ performances as internalised gendered expectations of 
familial care as a matter of obligation and love - hence reinforcing what this 
research  field  set  out  to  deconstruct  in  the  first  place:  a  normative 
understanding of ‘care’ understood as ‘labour of love’.  
 
Glucksmann & Lyon (2006) have already drawn attention to the dominance 
of research that focuses on the cultural representation of emotion in Western 
(European) home eldercare. They conclude that “ m uch of the Labour of 
care is performed by a relative stranger in a cultural context which prizes 
kinship in care. This might help explain the widespread depictions of fictive 
familial  ties  and  the  caring  qualities  of  the  migrant  women  themselves” 
(2006: 64). There is a certain ambiguity, however, as to who uses the label 
fictive  kin.  In  Hondagneu-Sotelo  (2001),  for  instance,  we  can  find  the 
suggestion  that  apart  from  organising  themselves  politically,  domestic 
workers need to start thinking of themselves as just that –workers – instead 
of  ‘one  of  the  family’.  Hence,  according  to  her  it  is  the  care  workers 
themselves who use this label. On the other hand, Lan (2001) argues that “we 
should recognize the social values of paid care work and improve institutional 
regulations on the working conditions of migrant workers. Thereby, personal   28 
meanings and emotional ties can be achieved in the relationships between 
care recipients and providers without reproducing a family-like oppression 
upon these fictive kin workers” (ibid: 24). In this study we can see that Lan 
shifts  the  focus  on  the  care  recipients  and  their  families,  arguing  that  a 
‘family-like oppression’ is created by them. 
 
Leaving the term ‘fictive kinship’ aside, for the moment, I want to address a 
second method which is commonly found in studies on the migrant-in-the-
family  model  and  which  also  touches  upon  the  idea  of  innate  emotions. 
Again, Arlie Hochschild is the eminent figure who provided a framework in 
her seminal book The Managed Heart (1983) for the purpose of analysing 
how  difficult  and  demanding  social  interactions  are  managed  by  the 
individual. Based on her analysis of the strategies PanAm flight attendants 
were  trained  in,  or  developed  themselves  on  the  job,  she  proposed  two 
categories of ‘emotion management’: surface acting, or feigning, and deep 
acting,  or  feeling.  In  particular  the  practice  of  feigning  emotions  over  a 
certain period of time motivated her to consider the negative psychological 
implications  of  emotional  dissonance;  the  condition  of  “maintaining  a 
difference between feeling and feigning” (1983: 90).  
 
Before we look at two selected case studies that apply Hochschild’s emotion 
management model to the migrant-in-the-family model of home eldercare, a 
deeper understanding of the framework’s theoretical foundation is crucial. 
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2.3. Hochschild’s concept of ‘emotion management’ 
 
In The commerzialisation of intimate life (2002b), Arlie Hochschild outlines 
the relationship between sociology and emotion studies in her quest for the 
‘sentient self’: “We need a third image – that of the sentient self, a self that is 
capable of feelings and aware of being so” (ibid: 78). She argues that a focus 
on  conscious  thinking,  as  with  Goffman,  and  a  focus  on  unconscious 
prompting, as with Freud and Slater, “allow conscious feeling to fall into a 
no-man’s land in between” (ibid: 78). Criticising the practice in sociology of 
distinguishing  between  different  emotional  states  with  the  help  of  the 
emotional vocabulary at hand, she concludes that researchers thereby ignore 
the informant’s own codification of feeling, and thus eliminate what is social 
about emotion:  
 
“If we want to pretend we know what the actor’s emotion “really is” (e.g., 
“It’s  really  depression”)  and  call  what  a  person  thinks  it  is  “bias”  (“I’m 
tired”),  then  part  of  our  intellectual  domain  must  still  be  precisely  this 
“bias.” For in ridding ourselves of the actor’s own codification of feeling, and 
of his or her ignorance or linguistic habits, we rid ourselves of part of what is 
social about emotion” (ibid: 78).  
 
She  suggests  to  start  instead  with  the  idea  of  a  self,  capable  of  feeling,  a 
sentient self, and then to take an interest in a person’s own definition of his 
or her feeling. We can learn from this how the individual uses an emotion 
vocabulary and “what social situations or rules call feelings forth or tuck them 
under” (ibid: 78). 
  
Turning her attention from language to feeling expressions she unfolds the 
tenets  of  her  theory  on  ‘emotion  management’.  Hochschild  argues  that 
feeling  expressions  develop  and  occur  in  normative  contexts.  Through 
mapping a rule to a feeling, or expression, we can therefore judge whether an 
expression is true or false:  
 
“We  can  see  emotional  expressions  as  a  medium  of  exchange.  The 
translation between expression and experience can be seen as analogous to 
the  translation  between  a  paper  dollar  bill  and  what  it  symbolizes.  Like   30 
paper money, many smiles and frowns are in circulation. They are symbolic 
with reference to certain taken-for-granted agreements as to which gesture 
goes with which meaning in which context. Like money, expressions work 
on a basis of trust that this expression (e.g., a clenched fist) corresponds to 
that range of inner experience (e.g., anger, exuberant bravado). So our trust 
in  a  gesture  rests  on  a  public  trust  in  the  general  validity  of  such 
expressions, their general link to inner experience” (ibid:83). 
 
In her next step she confronts the conscious actor in Goffman’s work with her 
argument so far. Hochschild criticises that the characters in Goffman’s books 
actively  manage  outer  impressions  but  they  do  not  actively  manage  inner 
feelings. She perceives this as a short-coming and argues that the reason can 
be found in Goffman’s concept of acting: “Goffman suggests that we spend a 
good deal of effort managing impressions – that is, acting. But he talks about 
only one sort of acting – the direct management of behavioural expression” 
(ibid:  92).  Hochschild’s  crucial  observation  is  that  Goffman’s  illustrations 
actually point to two types of ‘acting’: “the direct management of behavioural 
expression (e.g., the given-off sigh, the shoulder shrug), and the management 
of feeling from which expression can follow (e.g., the thought of a hopeless 
project)” (ibid).  
 
She uses the examples of two different actors playing the part of King Lear to 
exemplify  what  she  means.  According  to  Hochschild  the  one  actor  who 
represents the ‘English school of acting’ will focus on the outward demeanor. 
Whereas the other who follows the ‘American school’, or ‘Method acting’, will 
guide his memories and feelings in such a way as to elicit the corresponding 
expressions (ibid: 92). She calls the first technique surface acting and the 
latter  deep  acting.  Coming  back  to  Goffman,  she  states  that  he  fails  to 
distinguish the first from the second, and obscures the importance of deep 
acting. However, “when this is obscured we are left with the impression that 
social factors pervade only the “social skin,” the tried-for outer appearances 
of the individual. We are left underestimating the power of social forces on 
our inner grip of ourselves” (ibid: 92; emphasis in the original). 
 
Essentially, to Hochschild a focus on emotion management fosters attention 
on how people try to feel, not, as for Goffman, on how people try to appear to   31 
feel. It is crucial to point out that Hochschild highlights that this is about how 
people consciously feel and not, as for Freud, how people feel unconsciously 
(see 2002: 94). Accordingly, she stresses the “alternate theoretical junctures” 
(ibid)  that  an  interactive  account  of  emotions  points  to:  “between 
consciousness of feeling and consciousness of feeling rules, between feeling 
rules and emotion work, between feeling rules and social structure” (ibid). 
The  term  “emotion  work”  means  the  act  of  trying  to  change  in  degree  or 
quality an emotion or feeling and is used synonymously with “to manage” an 
emotion  (ibid).  Hochschild  gives  the  following  examples  she  found  in  her 
explanatory  study  and  characterised  as  emotion  work:   “I  psyched  myself 
up… I squashed my anger down … I tried hard not to feel disappointed… I 
made myself have a good time … I tried to feel grateful … I killed the hope I 
had burning.” (ibid: 95). Outlining next the different techniques of emotion 
work, she stresses first that emotion work “can be done by the self upon the 
self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself” (ibid: 96).  
 
Concerning  the  specific  techniques,  she  distinguishes  between  a  cognitive 
and a bodily one. Whereas the first attempts to “change images, ideas, or 
thoughts in the service of changing the feelings associated with them”(ibid: 
96), the latter is the “attempt to change somatic or other physical symptoms 
of emotion (e.g., trying to breathe slower, trying not to shake) (ibid: 96)”. As 
a third one, she adds expressive emotion work which she describes as “trying 
to change expressive gestures in the service of changing inner feeling (e.g., 
trying to smile or cry)” (ibid). Here, Hochschild applies her knowledge of 
Method acting, as this differs from simple display in that it is directed toward 
a change in feeling. According to her, all three strategies often go together in 
practice (ibid). 
 
Before concluding this section, it is important to define ‘feeling rules’ to fully 
understand Hochschild’s framework. Feeling rules are the “rights and duties 
[which] set out the proprieties as to the extent (one can feel “too” angry or 
“not angry enough”), the direction (one can feel sad when one should feel 
happy), and the duration of a feeling, given the situation against which it is 
set.  These  rights  and  duties  of  feeling  are  a  clue  to  the  depth  of  social 
convention, to one final reach of social control” (ibid: 97; emphasis in the   32 
original).  This  means  that,  once  agreed  upon,  feeling  rules  “establish  the 
worth of a gesture and are thus used in social exchange to measure the worth 
of emotional gestures” (ibid: 100). It follows that based on “framing rules” 
(ibid: 99) which are the rules according to which we ascribe definitions or 
meanings to situations, Hochschild argues  that it depends on an individual’s 
motivation (“what I want to feel”) to mediate between feeling rule (“what I 
should feel”) and emotion work (“what I try to feel”) (ibid: 98). 
 
Feeling rules, however, are subject to change. To exemplify this, Hochschild 
gives the following example of two mothers who feel guilty because they give 
their small child into day care while working: “One mother, a feminist, may 
feel that she should not feel as guilty as she does. The second, a traditionalist, 
may feel that she should feel more guilty than she does. Part of what we refer 
to as the psychological effects of “rapid social change,” or unrest, is a change 
in the relation of feeling rule to feeling and a lack of clarity about what the 
rule  actually  is,  owing  to  conflicts  and  contradictions  between  contending 
rules  and  between  rules  and  feelings.  (…)  Not  simply  the  evocation  of 
emotion but the rules governing it become the objects of political struggle” 
(ibid: 100). 
 
In  adding  the  empirical  study  on  PanAm  flight  attendants’  emotion 
management  strategies  to  her  theoretical  work,  Hochschild’s  findings 
indicate that emotional labour jobs reduce emotions to objects of commercial 
exchange,  since  workers  are  required  to  work  on  their  own  emotions  to 
produce  an  emotional  state  in  another.  The  predominant  understanding 
derived from her results is that as a consequence workers lose right of and 
suppress their authentic feelings. However, as Hochschild provides a detailed 
account of the situation-specific feeling displays PanAm demands from its 
employees, it becomes apparent that authentic feeling is defined relative to 
the  ‘feeling  rules’  which  are  shaped  by  and  shape  the  script  a  customer 
presumably has for ‘travelling on an airplane’.  
 
Coming  back  to  the  context  of  home  eldercare,  Himmelweit  argues  that 
“[s]pecific techniques, such as those described by Hochschild (1983) in the 
training  of  flight  attendants,  may  be  needed  to  engender  the  appropriate   33 
emotions when emotional labour is performed for strangers. However, where 
a continuing relationship is set up, as is usually the case for caring labour, its 
own development may be all that is needed to generate the appropriate ties” 
(1999:  10).  It  has  been  shown  earlier  in  this  chapter  that  a  similar 
understanding seems to underlie those studies that map the migrant live-ins’ 
practices against those of kin; thereby perpetuating the ideologically charged 
label ‘fictive kin’ and evoking the idea of ‘automatic ties’. In the context of 
domestic  work,  one  can  find  a  number  of  studies  that  apply  Hochschild’s 
seminal work to analyse the management of these ‘automatic emotional ties’, 
as  Himmelweit  suggested.  Having  outlined  Hochschschild’s  framework  in 
lengths, this endeavour potentially implies a very selective approach and a 
closer  examination  of  Degiuli  (2007),  followed  by  Ibarra  (2002)  shall 
exemplify this. 
 
 
 
2.3.1. Analysis of automatic emotional ties  
 
According to Degiuli (2007), it is her intention to explore the relationships 
that generate from home eldercare work. More specifically, she asks if it is 
possible  “that  the  relationships  established  between  employers  of  home 
eldercare  assistants  and  the  immigrant  workers,  who  perform  these  jobs, 
could open the way to new forms of solidarity?” (2007: 195). Acknowledging 
the dominant research agenda in this field, she further elaborates that she 
wants  to  find  out  “if  the  employment  relationship  is  always  only  an 
exploitative  one”  (2007:  195,  emphasis  added).  In  order  to  answer  these 
questions she conducted interviews in Italy with 35 home eldercare assistants 
from different nationalities and 26 interviews with Italian employers.   
 
In  the  following  we  will  see  an  interview  excerpt  which  is  immediately 
followed by Degiuli’s interpretation: 
 
”(…) I like this job because it rewards me, every time I walk into their 
house [the elder couple she works for] and notice that they are happy to 
see me,  I  become happy too. Aside from the salary, which obviously I   34 
need,  these  things  give  me  satisfaction.  Working  with  the  elders  is 
satisfying  because  no  matter  how  little  you  give  them,  they  enjoy  it, 
because they feel lonely and instead I like to chat and laugh, I keep them 
company” (2007: 198)  
 
 
The following extract shows Degiuli’s interpretation: 
 
“Aside from performing practical tasks, what most of these women do in 
these jobs is to give the elders a part of themselves, of their desire to be 
alive, of their personal histories, of their future, of their dreams. They 
share with the elders a large part of their private selves and, sometimes, 
even their children, but while doing all this in exchange for wages, they do 
not consider this aspect of their occupation as exploitative (Hochschild, 
2003). On the contrary, for the most part, they consider performing this 
‘love  work’  a  redeeming  aspect  of  the  job,  what  makes  it  worthy  and 
irreplaceable” (2007: 199) 
 
First, I want to draw attention to the fact that Degiuli distinguishes between 
‘practical tasks’ and ‘love work’. With regard to the feminist discussion on the 
nature  of  care  mentioned  earlier,  this  resembles  Ungerson’s  suggested 
concepts of care understood as paid work and care understood as feeling 
(see Ungerson, 1984, 2005). The term ‘love work’ has been established in 
order  to  differentiate  between  unpaid  settings  (that  is  ‘love  work’  or 
‘emotional  work’  usually  performed  by  spouses,  relatives,  friends  or 
neighbours), and paid (‘emotional labour’) work settings. Thus, based on her 
choice  of  terms,  Degiuli  creates  ambiguity.  Rather  than  deconstructing  a 
gendered ideal of innate love, she achieves the opposite in creating this image 
of women who “give a part of themselves” to accomplish ‘love work’. 
 
In the following extract she then sets out to describe how these ‘ties’ develop. 
Degiuli states that lunchtime “and the activities involved in it like cooking 
and sharing meals” (2007: 199) helps the care workers to “bond with the 
elders” (ibid): 
 
“The evening routine, for the most part, is very similar to the lunchtime 
one.  When  the  physical  conditions  allow  for  it  the  elders  usually 
participate in the preparation of the meal and if feeling well enough also   35 
in sharing the meal with the rest of their own or their adopted families. 
For the most part, though, the meals are shared only between the elders 
and their assistants, their respective families are absent for very different 
reasons. The workers’ families have been left behind either in the country 
of origin, or at their new home in Italy to allow the worker to do her job. 
The elders’ families, instead, are absent for various reasons: some live in 
other  cities,  some  feel  that  their  lives  are  already  difficult  enough  to 
manage  without the burden of an ailing relative, some have their own 
families to take care of, while others actually fear witnessing their parent’s 
decay and are unable to face it first hand. In all these cases, the elders and 
the workers end up sharing their different solitude, one stemming from 
old  age  in  industrial  societies  and  the  other  from  the  need  to  provide 
remittances in a globalized economy” (2007: 200, emphasis added) 
 
 
Rather than providing data of the actual interactions that fulfil the task of 
‘bonding’, Degiuli concludes this section stating that “sharing meals for some 
elders means that they no longer consider the worker simply a ‘worker’ but 
also a ‘member of the family’” (2007: 200). Hence, she claims that everyone 
involved ‘automatically’ developed the ‘deep ties’ one expects to find in care 
work (according to Himmelweit) without actually providing evidence of it. 
Although  Degiuli  stated  in  the  introduction  that  she  is  interested  in  the 
relationships and therefore also conducted interviews with the employers, 
their voices and those of ‘the other’ in interaction/bonding, are completely 
absent in this study. In fact, the description of the care recipient’s family only 
seems to be used to underline that actual kin in home eldercare is far from 
the ideal fictive kin embodies. 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Analysis of authentic feeling 
 
Next,  I  want  to  have  a  more  detailed  look  at  a  study  that  refers  to  Arlie 
Hochschild’s  emotion  management  strategies  in  order  to  give  a  detailed 
account of the role and embodiments of emotions in relationships between 
migrant live-ins and care recipients. 
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In  contrast  to  Degiuli,  Ibarra  (2002)  suggests  a  typology  of  ‘coping 
mechanisms’ Mexican live-ins in US home eldercare employ. She states that 
the  narratives  of  Mexican  women  working  in  the  Bay  Area  “reveal  that 
workers undertake a broad range of unrecognized emotional efforts such as 
facial  and  bodily  displays,  tone  of  voice  and  spoken  word,  and  more 
significantly,  empathy  and  long-term  strategic  choices.  These  types  of 
emotional  labour  stand  in  sharp  contrast  to  those  performed  by  the 
prototypical “emotional proletarians” of the academic literature and suggest 
that there is a new, more flexible type of emotional proletarian in the global 
economy, one whose skills involve providing authentic emotion” (2002: 321).  
 
First of all, it is important to point out that Ibarra labels her data ‘narratives’. 
This  might  explain  that  she  presents  her  data  which  she  has  collected  in 
interviews in quite large chunks; thereby not only reproducing the voices as 
streams of consciousness, but also deleting herself from the data as the one 
who asked questions and triggered responses at some point. Secondly, she 
proclaims the existence of a “prototypical” emotional proletariat that comes 
with a variant that she discovered in her own data. Ibarra distinguishes hence 
between the “prototype” and the “more flexible” one based on the ability of 
being  able  to  provide  “authentic  emotion”.  Here,  she  refers  to  Arlie 
Hochschild, quoting her in defining emotional labour as “the act of inducing 
or  suppressing  feeling  in  order  to  sustain  the  outward  countenance  that 
produces the proper state of mind in others” (Hochschild, 1983: 7, in Ibarra, 
2002:  332).  Ibarra  further  defines  those  who  have  to  perform  emotional 
labour as “emotional proletariat”: their “skills are critical to profitability and 
are carefully scripted for workers in the new economy” (2002: 332), however 
with regard to the constant faking of emotions this potentially threatens their 
health. The article centres on ‘Mrs. Archuleta’ - based on Ibarra’s framing, the 
reader  expects  her  to  be  a  member  of  the  “more  flexible  emotional 
proletariat”: 
 
“At the very beginning things were difficult on Mrs. Archuleta because Mrs. 
Sara did not want to be touched if she was naked or if it was necessary for 
Mrs. Archuleta to change her diaper. Mrs. Archuleta recognized that this 
would make the morning more stressful for both of them, so she verbally 
soothed  her  ward  to  help  Mrs.  Sara  manage  the  idea  of  a  stranger   37 
performing such intimate tasks. Mrs. Archuleta said: Poor old woman, she 
would get very embarrassed. Then when she got embarrassed she would try 
to hide herself and it would make the job more difficult on me. So I decided 
that she had to be comfortable. I told her, “I have done this all my life, so 
this is not the first time I change somebody (referring to diapers). Before I 
came here I took care of my own mother as well, who was very much like 
you.”  By  putting  herself  in  the  position  of  a  daughter,  Mrs.  Archuleta 
helped “normalize” the experience for Mrs. Sara and made the job easier 
for both of them. Mrs. Archuleta then organized the rest of the day around 
Mrs.  Sara’s  two  remaining  mealtimes  and  afternoon  exercise  routine” 
(2002: 328).  
 
 
I would like to draw attention first to the phrase “Mrs. Archuleta recognized 
that this would make the morning more stressful for both of them, so she 
verbally soothed her ward to help Mrs. Sara manage the idea of a stranger 
performing such intimate tasks”. This one sentence summarises at least three 
fascinating instances of interaction, which unfortunately go unnoticed in the 
analysis. First of all, it is Mrs. Archuleta who not only describes mornings as 
stressful for herself, but also for Mrs. Sara. We could ask here for example: 
What exactly is stressful for her? And how does she know it stresses Mrs. 
Sara?  What  are  both  contributing  to  the  situation  in  order  to  construct  a 
‘stressful’ experience for the both of them? Next, Mrs. Archuleta either says, 
or Ibarra interprets, that she ‘verbally soothed’ Mrs. Sara. Once again, we 
could ask: What exactly did she say? Why is it soothing? How do both women 
(and the researcher) co-construct this episode as a ‘soothing’ one?  
 
Finally, Mrs. Archuleta states that she ‘helped Mrs. Sara manage the idea’. 
Regardless of the possibility that Ibarra chose the word ‘manage’ randomly, 
this situation clearly involved interaction of a certain, yet unknown, kind. It is 
likely  that  Ibarra  chose  the  word  ‘manage’  purposefully,  since  emotion 
management can also refer to managing someone else’s emotions. As we can 
see  here,  Mrs.  Archuletta  “managed”  to  “soothe”  Mrs.  Sara  and  resolve  a 
“stressful”  situation.  However,  the  crucial  question  of  how  exactly  this 
happened remains unanswered. I argue that this type of analysis, which lacks 
interactional data, is not fit to provide sufficient proof for her results, namely 
the different types of care strategies Ibarra announces in the introduction to   38 
her study because Mrs. Archuleta’s goals in her care practices (i.e. keep her 
ward  happy,  safe,  etc.)  necessarily  involve  participation  in  joint  activities. 
This  lack  of  an  interactional  perspective  that  also  considers  emotion 
management as distributed social practice, however, is possibly a result of the 
dominant assumption that in service sectors and in the context of domestic 
employment emotional labour is rarely reciprocal (Ibarra, 2002: 323).  
 
Instead of exploring this very “intimate” act of bonding, Ibarra focuses on the 
verbal utterance: “I have done this all my life, so this is not the first time I 
change somebody (referring to diapers). Before I came here I took care of my 
own  mother  as  well,  who  was  very  much  like  you”.  This  she  then  maps 
against the dominating image of live-ins as fictive kin: “By putting herself in 
the position of a daughter, Mrs. Archuleta helped “normalize” the experience 
for  Mrs.  Sara  and  made  the  job  easier  for  both  of  them.”  Although  she 
chooses  “a  daughter”  instead  of  “her  daughter”,  the  mere  fact  that  she 
analyses this as “normalizing” the situation reveals that Ibarra frames care 
work in her analysis in a normative and gendered way.  
 
Coming  back  to  the  ‘emotion  management  strategies’  she  set  out  to  find, 
Ibarra then “deconstructs” (2002: 332) the four types she identifies in Mrs. 
Archuleta’s  performance:  “facial  and  bodily  displays,  tone  of  voice  and 
language,  empathy  and  long-term  strategic  choices”  (ibid).  Concerning 
smiling, for instance, Ibarra explains: “This may mean that workers hide their 
own feelings (such as anger, sadness, or fear) behind a smiling face so that 
their wards do not feel badly. (…) Likewise Mexicanas may simply put on an 
impassive or serious face (neither smiling nor frowning) to let their wards 
know that they are “busy” with other tasks” (ibid). Furthermore, conscious 
control of tone of voice is used to soothe and to encourage. Although Ibarra 
states that “Mexicanas, however, do not work from a script provided by their 
employers  but  rather  from  the  knowledge  they  are  able  to  get  from  their 
ward”  (2002:  332),  yet  again,  the  examples  she  gives  exemplify  that  she 
exclusively focuses on the subject (for instance, a woman who tries not to 
show  disgust  while  changing  a  diaper).    Hence,  once  she  talks  about 
“empathy”, it becomes apparent that such a one-sided analysis does not allow 
for the conclusions she arrives at:   39 
  
 
“Among  elder  care  workers  in  Santa  Barbara  empathy  means  trying  to 
apprehend, not only what their wards feel in the present moment, but also 
how the present is tinged by the past. That is, workers express that it is 
necessary to have an understanding of their ward’s life and the history of 
their  physical  and,  sometimes,  mental  decline.  (…)  Over  time,  however, 
empathy  also  involves  trying  to  understand  in  more  detail  a  ward’s 
worldview,  a  person’s  way  of  life  relative  to  their  social  class  (…)  For 
workers who are simultaneously in a position of needing to care while in a 
position  of  great  social  inequality,  learning  about  those  elements  of  life 
history that are most relevant to their own lives is one way to positively 
‘feel’ for their wards and subsequently provide better care” (2002: 337, 
emphasis added).  
 
 
Apart from the fact that the reader is not provided with sufficient information 
one could ask here: what, when, why and how do they share which stories? 
And what does it mean for the ward to share? It is not clear at all how the 
data allows for the judgement that the women “subsequently provide better 
care”. In an attempt to explain her findings, Ibarra points outside her own 
analysis, quoting other research: ”When engaging in the emotional labour of 
empathy, workers in essence recognize that their wards’ past, imagined or 
otherwise, “entered into their way of being-in-the-world” and subsequently 
elicit this knowledge and “fold” it into their everyday practices (E. Valentine 
Daniel 1996)” (2002: 340).  
 
Drawing attention back to the fact that she takes these women’s strategies to 
be the insignia of the new “more flexible emotional proletariat” that provides 
“authentic emotion”, her concluding remarks on the strategy ‘empathy’ read 
like  this:  “Workers  need  to  “know”  to  care  well  (they  need  a  reason  for 
empathy) but the details do not all have to be accurate. [A few lines earlier 
she talks about a live-in who invented a life story of her ward based on a few 
bits of information] (…) In short, empathy allows workers to diachronically 
get to “know” their ward and subsequently “feel” their plight. In so doing, 
workers are able to provide better care because they take into consideration 
not only physical needs but also the emotional needs of people who are at the   40 
end  of  their  lives”  (2002:  341).  Not  only  that  one  has  to  wonder  what 
“authentic” emotion means if the “reason for empathy” can be a ward’s fictive 
life story, the mere fact that Ibarra states that these women will “care well” as 
long  as  one  tells  them  any  kind  of  story,  runs  the  risk  of  potentially 
stigmatising the very same people their work sets out to help. Considering the 
number of neologisms in this field that are walking the high wire, i.e. New 
Maid and emotional proletariat, one may conclude that a political message 
(as important as it may be) is potentially carried on the back of insufficient 
data analysis. Degiuli’s and Ibarra’s findings certainly call out for empirical 
testing based on interactional data.  
   
To sum up, Ibarra and Degiuli share the specific analytic shortcomings of 
under-analysis  through  summary,  over-quotation,  and  circular  discovery 
(Antaki et al., 2003). Furthermore, I would argue that both are examples of 
under-analysis  through  taking  sides,  as  both  omitted  the  voices  of  those 
cared-for as well as their children. In particular this latter aspect affects the 
analysis in a crucial way because we can find statements about the nature of 
the relationships to these individuals in these two studies. This leads to a 
pattern in the qualitative evaluation of individual interpretations of meaning-
making in day-to-day home care experience: (1) A subjectivist approach to 
communication and emotion where (2) data is collected in interviews, (3) 
interpreted  in  figurative  language,  where  verbal  reports  are  mapped  to 
emotions  (4)  contributing  to  a  homogeneous  picture  of  “migrant-in-the-
family” realities.  
 
Finally,  I  want  to  draw  attention  to  the  method  of  establishing  emotion 
management as embodied care practices. Once more acknowledging that care 
is ‘interactive in nature’ (Timonen & Doyle, 2009), studies like Ibarra (2002) 
make  a  peculiar  statement  about  adaptive  learning  in  focusing  on  the 
individual alone. Yet, I think that in relating the emergence of ‘empathy’ to 
acts  of  (shared)  remembering,  Ibarra,  just  like  Hochschild,  traces  and 
highlights  the  essential  connection  between  emotion  and  memory.  Two 
guiding questions therefore arise from this literature review which shall form 
the basis of inquiry in the following chapter on research in work psychology   41 
on  emotion  management:  What  is  the  role  of  memory  in  emotion 
management?  And what is the role of emotion in acts of remembering?  
 
Hochschild  uses  Lee  Strasberg’s  notions  of  Emotional  Recall,  Affective 
Memory and Sense Memory (Strasberg, 1988) for her concept of deep acting. 
Here  we  will  find  potential  links  to  modern  thoughts  about  cognition, 
memory, perception, emotion and action. Emotional Recall is the Method, or 
its  ‘essence’,  that  trains  actors  to  draw  upon  their  own  emotions  and 
memories  in  their  performance  of  characters.  It  can  be  divided  into  the 
exercises  Affective  Memory  and  Sense  Memory.  While  Affective  Memory 
trains an actor to call on the memories he or she felt when they were in a 
situation, either similar to that of their character, or in one that triggered the 
emotion required, Sense Memory is used to refer to the recall of physical 
sensations surrounding emotional events, instead of the emotions themselves 
(see Krasner, 2000).  Hochschild’s focus is on the ‘conscious sentient self’. 
She  compares  this  with  an  actor  trained  in  method  acting.  However,  this 
simile  is  not  entirely  correct.  Latest  research  in  neuroscience  shows  that 
memory  encoding,  activation  and  updating  employs  and  needs  all  senses, 
consciously and unconsciously. 
 
 
 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
In the beginning of this chapter we have seen that in public Discourse the 
image  is  invoked  that  an  individual’s  traits  (i.e.,  ‘warm-hearted’)  are 
consistent  across  situations,  causing  the  same  behaviour,  over  and  over 
again, regardless of the context and situation. A similar homogenising trend 
can be observed in academic Discourse. Established labels, such as the New 
Maid (Lutz, 2002) and the emotional proletariat (Ibarra, 2002) dominate 
the ‘knowledge regime’ (Foucault, 1982) of research with live-ins. While in 
the 1970s and 1980s feminist researchers argued for a rethinking of domestic 
and  care  work,  beyond  the  normative  gendered  label  ‘labour  of  love’, 
contemporary  research  on  the  ‘migrant-in-the-family’  model  of  home   42 
eldercare  reinforces  this  normative  concept  of  care  for  the  sake  of 
highlighting markers of exploitation. As we have seen, kinship terms play a 
crucial role in these analyses. This in turn has led to a specific understanding 
of ‘emotion management’ in this research field.  
 
Considering the ideological heritage and aims of above-mentioned studies, 
there  is  a  danger  of  professional  vision  (Goodwin,  1992),  the  power  to 
convince that certain interpretive procedures of analysts have. I believe that 
research  on  and  with  live-in  domestic  and  care  workers  should  feel  an 
obligation to draw attention to human rights violations, as well as to illegal 
and precarious situations of live-ins worldwide. However, at the same time, 
studies like Ibarra (2002) need to be carefully tested for their homogenising 
and potentially stigmatising effects. This chapter shall hence establish this 
study’s research context. While certainly agreeing that scientific research has 
a mission to make the world a better one, this study hopes to contribute to 
the research field in providing data analysis of the situational dynamics in 
specific interactions – an aspect which by and large has been ignored in the 
above-mentioned studies.  
 
However,  data  analysis  will  not  make  use  of  established  labels  like  ‘New 
Maid’, or ‘innate’, because in this case I would merely study the categories 
common to above-mentioned research tradition. Furthermore, I do not want 
to treat ‘emotion management’ as a “concept on holiday” (Lynch & Bogen, 
1996: 273) but ground it in situated context. Hence, I will concentrate on how 
participants themselves create meaning in interactions. This evidently also 
affects  the  methodology  used.  It  can  be  considered  common  practice  that 
data  is  obtained  in  interviews,  with  the  vast  majority  of  studies  focusing 
exclusively on the migrant workers. Another common aspect is that usually 
these interviews are conducted in hindsight.   
 
Today, Hochschild’s framework for surface and deep acting are widely used 
as a method of data analysis in research areas as varied as patient-physician 
relationships  (e.g.,  Larson  &  Yao,  2005)  or  management  studies  (e.g.,  de 
Castro  et  al.  2006).  In  particular,  many  studies  depart  from  her  notion 
emotional dissonance and explore the mechanisms in emotional labour that   43 
may  lead  to  burnout  (Adelmann,  1995;  Grandey,  2000,  2003;  Johnson, 
2007; Naring & van Droffelaar, 2007; Wharton, 1993; Bolton & Boyd, 2003). 
Whereas  surface  acting  is  usually  connected  with  emotional  exhaustion, 
findings on deep acting are mixed. However, some studies at the same time 
conclude  that  there  are  positive  outcomes  (e.g.  Ashforth  and  Humphrey, 
1993; Karner, 1998). In her work, Hochschild bridges the gap between the 
cultural  meaning  level  and  the  biological  level  of  emotions,  drawing  on 
research findings in psychology. However, attention has been drawn to the 
fact that “strangely, perspectives on emotional Labour have not specifically 
considered  emotion  theory  since  Hochschild”  (Grandey,  2000:  4).  More 
generally,  Milton  &  Svaŝek  (2005)  highlight  that  the  challenge  for 
anthropology  and  the  other  social  sciences  has  been  to  develop  an 
understanding  of  emotions  that  takes  both  their  cultural  and  biological 
character into account. 
 
The following chapter will therefore discuss a psychological perspective on 
emotion  management  which  will  provide  the  necessary  background  to 
critically  assess  the  notions  of  internal  emotion  regulation  and  coping 
strategies in interdependent social actions. 
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3 
 
Love is just a four-letter word? 
A psychological perspective on emotion management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Departing from last chapter’s conceptualisations of innateness, automaticity 
and trait coherence, a review of psychological perspectives on emotions will 
follow the first section of this chapter which reviews existing research in work 
psychology  on  ‘emotion  management’.  It  will  be  shown  that  research  on 
‘emotion  management’  ultimately  poses  the  question:  managing,  or 
regulating emotions compared to what? An in-depth comparison of emotion 
theories that consider neurological, as well as psychological positions then 
shows  that  emotion  cannot  be  discussed  without  memory.  This  insight  is 
essential  for  two  reasons.  First  of  all,  we  will  see  that  those  connections 
between  subjective  remembering  and  embodied  emotion  that  Ibarra  and 
Hochschild insinuate in their conceptualisation of ‘emotion management’ can   45 
be backed up by neurological research. In fact, looking at the neurological 
basis  it  has  to  be  concluded  that  these  two,  emotion  and  memory,  are 
intertwined in such way that they cannot be analysed individually without 
considering the other at the same time. Consequentially, in the second part of 
this chapter these findings will then be discussed in the light of Alzheimer’s 
disease.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is hence twofold: The previous chapter’s review 
of studies on ‘emotion management’ in sociology singled out methodological 
short-comings,  but  also  two  guiding  questions  towards  the  formulation  of 
this thesis’ framework, that were derived from the crucial role memory plays 
in  ‘emotion  management’.  These  were:  What  is  the  role  of  memory  in 
emotion  management?  And  what  is  the  role  of  emotion  in  acts  of 
remembering? Considering this study’s interest in interactions involving all 
members of a migrant-in-the-family model, this chapter provides sufficient 
background knowledge to challenge the dominating medicalised Discourse 
on Alzheimer’s disease.  
 
This is important in that we will see in the following chapter that the majority 
of discourse analytical studies with Alzheimer’s patients inevitably limit the 
scope of their findings based on their decision to take the assumed markers, 
such as impaired language and memory loss, as the default position. This in 
turn  radically  affects  the  (researcher’s)  attitude  towards  the  Alzheimer’s 
patient’s  place  in  the  participation  framework.  He  or  she  may  not  be 
considered  a  fully  competent  member  because  of  their  condition,  but  in 
conversations  they  are  nevertheless  in  the  immediate  presence  of  others 
which satisfies the basic requirement for social interaction. The present study 
therefore  treats  the  study  of  emotion  management  as  distributed  social 
interaction  between  individuals  who  are  immediately  present  with  one 
another.       
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3.1. Emotion management research in work psychology 
 
According  to  the  emotion  regulation  research  group  (EROS)  based  at  the 
University  of  Sheffield,  emotion  regulation,  or  management,  in  general 
describes the mental and behavioural processes by which people influence 
their own feelings and the feelings of other people (see Miles, 2010; Niven, 
2010). Right from the start, I want to draw attention to the fact that emotion 
regulation concerns mental and behavioural processes. I will come back to 
this further down. Emotion regulation first of all refers to the ways in which 
individuals regulate their own feelings (intrapersonal emotion regulation). 
With  regard  to  emotional  labour,  the  last  chapter  has  highlighted  that 
intrapersonal  emotion  management  is  a  form  of  self-control.  We  have 
encountered  the  concept  of  ‘surface  acting’  as  one  of  the  means  through 
which people are able to regulate their feeling expressions (face, tone and 
posture).  However,  to  what  extent  this  does,  or  does  not,  affect  an 
individual’s feelings will be problematised as this chapter unfolds.  
 
As for the mental processes, regulation strategies can involve thoughts, for 
instance  thinking  about  a  situation  differently.  In  fact,  the  strategies  of 
reappraisal  (thinking  about  something  from  a  different  perspective)  and 
distraction  (thinking  about  something  else)  have  been  found  to  be  very 
effective in producing the desired change in feeling. For instance, Garnefski 
et  al.  (2004)  outline  different  cognitive  emotion  regulation  strategies  in 
response to the experience of life stress. Strategies women were reported to 
use more often than men are rumination (repetitively and passively focusing 
on the symptoms of distress, and on its possible causes and consequences), 
catastrophising, and positive refocusing. The results of this study show that 
the first two strategies are positively related to depression, whereas higher 
extents of using positive reappraisals were related to lower depression scores 
(ibid: 267). 
 
It is suggested that the effectiveness of emotion regulation is influenced by 
the individual’s beliefs concerning their regulation ability (Miles, 2010). A lot 
of contemporary research provides in this respect most interesting studies 
based  on  Buddhist  meditation  (for  instance,  Lehrer  2009).  Insights  have   47 
been popularly translated into an overwhelming number of self-help books 
and meditation workshops that aim at helping people to cope with stress, 
anger, or low self-esteem. The perspective promoted is that feelings are seen 
as part of the mind. Hence, it is proposed that one can change their feelings 
through  changing  their  own  mind  (for  instance  through  meditation)  to 
generate pleasant feelings, or reduce stress and anger. 
 
The second form of emotion regulation refers to strategies with which people 
try to change another person’s feelings (interpersonal emotion regulation). 
Although this is a recent research area, there is already a body of research 
that shows that individuals not only do it on a daily basis (with their friends, 
partners, colleagues, customers, etc.), but that people also draw on hundreds 
of distinct strategies to change others’ emotions (Niven, Totterdell & Holman, 
2009; Parkinson & Totterdell, 1999). The above-mentioned research group 
confirmed research that shows that the ability to regulate how others feel is 
vital to building good relationships with colleagues and customers. One focus 
of the research group in Sheffield is on co-regulation in close relationships 
and on the adoption of complementary or conflicting regulation strategies by 
partners  and  their  effects  on  relationship  quality  (Niven,  2009).  There  is 
considerable proof that emotion regulation has important consequences for 
well-being  (for  instance,  Gross  &  John,  2003)  and  goal  attainment  in  a 
number of life domains. Malcolm & Greenburg (2000), for instance, found 
that the ability to attend to emotions enables individuals to take another’s 
perspective and thus affects the development of empathy. 
 
Although by now researchers have identified hundreds of different strategies 
how people influence how they feel and how others feel, it is not known, yet, 
how  emotion  regulation  exerts  these  effects.  “Specifying  precisely  what  is 
regulated – and whether emotion regulation has taken place at all – is one of 
the most serious challenges this area faces” (Gross, 1999: 564). Accordingly, 
one of the many questions that have to be addressed in defining emotion 
management  is:  “Changes  compared  with  what?”  (ibid:  564,  emphasis 
added). Gross elaborates: “Presumably, emotion regulation may be inferred 
when  an  emotional  response  would  have  proceeded  in  one  fashion,  but 
instead proceeds in another. (…) Little is known about the complexities of   48 
normative  emotional  responding,  let  alone  the  effects  of  dispositional 
variables,  such  as  neuroticism,  and  group  differences,  such  as  sex.  This 
means  that  at  best,  probabilistic  statements  can  be  made  about  emotion 
regulation in any given case” (ibid: 564/ 565). Niven (2010) adds that to date 
it is impossible to recommend which course of emotion regulation to take. 
Furthermore,  attempts  at  eliciting  emotion  in  the  laboratory  have 
demonstrated  that  emotional  responses  vary  as  a  function  of  subtle 
environmental cues (Gross & Levenson, 1995).  
 
A  hypothesis  that  has  attracted  a  lot  of  attention  which  is  reflected  in  a 
growing  corpus  of  interesting  studies  in  disciplines  as  varied  as 
developmental  psychology  (Trevarthen,  2010,  2004,  1978)  or  artificial 
intelligence (Cañamero, 2010), is the idea that we often regulate how we feel 
without being aware of it. In particular, it has been shown that feelings are 
‘contagious’  and  that  we  non-consciously  mimic  others.  From  a  biological 
perspective,  this  is  very  prominently  backed  up  by  research  on  mirror 
neurons  (Damasio  2003,  2008).  At  the  University  of  Hertfordshire,  for 
instance, we can find a most interesting project where researchers are able to 
combine these findings with the help of modern robotics. The robot Nao has 
been developed as part of a project led by Lola Cañamero to use the same 
types of expressive and behavioural cues that babies use to learn to interact 
socially and emotionally with others. Nao is able to detect human emotions 
by  studying  body  language  and  facial  expressions  and  becomes  better  at 
reading someone's mood over time as it grows to 'know' the person. It is also 
able to remember its interactions with different people and memorises their 
faces. Nao has been created through modelling the early attachment process 
that  human  and  chimpanzee  infants  undergo  when  they  are  very  young. 
According to Cañamero (2010), one of the aims is to study non-verbal cues 
and  the  emotions  revealed  through  physical  postures,  gestures  and 
movements of the body rather than facial or verbal expressions.  
 
Before  I  turn  attention  to  the  cues  Gross  and  Levenson  (1995)  and  also 
Cañamero (2010) hinted at, it is necessary to learn about emotion theories. 
We do not know much, yet, about the behavioural processes involved. We 
have seen that Hochschild and Ibarra stress the mental processes involved.   49 
However, we will see in the following that the role of the body cannot be 
ignored. 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Love is not just a four-letter word.  
         A psychological perspective on emotions 
 
In psychology it is a common practice to “tap emotional experience through 
verbal report” (Holodynski & Friedlmeier, 2006: 43). This procedure involves 
participants  themselves  classifying  the  quality  of  the  feeling  they  are 
experiencing  into  emotion  categories  and  qualifying  its  intensity  on  a  set 
scale. Holodynski & Friedlmeier stress the shortcomings of this method. They 
argue  that  the  results  are  subjective  verbal  reports  based  on  emotion 
categories  (e.g.  scared,  sad,  etc.)  that  represent  the  feeling  experienced. 
According  to  Holodynski  &  Friedlmeier,  the  problem  at  hand  is  that 
individuals do not consciously experience the act of appraisal, that is, the 
internal  process  of  constructing  an  emotion  in  the  brain.  They  only 
experience the action readiness resulting from this appraisal. Holodynski & 
Friedlmeier (2006) hence argue that individuals “are exposed to a feeling in 
the  form  of  expressive  and  bodily  sensations,  and,  as  such,  it  evokes  the 
impression that something real has happened and not that something has 
been  constructed  subjectively”  (ibid:  55).  Furthermore,  Holodynski  and 
Friedlmeier point out the actor’s random selection of certain cues by asking: 
“What special sign embedded in the entirety of the sensations experienced 
does a person refer to when judging an emotion from the actor perspective? 
What could these special signs be?” (2006: 54).  
 
Holodynski & Friedlmeier’s emotion model invites criticism as it describes a 
one-way relationship between the body and emotions, where the individual 
experiences the bodily changes first and then appraises the emotion. Over the 
centuries there has been much debating about the sequence of events. Ever 
since  the  influential  James-Lange  theory  that  states  that  “[t]he  bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and our feeling of   50 
these same changes as they occur is the emotion” (James, 1892: 375), the 
question nowadays is whether the relation between emotions and the body 
could be two-way: emotions do influence the body – but can the body also 
influence emotion?  
 
Research on the ‘facial feedback hypothesis’ (Buck, 1980), for instance, offers 
interesting  answers  to  this  question.  This  hypothesis  suggests  that  facial 
expressions  influence  our  emotional  experience.  In  the  famous  ‘pencil 
experiment’ participants were asked to hold a pen either sideways between 
their teeth (thereby activating the muscles used in smiles), or to hold the pen 
between  the  lips  like  a  lollipop  while  watching  cartoons.  Afterwards 
participants rated the cartoons. Results show that those who produced a grin 
holding the pen sideways rated the cartoons funnier. Studies like this have 
led  a  high  number  of  researchers  to  suggest  that  bodies  do  influence 
emotions  and  our  emotional  evaluation  of  our  environment.  Participants, 
however,  were  unaware  that  their  actions  were  related  to  emotions.  The 
explanation for this is that the actions these participants performed had a 
priming effect on their emotions.  
 
Priming refers to the activation of concepts or goals outside a participant’s 
awareness,  which  then  unconsciously  influence  behaviour.  Miles  (2010) 
refers to a study by Bargh, Chen and Burrows (1996) as a good example of 
priming. Participants were primed with the concept ‘elderly’ by asking them 
to complete a word search containing words like old, grey, and retired. The 
researchers observed that participants who had been primed walked more 
slowly  than  the  control  participants  when  leaving  the  room  after  the 
experiment. Just like in the above-mentioned experiment participants once 
again  did  not  realise  that  they  were  doing  this,  or  why  it  happened.  So, 
priming the concept of ‘elderly’ had an unconscious effect on their behaviour.  
 
With  regard  to  the  ‘pencil  experiment’,  performing  an  emotion-relevant 
action seems to automatically prime the related emotion. This suggests that 
the motor, sensory, and affective components of each emotion are linked, so 
that activating one component activates the others. An intriguing explanation 
for this process is that the sensory, motor and affective experiences of an   51 
emotion might be the representations of that emotion. While most cognitive 
theories  view  representations  as  abstract  symbols,  embodied  cognition 
theories suggest that emotions are represented in modality-specific systems 
(Barsalou,  2008).  In  this  view,  when  we  think  about  an  emotion,  we  are 
partially  activating  the  same  sensory,  affective,  motor  and  physiological 
components  that  were  involved  in  experiencing  it.  And  this  same  re-
activation also occurs when the emotion is primed, whether it is by making 
an emotion-related facial expression or by seeing someone else experience 
that emotion.  
 
We can see that bodies do not only express what is being felt. Rather, they 
actually play a causal role in the experience and understanding of emotions. 
Whereas  in  the  heydays  of  cognitivism  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  emotion 
theory  focused  on  the  cognitive  antecedents  of  emotions  (appraisal 
processes),  and  hence  on  the  subjective  evaluations  of  the  significance  of 
events, in recent years, this disembodied conception of cognition has been 
seriously  challenged  by  the  rise  of  embodied  and  situated  approaches  in 
cognitive  science  (see  Clark,  1999;  Varela,  Thompson  &  Rosch,  1991). 
Nevertheless, most emotion theorists have not embraced the embodied view 
of the mind (see Colombetti and Thompson, 2007). As mentioned earlier, 
according  to  this  approach  the  human  mind  is  embodied  in  our  entire 
organism and embedded in the world, and hence not reducible to structures 
inside the head. Meaning and experience are created by, or enacted through, 
the continuous reciprocal interaction of the brain, the body, and the world. 
From this standpoint just sketched, emotions are simultaneously bodily and 
cognitive.  In  contrast  to  the  traditional  conceptualisation,  where  they  are 
made up of separate, but co-existing bodily and cognitive constituents, they 
convey  meaning  and  personal  significance  as  “bodily  meaning  and 
significance”  (Prinz,  2004).  Hence,  in  the  words  of  Thompson  (2009) 
“[i]ntersubjective  interaction  is  the  cognition  and  affectively  charged 
experience of self and other” (ibid: 564). 
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More recently, the value of an embodied perspective has been recognized in 
social  psychology  (e.g.,  Barsalou,  Niedenthal,  Barbey  &  Ruppert,  2003; 
Schnall, 2004). Since the assumption that cognition ultimately serves action 
is central to the embodied cognition position, a similar assumption can be 
made about affect and emotion, because affect provides information about 
the  liking  or  disliking  of  objects  and  situations,  and  about  the  value  of 
pursuing  or  avoiding  particular  actions  (Clore  et  al.,  2001).  Similarly, 
attitudes serve not merely as mental structures of preference, but also as a 
‘compass for action’ (Clore & Schnall, 2005).  
What might this imply for emotion regulation? We understand now that the 
way in which individuals regulate feelings always depends on the  context. 
One  can  study  not  only  how  emotions  influence  the  subject  and  its 
environment,  but  also  how  they  are  oriented  to  the  social  function  of 
emotions, and emotionally orientated towards an object of common concern. 
Emotions  as  such,  or  the  behaviours  following  from  these  emotions,  may 
affect the environment, thus changing the situation in which the emotions 
were elicited in the first place (see Lazarus, 1994).  
 
Here, I want to come back to Mischel now whose views on the ‘person v. 
situation’ debate were introduced in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
His analysis revealed that an individual’s behaviour is highly dependent on 
situational cues, rather than consistent across diverse situations that differ in 
meaning. Whereas in the classic view “the basic qualities of the person are 
assumed  to  be  independent  of,  and  unconnected  with,  situations:  causal 
powers then are attributed either to one or the other” (Mischel, 2004: 3). He 
justified his seminal review, claiming that his purpose was to draw attention 
to abuses of personality models by clinicians, and specifically to attack their 
tendency “to use a few behavioural signs to categorize people enduringly into 
fixed  slots  on  the  assessor’s  favourite  nomothetic  trait  dimensions  and  to 
assume  that  these  slot  positions  were  sufficiently  informative  to  predict 
specific behaviour and to make extensive decisions about a person’s whole 
life” (Mischel, 1979: 740).  Mischel concluded his work by arguing that the 
data reviewed aimed at “fit[ting] the view that behaviours depend on highly   53 
specific events but remain stable when the consequences to which they lead, 
and the evoking conditions, remain stable” (1968: 282).  
   
The focus thus shifted away from broad situation-free trait descriptors (e.g. 
warm-hearted)  to  more  situation-qualified  characterizations  of  persons  in 
contexts,  making  dispositions  situationally  hedged,  conditional,  and 
interactive with the situations in which they were expressed (see Mischel, 
2004).  Rather  than  argue  about  the  existence  of  personality  consistency 
across  situations,  Mischel  holds  that  “it  would  be  more  constructive  to 
analyze and study the cognitive and social learning conditions that seem to 
foster – and to modernize – its occurrence” (Mischel, 1973: 259).  As for their 
relative  potency  in  determining  behaviour,  he  writes:  “Psychological 
"situations" (…) induce uniform expectancies regarding the most appropriate 
response pattern, provide adequate incentives for the performance of that 
response  pattern,  and  instill  the  skills  necessary  for  its  satisfactory 
construction and execution”. On the other hand: “Conversely, situations and 
treatments are weak to the degree that they are not uniformly encoded, do 
not generate uniform expectancies concerning the desired behavior, do not 
offer sufficient incentives for its performance, or fail to provide the learning 
conditions  required  for  successful  construction  of  the  behavior”  (Mischel, 
1973:  276,  emphasis  in  original).  Mischel  thus  calls  for  a  personality 
psychology more attuned to “the dual human tendency to invent constructs 
and adhere to them, as well as to generate subtly discriminative behaviours 
across settings and over time” (Mischel, 1973: 279).  
 
So what are the cues we need to look out for? Very broadly, situational cues 
are defined as contextual cues in the environment that signal a person that an 
action or event may occur. On the one hand, these specific cues and signals 
can be culturally grounded and contain information about the social aspect of 
a situation. For instance, if someone walks up to you, holds out their hand 
and says ‘hello’, you know from these situational cues that you should shake 
their hand (see Howard, 1982). On the other hand, an important perspective 
in social, personality, and cognitive psychology is that different people can 
perceive the same objective stimulus differently depending on the subjective 
meanings  they  attach  to  it,  and  that  these  meanings  often  derive  from   54 
personal histories (e.g., Anderson & Bushman, 2002; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 
1982; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1981). That is, differences in past experience lead 
to different knowledge about the relationships among objects in the world, 
and  this  knowledge  influences  how  information  about  such  objects  is 
processed.  
 
Research shows that the more frequently the linkage between an object and a 
subjective evaluation of that object is activated, the more likely it is that the 
evaluation will be spontaneously activated in the presence of the object (e.g., 
Fazio,  Chen,  McDonel,  &  Sherman,  1982).  The  famous  ‘weapons  priming 
effect’ experiment (Bartholow et al., 2005) shall exemplify this. Bartholow 
and his colleagues theorised that repeated exposure to the use of guns for 
aggressive  purposes  may  lead  people  to  form  gun-related  knowledge 
structures  that  include  the  idea  that  guns  cause  or  enable  aggressive 
behaviour  and  information  about  how  guns  are  used  to  threaten  or  harm 
people.  The  presence  of  a  gun  should  thus  activate  these  gun-related 
knowledge structures.  
 
Their  research  was  designed  to  test  whether  pre-existing  individual 
differences  in  knowledge  structures  about  aggressive  stimuli  have  similar 
effects on the interpretation of weapon stimuli and on the likelihood that 
such stimuli will evoke aggressive behaviour. Bartholow and his colleagues 
found that individual differences of several types (e.g., knowledge structures, 
levels of trait hostility) influence the interpretation of situational variables 
(e.g., the presence of guns) related to aggression. The combination of these 
factors  then  influences  one  or  more  of  three  major  routes  to  aggression, 
including the accessibility of aggressive thoughts, the experience of affect, or 
arousal. The interaction among these aspects of the internal state influences 
appraisal and decision processes (e.g., interpretations of intent to harm) that 
ultimately determine whether or to what extent an aggressive response will 
occur. 
 
The multimodality and interplay of cues, environmental and internal, is also 
exploited  in  research  on  addictions.  For  instance,  Tapert  et  al.  (2004) 
presented patients with words to induce alcohol craving, whereas Schneider   55 
et al. (2001) used olfactory stimuli. While these studies made use of general 
cues, craving is, of course, also associated with highly individual situations 
and personal cues. This example shall exemplify, yet again, the sheer number 
of cues that can be potentially considered. 
 
Concluding, I want to introduce a study (Duclos & Laird, 2001) that considers 
the role of situational cues in emotion management. Based on the research 
findings in work psychology outlined earlier, it was theorised that deliberate 
manipulation  of  expressive  behaviours  might  self-regulate  emotional 
experiences. In the previous chapter we have seen that this idea has also been 
developed from a sociological perspective in the work of Arlie Hochschild. 
“The core assumption of self-perception theory is that we know ourselves by, 
in effect, observing ourselves, in the same way that someone else would know 
us. How could another person know our emotional state? Someone trying to 
identify our emotional state would have only two kinds of information to use. 
One  is  behaviour:  Are  we  smiling  or  frowning?  The  other  is  our 
circumstances: Did we just receive a compliment or were we just insulted?” 
(Duclos & Laird, 2001: 30). We have seen earlier that the first type of cues 
has been labelled personal and the latter one situational.  
 
In their experiment, Duclos and Laird want to identify whether individuals 
tend to be more responsive to situational or personal cues and to what extent 
this  is  affected  by  conscious  expressive  behaviour  (facial  manipulation  to 
produce  a  smile  or  frown)  and  emotion  induction  (imagery  on  anger  or 
sadness). They first induced eighty people to adopt emotional expressions in 
a successfully disguised procedure that identified whether their feelings were 
affected by their expressive behaviour when they were unaware of the nature 
and  purpose  of  that  behaviour.  In  the  first  part  of  the  experiment, 
participants’  responses  to  personal  or  situational  cues  were  tested.  This 
classification was based on two pairs of facial manipulation trials, each trial 
consisting of one ‘frown’ and one ‘smile’ manipulation (p.35 ff.). A series of 
drawings was placed on the wall in front of the participant that provided him 
or her with situational cues for their feelings. The pictures entitled ‘Dancing’ 
and ‘Spring’ were then in view when participants were asked to ‘frown’, and 
the  ‘Betrayal’  and  ‘Rip-off’  pictures  were  in  view  during  the  ‘smile’  trials.   56 
Participants either reported that their feeling emotion was congruent with 
their manipulated facial expressions, or that feeling emotions were instead 
congruent with the titles of the drawings.  
 
Participants were then instructed to close their eyes and imagine themselves 
in a particular situation in which most of the people around them are feeling 
angry or sad (for instance, at a funeral). They were also told to try to “smell 
the  appropriate  smells,  hear  the  appropriate  sounds,  see  and  feel  the 
appropriate things” (ibid: 38). Participants then completed a post-induction 
Emotion  Rating  Scale  and  were  asked  to  verbally  report  what  they  were 
thinking while doing the task. 
 
Duclos and Laird observed that “people who are responsive to personal cues 
should  find  that  deliberately  adopting  or  inhibiting  facial  expressions  will 
change  their  feelings.  However,  people  who  are  unresponsive  to  personal 
cues  should  be  relatively  unaffected  by  their  deliberate  attempts  to 
manipulate their expressions” (ibid: 32). Compared to people who respond to 
personal  cues,  those  who  are  unresponsive  to  personal  cues  are  more 
responsive to situational cues that imply what they should feel. For example, 
they  are  more  likely  to  accept  an  experimenter’s  implication  about  how 
confident  they  should  feel  (Kellerman  &  Laird,  1982).  Also,  participants 
attempted to change emotional feelings by adopting or inhibiting emotional 
behaviours, or by focusing on or being distracted from situational cues for 
emotion. Hence, the effectiveness of techniques for emotional self-regulation 
largely  depends  on  the  characteristics  of  the  person.  These  individual 
differences suggest that deliberate manipulations of expressive behaviour, as 
suggested in Hochschild (1982) and Ibarra (2002), will be more successful 
for some people than for others, which implies that it is very difficult to arrive 
at a general set of emotion management strategies for emotional labour jobs. 
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3.3. Emotions and Alzheimer’s disease  
 
We have seen that understanding situational influences on behaviour is in the 
focus of research in behavioural and social psychology8. This general interest 
gains even more impetus with an increasing awareness of, and interest in 
Alzheimer’s disease. The more we learn about it the more we have to start 
asking  questions  concerning  the  interrelationship  between  memory  and 
emotion, and how this eventually touches upon the question of ‘self’. 
 
Considering emotions in the light of Alzheimer’s disease, we are faced with a 
multitude of ‘truisms’. For instance, we learn from Feil (1999), the creator of 
Validation  Therapy,  that  “[t]he  very-old  often  lose  their  control  of  strong 
emotions they have kept bottled up inside”. She advises caregivers to act as 
‘sounding boards’: “By venting these emotions, they are in a sense unpacking 
before  their  last  journey  (…)  Guiding  them  toward  successful  resolution 
before vegetation occurs is a chief goal of validation” (ibid: 4). In chapter 4 I 
will discuss in detail the medicalised and inhumane rhetoric that seems to 
have been established in studies with Alzheimer’s patients across disciplinary 
boundaries, but for the time being I want to point out that the simple rule of 
thumb seems to be: feelings outlast facts.  
 
In  her  book  Learning  to  speak  Alzheimer’s  (2004),  Joanne  Koenig  Coste 
hence  gives  advice  to  caregivers  on  how  to  work  with  the  “remaining 
emotions” and skills of the patient. According to her, it is essential that family 
members understand that the person’s behaviour is largely fuelled by their 
emotions. Koenig in particular promotes two popular hypotheses. Her first 
claim  is  that  “[m]ost  behavioural  changes  in  a  person  with  progressive 
dementia are rooted in frustration of being unable to master an emotional or 
physical  environment  that  feels  like  foreign  territory”.  Thus,  she  advises 
family members to keep their own emotions as even as possible and invents 
                                                 
8 Some popular examples by David Givens to exemplify the scope of this ‘business’:  Love 
Signals:  A  Practical  Field  Guide  to  the  Body  Language  of  Courtship (2005;  has  been 
translated into 15 languages); Crime Signals: How to Spot a Criminal Before You Become a 
Victim (2008); Office Signals: What Corporate Walls Would Say If They Could Talk (2009). 
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the ‘7-second Alzheimer’s hug’ which according to her is long enough to be 
registered by someone with cognitive deficits.  
 
The second claim concerns the hypothesis that emotional reactions outlast 
memory. It his here that we find most interesting examples of how emotion 
and  memory  go  hand  in  hand.  Kennedy  &  Heilman  (2010)  claim  that 
emotions may be blunted in Alzheimer’s patients because in their experiment 
individuals suffering from the disease did not find the pleasant pictures (such 
as babies and puppies) as pleasant as did the healthy participants, and they 
found the negative pictures (snakes, spiders) less negative. Why this blunting 
of emotions may occur is unknown. Kennedy & Heilman speculate that there 
may be a degradation of part of the brain or loss of control of part of the brain 
important for experiencing emotion.  
 
According to Kennedy (2010), what these findings suggest is that as memory 
goes,  so  does  some  emotion.  As  a  possible  explanation  for  the  blunted 
emotions, Zaitchick & Albert (2004) suggest that individuals suffering from 
Alzheimer’s become incapable of interpreting emotion correctly because the 
lack  of  nerve  cells  and  synapses  does  not  allow  the  brain  to  process  the 
necessary  information.  They  report  that  their  study,  in  line  with  previous 
research  studies,  indicates  that  brain  damage  associated  with  Alzheimer’s 
prevents sufferers from recognizing emotions and appropriately interpreting 
those emotions in social situations. 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Emotion and memory - two sides of the same coin 
 
Based on the interrelation between emotion and memory Kennedy (2010) 
stressed earlier, it is essential to follow this trail, as we will see that it is very 
difficult to support the claims Zaitchick & Albert (2004) arrive at. In fact, 
starting from the assumption that emotion and memory go together, we will 
find  on  the  neurological  level  very  little  support  for  the  truisms  about 
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assumption  of  close  to  absolute  memory  loss  in  Alzheimer’s  patients.  In 
chapter 4 we will see that whole research designs are built on this fallacy. We 
will see that research tools originally developed in conversation analysis have 
been  established  across  disciplines  in  particular  to  trace  and  mark  the 
assumed  ‘loss  of  self’  which  the  majority  of  studies  on  Alzheimer’s 
presuppose based on the assumed memory loss.  
 
From a neurological perspective, looking at the brain’s anatomy reveals that 
memory  is  tied  to  emotion  and  vice  versa.  Emotions,  as  well  as  memory 
functions  are  broadly  distributed  across  both  hemispheres  of  the  brain, 
indicating that emotion and memory processes involve multiple functions. 
Hence, a high number of brain regions are involved in the emotion-memory 
interaction with the limbic system, and in particular the amygdala playing an 
essential role. The amygdala is the brain region most strongly implicated in 
emotional  memory  because  it  is  critically  involved  in  calculating  the 
emotional significance of events, and, through its connection to brain regions 
dealing  with  sensory  experiences,  also  appears  to  be  responsible  for  the 
influence  of  emotion  on  perception  (see  Smith  &  Squire,  2009).  Brain 
imaging  methods  have  also  revealed  that  the  frontal  cortex  is  crucially 
involved, and it is currently thought that new memories are transferred to 
there for long-term storage.  
 
Without  going  into  too  much  depth,  the  crucial  insight  we  get  from 
neuroscience is that only patients with lesions in the hippocampus on both 
sides of the brain not only lose the ability to form new memories, but also 
lose memories of events which occurred in the years preceding the onset of 
their amnesia. To suffer from lesions on both sides is a very unlikely scenario. 
A famous individual who suffered from this condition, and hence received a 
lot  of  interest  from  cognitive  neuroscientists  and  psychologists  over  the 
course  of  his  life  time,  was  H.M.  who  in  1953  had  large  parts  of  his 
hippocampi on both hemispheres removed in an attempt to cure his epilepsy. 
Almost two years after the surgery, Scoville & Milner (1957) reported that 
H.M. appeared to have a complete loss of memory of events subsequent to 
the  operation,  and  also  a  partial  retrograde  amnesia  for  the  three  years   60 
leading up to the surgery; however, early memories were reported to be intact 
(1957: 17).  
 
Based on the insights cognitive neuroscientists gained from the case of H.M., 
it has been shown, first  of all, that most importantly the hippocampi and 
limbic system are involved in the laying down of recent memories. Secondly, 
it  has  been  found  that  people  do  not  have  a  recent  memory  impairment 
unless these structures, which are all paired, are affected bilaterally. So, to 
affect laying down of new memories both right and left hippocampi (or other 
paired  structures  such  as  mamillary  bodies,  thalamus,  etc.)  have  to  be 
destroyed; which rarely occurs.  
 
Remote or old memories, in contrast, reside in multiple brain areas. Modern 
functional  imaging  shows  that  the  patterns  of  activation  are  widespread, 
including visual areas to auditory and olfactory regions, frontal attentional 
areas and the limbic system “as the entire scene ramifies through the brain 
and widespread groups of neurons get recruited” (Smith & Squire, 2009: 4). 
Based  on  his  observations  of  people  suffering  from  dementia,  Ribot 
formulated  his  law  (1888)  which  states  that  remote  memories  are  more 
resistant to memory destroying processes than new ones. Hence, by simply 
destroying  one  part  of  the  brain  one  cannot  expunge  remote  memories. 
Moreover, Smith & Squire (2009) outline that certain memories will never be 
affected unless for some reason the whole brain shuts down, as in coma: “If a 
person  is  otherwise  communicating  logically  he  will  never  forget  his  own 
identity,  his  own  childhood,  nor  will  he  forget  about  well-rehearsed  tasks 
such as tying shoelaces or even complex well-learned tasks. She is unlikely to 
forget about her parents or his wife and children unless such memories were 
recently established” (ibid: 5).  
 
So,  while  memory  refers  to  writing  up  the  engram  into  the  brain,  recall 
means bringing the memory back up into awareness and finding some means 
to express it. Based on Ribot’s insights into dementia, nowadays it is assumed 
that recall of verbal memory, that is memory of words, is first to be affected in 
Alzheimer’s  disease  (see  Smith  &  Squire,  2009).  To  test  this,  subjects 
suffering  from  mild  to  severe  Alzheimer’s  and  a  control  group  of  healthy   61 
subjects are typically asked to store a small number of unrelated words and 
are  then  asked  to  repeat  these  words  after  a  few  minutes  (for  instance, 
Kramer et al., 1988; Pepin, 1989; Finali, 1992; Kaltreider, 1999). Zakzanis & 
Boulos (2002) even claim that tests of verbal memory are the best predictor 
of who will suffer from Alzheimer’s.  
 
For different reasons, I argue that the above-mentioned studies have to be 
carefully tested. The first reason concerns the neurological basis of language, 
the second the role of emotions in memory retrieval, and the third one the 
recurring triadic relationships between a person, the environment and their 
behaviour. Starting with the first point, Antonio and Hanna Damasio (1992) 
have discovered that specific verbal categories may have an exact localization 
within the brain. They give the example of patients in whom after having had 
a stroke or brain injury, a small specific brain region stops working which 
stored  a  specific  category  of  words,  for  instance  ‘tools’.  The  interesting 
observation is that the lesion prevents certain patients from being able to 
make that specific association, for instance that a ‘hammer’ is a ‘tool’, though 
they  may  very  well  be  able  to  focus  their  attention  on  the  uses  or 
characteristics of a hammer if shown a picture.  
 
In another study, Lyons et al. (2010) studied the role of personal experience 
in the neural processing of action-related language. They investigated how 
auditory language processing is modified by a listener’s previous experience 
with the specific activities mentioned in the speech. They show that personal 
experience  with  linguistic  content  modulated  activity  both  in  regions 
associated  with  language  comprehension  and  in  those  related  to  complex 
action planning. Furthermore, their findings suggest that the degree to which 
one finds information personally relevant also modulates processing in brain 
regions related to semantic-level processing. 
 
These are striking examples of the fact that conceptualizations are stored in 
memory and have multiple ‘handles’ (Smith & Squire, 2009) by which they 
may be pulled up into awareness.  In the following we will have a brief look 
again at the interconnection of emotion and memory to understand what is 
potentially meant by ‘handles’ apart from verbal language. I hope that so far   62 
we have collected enough proof that we have to carefully test certain truisms 
in research with Alzheimer’s patients. In particular, I want to provide the 
essential background knowledge for the critical discussion in  chapter 4 of 
traditional views on the ‘self’ that is tied to (flawless) verbal language and that 
take impaired speech as a hallmark feature of declining cognitive abilities. So 
far,  we  considered  emotion  and  memory  on  the  neuronal  level.  In  the 
following we will now focus on the psychological level.  
 
Coming back to the relationship between memory and emotion as it has been 
suggested earlier in the studies with Alzheimer’s patients, and also in relation 
to method acting in chapter 2, we know that a specific memory itself may be 
difficult  to  recall,  but  the  emotional  association  occurs  and  affects  the 
behaviour in multiple ways. There is a solid body of research that suggests 
that the more emotion one attaches to an event, the more likely one is to 
remember it (see Russell, 1980).  In Yanofsky’s words, “once made, the nexus 
between emotion and specific memories is hard to tear asunder” (Yanofsky, 
2001:  2).  So,  how  does  this  work?  Most  studies  focus  on  the  arousal 
dimension  of  emotion  as  the  critical  factor  contributing  to  the  emotional 
enhancement  effect  on  memory  (Guderian  et  al.,  2009).  Latest  research 
suggests that it is the emotions aroused, not the personal significance of the 
event, that makes such events easier to remember. The memory of strongly 
emotional events, however, may be at the expense of other information.  
 
Thus,  an  individual  may  be  less  likely  to  remember  information  if  it  is 
followed by something that is strongly emotional. Another crucial aspect is 
mood or more precisely an individual’s emotional state at the time of memory 
encoding  or  retrieving.  On  the  one  hand,  our  mood  interacts  with  our 
perception in influencing what is noticed and encoded. On the other, it has 
been shown that individuals remember events that match their current mood 
(mood congruence), and also tend to remember more easily when the mood 
at retrieval matches that at encoding (mood dependence). Thus, chances of 
remembering an event are higher if one evokes the emotional state one was in 
at the time of experiencing the event or learning the fact.  
   63 
Finally I want to draw attention again to the fact that a very high number of 
brain  regions  may  become  involved  in  recollecting  a  memory  as  emotion. 
Vision, hearing and other senses are recruited. Of all five senses, olfaction 
seems  to  be  the  most  closely  associated  with  memory  function  (Lehrer, 
2009). This has been argued anatomically, because olfaction is probably the 
most tied to the limbic system and the motivational areas of the frontal lobe 
as well (see Smith & Squire, 2009). With regard to evolution, it has been 
found that olfaction appears early in animals who inhabit water; far before 
cognition. 
 
 
 
3.5. Summary 
 
This chapter began with an introduction into emotion management research 
in work psychology. This overview was followed by a discussion of emotion 
theories in neuroscience and psychology. Here, it was concluded that emotion 
and memory are interrelated. This can be shown on the biological level, but 
also in psychological experiments. With regard to Alzheimer’s, and dementia 
in general, these insights provide the necessary background information to 
question  certain  truisms;  the  most  important  one  being  that  absolute 
memory loss has to be expected in individuals with this diagnosis. Whereas 
the disease is known to be neurodegenerative, meaning that brain tissue is 
destroyed over the course of it, we have seen that the way memory is spread 
all over the brain is so complex, that it is literally impossible to know for sure 
if it is ‘lost’. Furthermore, we have seen that the role of emotions is crucial in 
memory formation and remembering. Remembering can be expressed using 
the  multimodality  of  our  bodies  (facial  expressions,  gestures,  etc.),  with 
language being only one aspect of many. The same holds true for emotion 
processes. In the following chapter we will now apply these insights to recent 
discourse studies in psychology and conversation analysis with Alzheimer’s 
patients.  
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In  psychology  it  is  common  to  study  empathic  behaviour  and  emotion 
recognition through emotion world questionnaires (Werner et al., 2007) and 
standard Ekman 60 Faces Test (Ekman & Friesen, 1976; modified version: 
picture-picture matches, instead of picture-word matches). Another tool is 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), a questionnaire that 
measures  the  different  aspects  of  empathy.  Also,  quite  frequently 
Interpersonal  Adjective  Scales  (IAS;  Wiggins,  1995)  are  used,  a  self-  and 
other- report questionnaire based on a personality theory of interpersonal 
constructs. Upon learning about the social nature of emotion, as well as the 
broad range of cues  which  are factored into social psychological research, 
research  on  ‘emotion  management’  has  to  reflect  the  highly  interactive 
nature. This cannot be sufficiently realised with the help of the research tools 
just listed. Therefore this thesis’s main body will present ethnographic data 
that sets out to capture emotion and cognition ‘in the wild’ (Hutchins, 1995). 
Yet,  since  this  study  is  situated  within  discourse  studies,  the  following 
chapter first  needs to answer the crucial question as to what a discourse-
based study can possibly achieve and if there is room to integrate the insights 
we gained in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   65 
4 
Love and the four-letter word 
Discourse studies, emotions and cognition 
 
 
 
 
There is no reason to look under the skull since nothing  
of interest is to be found there but brains.  
(Garfinkel, 1963: 190) 
 
Don't worry about how fast they’re thinking. First of all, don't 
worry about whether they’re ‘thinking.’ Just try to come to 
terms with how it is that the thing comes off. 
(Sacks, 1992: 11, Vol. 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that in this ‘decade of the brain’ (Jones 
et al., 1999) there is a strong tendency to study cognition hand-in-hand with 
progress in the neurosciences. However, these phenomena which are usually 
summarised  under  the  umbrella  term  cognition,  i.e.  memory,  learning, 
linguistic performance, and comprehension, for instance, enjoy equally high, 
and  long-established  interest  from  those  disciplines  traditionally  more 
interested  in  the  social  level  of  analysis,  for  instance  sociology, 
ethnomethodology,  and  conversation  analysis.  This  chapter  discusses   66 
theoretical and methodological approaches to cognition in the wider field of 
discourse  studies.  This  will  encompass  conversation  analysis  but  also 
discursive psychology, a growing subfield of social psychology. We will see 
that  scholars  in  discursive  psychology  draw  heavily  on  the  theoretical 
framework  of  conversation  analysis  to  distance  themselves  from  their 
colleagues  in  cognitive  psychology.  Contrary  to  their  paradigm,  this 
subdiscipline rejects the ‘cognitivist’ model of mind, focusing rather on the 
emergence and role of cognitive functions as they occur in social interactions. 
As mentioned earlier, we can see here CA’s influence in providing not only 
the motivation but also the toolkit to analyse how participants themselves 
create meaning. As one of Harvey Sacks’s closest colleagues, Schegloff (e.g., 
1997, 2006) is a major proponent of the importance of limiting analysis to 
participants’ own categories and demonstrable concerns. The wording here, 
of course, is ambiguous, considering that a ‘cognitivist’ perspective promotes 
exactly this view: that subjects create meaning in their own minds. So, the 
crucial question that fuels this ‘cognitivist’ v.  ‘anticognitivist’ debate is where 
exactly cognition resides. From the beginning, it has to be pointed out that 
the label ‘anticognitivist’ does not equal an embodied and distributed view on 
cognition. In fact, we will see in the first part of this chapter that among those 
who have been debating about this topic in eminent journals over the course 
of years, an embodied perspective, as introduced in the past two chapters, is 
not represented.  
 
Taking  this  discussion  from  the  theoretical  level  to  actual  studies  with 
Alzheimer’s patients, we will see, that despite using the label CA many studies 
are  cognitivist  in  disguise.  Calling  into  mind  the  existing  medicalised 
Discourse  on  the  disease,  it  is  in  particular  this  type  of  approach  that 
perpetuates a Cartesian notion of ‘self’ which provides the basis for those who 
theorise a loss of ‘self’ attached to the progression of Alzheimer’s. In the last 
section of this chapter we will therefore consider the work of Charles and 
Marjorie  Goodwin,  who  not  only  are  eminent  scholars  in  CA,  but  also 
proponents of the embodied and distributed perspective on cognition.   
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4.1. Is discourse analysis suitable for cognitive analysis? 
 
In order to understand the scepticism about cognitive analysis in discourse 
studies, I will present in the following selected contributions to this debate as 
published  in  the  journals  Discourse  Studies,  Discourse  &  Society  and 
Discourse  &  Communication.  The  contributors  are  established  scholars  in 
(anthropological)  linguistics,  cognitive  science,  sociology  and  discursive 
psychology  (for  instance,  van  Dijk,  Billig,  Cicourel,  Coulter,  Duranti, 
Edwards, Potter, Wodak, Schegloff, and Levinson, just to name a few) and 
either declared proponents or opponents of those links between conversation 
and cognition.  
 
First, the position of discursive psychology (DP) will be introduced as this 
discussion first of all establishes DP’s radically different perspective within 
psychology,  and  secondly  outlines  the  pre-eminent  role  of  conversation 
analysis (CA) within DP. DP is a systematically non-cognitive approach. That 
is, “it brackets off questions about the existence (or not) of cognitive entities 
and  processes  (…).  Its  focus  is  squarely  on  cognitive  entities  as  they  are 
constructed  in  and  for  public,  interactional  practices”  (Potter  &  Hepburn, 
2006: 166). Contrary to the majority of subdisciplines in social psychology, 
DP accordingly rejects the cognitivist approach, which treats human action as 
a  product  of  cognition.  This  implies  that  within  cognitivism  discourse  is 
treated as the expression of thoughts. We have seen in the previous chapter 
that  in  psychology  it  is  a  common  practice  to  “tap  emotional  experience 
through verbal report” (Holodynski & Friedlmeier, 2006: 43). In particular in 
cognitive psychology, discourse is seen as: “1) the input to, or output from, or 
categories and schemas used in, mental models and processes; and/ or 2) a 
methodological resource for research into mental states and representations” 
(Edwards, 2006: 2). 
 
In opposition to this approach, DP promotes an interpretivist examination of 
behaviours  that  foregrounds  “participants’  own  concepts  and 
understandings” as these are deployed in practices of interaction (Edwards 
and  Potter,  1992:  100).  In  contrast  with  the  mainstream  social-cognitive 
tradition in psychology is DP’s use of records of natural, everyday interaction,   68 
such as police interrogations, psychiatric assessments, and family mealtimes 
(Edwards,  2006;  see  Hepburn  and  Wiggins,  2007,  for  reviews  and 
summaries of recent work). So, in contrast to modelling action (‘behaviour’) 
experimentally  with  the  aim  of  deducing  general,  trans-situation,  trans-
historical  processes  (representative  experiments  were  presented  in  the 
previous  chapter),  discursive  psychology  emphasizes  the  importance  of 
working  with  participants’  orientations  (see  Potter,  2003).  Regarding 
discourse as a social rather than a psychological phenomenon, orderliness is 
hence found in the observable composition and positioning rather than in 
tracking underlying mental processes.  
 
One  can  tell  that  discursive  psychology  has  been  profoundly  shaped  by 
conversation analysis (see for instance Potter, 2006). In fact, Edwards (1995) 
points out that in particular the reception of Sacks’s work in DP provided a 
radical alternative to mainstream cognitivist approaches to psychology. Based 
on  the  short  introduction  to  DP  so  far,  we  can  see  why  CA  appeals  to 
proponents of DP. Sacks’s emphasis was on how the visibility/ hearability of 
interaction  is  crucial  to  its  operation,  with  cognition  (mind,  thoughts, 
knowledge, etc.) relevant through how it is heard and seen. Considering talk 
as a medium for action, Sacks’s focus was on the issue of how language can 
work  as  something  that  can  be  both  culturally  learnable  and  publicly 
understandable.  It  is  the  following  quote,  possibly  one  of  Sacks’s  most 
famous statements, that DP identifies with and refers to: 
 
“When  people  start  to  analyze  social  phenomena,  if  it  looks  like 
things occur with the sort of immediacy we find in some of these 
exchanges, then, if you have to make an elaborate analysis of it - 
that is to say, show that they did something as involved as some of 
the things I have proposed - then you figure that they couldn't have 
thought  that  fast.  I  want  to  suggest  that  you  have  to  forget  that 
completely. Don't worry about how fast they’re thinking. First of all, 
don't worry about whether they’re ‘thinking.’ Just try to come to 
terms with how it is that the thing comes off. Because you'll find 
that  they  can  do  these  things”  (Sacks,  1992:  11,  for  instance  in 
Edwards, 2004).  
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At the end of his very first lecture Sacks claimed that analysis would be most 
effective without thinking about how fast people think or whether they are 
thinking at all. While we can see here how this quote can be fitted to DP’s 
program – we will see in the next chapter that this quote is taken out of 
context - Potter (2006) takes it a step further in highlighting “the potential 
pitfalls”  (ibid:  4)  of  using  conversation  analytic  techniques  to  identify 
cognitive  states.  As  the  first  ‘pitfall’  he  describes  the  development  of  a 
dualistic picture that “distinguishes conduct from state of mind, and uses the 
classic  depth/  surface  figuration  of  cognitivism  where  cognitive  states  can 
‘come  to  the  interactional  surface’  or  remain  ‘disguised’”  (ibid:  5). 
Accordingly,  he  problematizes  in  a  next  step  the  analysis  of  a  speaker’s 
‘intention’.  Although  he  outlines  that  there  are  important  traditions  of 
psychology  where  intentions  are  treated  as  mental  events  that  are 
(somewhat) causally related to subsequent actions (ibid: 6), he argues that 
the tradition of thinking inspired by Wittgenstein rather tends to treat the 
term ‘intention’ as part of a particular language game, as a way of talking 
rather than a referential term for a mental state (ibid: 8).  
 
Potter’s colleague Edwards adds and concludes that “the key to analysis is to 
locate  psychological  and  other  issues  in  participants’  own  practices  of 
accountability. Whatever people say is always action-oriented, specific to its 
occasion, performative on and for its occasion, selected from an indefinite 
range of options, and always indexically tied to particulars. (...) Examining 
discourse  as  a  socially  disembedded  realm  of  mental  representation  will 
inevitably, and circularly, reproduce discourse as the expression of cognitive 
states  and  schemas”  (Edwards,  2006:  3).  Hence,  discursive  psychology’s 
message directed at everyone else in discourse studies has been quite bluntly 
formulated by Antaki, Billig, Edwards & Potter (2003): “it is to suggest that 
whatever kind of discourse analysis is being done, it has to amount to much 
more than treating talk and text as the expression of views, thoughts and 
opinions,  as  standard  survey,  ethnographic  and  interview  research  often 
does” (ibid: 17).  
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Of course, not all discourse analysts share discursive psychology’s rejection of 
underlying  mental  schemata.  Most  prominently,  van  Dijk  (1977,  2008) 
incorporates cognitive factors within his context models, without regarding 
discourse  as  a  means  of  discovering  cognitive  structures  or  mental 
representations. 
 
 
 
4.1.1. Coulter’s critique of DP 
 
In particular Coulter (1999) has frequently accused DP scholars of “missing 
the essential point, namely, that ‘cognition’ is intersubjectively ascribable and 
ratifiably  avowable.  That  is  the  nub,  if  you  will,  of  the  ‘social’  take  on 
‘cognition’” (1999: p.165/ 166; emphasis in original). He explains, that “if the 
mental  and  cognitive  (and  the  ‘personality’  and  the  ‘self’)  are  indeed  real 
entities in some sense, then the entire discursive approach is at best a side-
show:  the  serious  business  at  hand  will  remain  the  work  of  the  cognitive 
sciences”  (ibid).  As  outlined  earlier,  DP  holds  that  mind  and  reality  are 
treated analytically as discourse’s topics and the analytic task is to examine 
how  participants  descriptively  construct  them  (see  Edwards,  1997). 
According to Coulter, the problem with such formulation is that “the ‘mental’ 
is thus to be construed solely in terms of what people say about it” (1999: 
166).  
 
To justify his criticism and to show “how  the conflation of discourse with 
conceptual analysis can lead us astray” (ibid: 167), he has a closer look at how 
Edwards (1997) considers and analyses the concept of ‘memory’. Edwards 
states  that  from  a  discursive  perspective  memory  can  be  studied  in  two 
related ways: “as acts of remembering, as the discursive equivalent to what 
people do in memory experiments when they recall events” (Edwards, 1997: 
282), or “as a participants’ concern, examining the situated uses of words 
such as ‘remember’, ‘forget’, and so on” (ibid). Also, “we can study how these 
two things go  together, how  appeals to notions such as remembering and 
forgetting feature in the dynamics of event reporting, and vice versa.” (ibid). 
Either way, Coulter concludes, that “for them, ‘mental’ predicates are either   71 
names for real, interior entities or processes or they are names deployed in 
discourse as just “ways of talking” about self and other(s)” (Coulter, 1999:  
168/ 169).  
 
To clarify his position, Coulter quotes Wittgenstein’s famous ‘beetle in the 
box’ thought experiment: “Imagine a community in which each member had 
a box with something inside it. Everyone calls the object in the box a ‘beetle’, 
but no one can look in anyone else’s box and can only determine the nature of 
a ‘beetle’ by looking into his own box. Wittgenstein proposes that, if ‘beetle’ 
has a use in the public language, then the object in the box must be irrelevant 
to its meaning. If this private object does play a part in the understanding of 
‘beetle’, then intersubjective communication would be impossible” (Coulter, 
1979: 78; emphasis in original). 
 
Indeed,  the  ‘language  system’  is,  as  Harris  (1981,  1996,  2003,  2004)  has 
argued, a myth which prevents us from appreciating the constant creation of 
linguistic  means  in  our  everyday  acts  of  communication.  The  alternative 
promoted is to see communication not as a process in which individuals are 
merely  the  embodiment  of  meanings  set  up  in  advance  in  the  ‘language 
system’, but to place it “on a par with all other forms of voluntary human 
action” (Harris, 1981: 167). 
 
This chapter will now discuss a number of studies in psychology and CA that 
conducted research with Alzheimer’s patients. We have seen in chapter 3 that 
many studies focus on the individual in isolation, shifting the focus to the 
presumed  cognitive  representations  and/  or  biological  underpinnings  of 
memory,  cognition  and  emotions.  However,  we  have  seen  that  these 
phenomena are at the same time thoroughly social in nature. Hence, both 
components  –  individual  cognition  and  the  emerging  interactional 
organisation/  distribution  –  are  absolutely  necessary.  We  have  seen  in 
chapter 2 and 3 that a focus on only one aspect potentially results in one-
sided  studies  which  deliver  over-simplified  reports  on  the  complex  issues 
they set out to study. In this chapter we will now have a concluding look at 
studies  that  intend  to  shed  light  on  social  interactions  with  Alzheimer’s 
sufferers.  The  discussion  will  reveal  that  original  CA  tools  are  re-  72 
contextualized  in  such  ways  that  help  maintaining  a  Cartesian  view  on 
cognition where the self is tied to language. These studies thereby establish a 
view on language that resembles Chomsky’s ‘ideal speaker’ – a view Sacks 
prominently rejected. 
 
 
4.2. Name it and claim it - Discourse studies and Alzheimer’s           
I have mentioned earlier that Wilma exhibits certain symptoms which are 
assumed to be markers of Alzheimer’s disease, such as incontinence, weight 
loss,  wandering,  tremors,  and  sundowning.  All  of  these  are  not  only 
commonly associated with the late stage of the disease but also with a rapid 
decline  in  cognitive  functions  (Scarmeas,  Brandt,  Blacker,  et  al.,  2007). 
Furthermore,  Wilma  exhibits  a  severe  disorder  of  speech  production, 
including to different extents phonology, morphology, semantics, and syntax, 
as well as noticeable declines in her ‘reasoning’ and ability to memorize or 
recall information. Describing Wilma in this fashion hence establishes her as 
a patient who suffers from a progressive neuro-degenerative brain disorder - 
someone  whose  existence  is  often  stigmatised  as  “drifting  towards  the 
threshold of unbeing” (Kitwood and Bredin, 1992: 285). Taking in particular 
linguistic  degradation  as  a  hallmark  feature  of  dementia,  the  dementia 
sufferer’s  declining  ability  to  communicate  with  others  about  past  and 
present events has led some authors to the hypothesis of an “internal loss of 
self in dementia” (Small et al., 1998: 292).  
As  introduced  in  chapter  1,  more  recently  there  has  been  a  focus  on 
narratives,  or  the  discursive  properties  of  communication  with  dementia 
sufferers.  Drawing  the  attention  away  from  the  prevalent  Cartesian 
understanding  of  ‘self’  in  research  with  Alzheimer’s  patients,  this  new 
research  direction  has  identified  a  number  of  external  influences  on  the 
preservation of ‘self’ or personhood in dementia (Kitwood and Bredin, 1992; 
Sabbat and Harré, 1992; Golander and Raz, 1996). In contrast to the afore-
mentioned studies, and their focus on the internal, neuro-pathological and 
neuro-psychological declines, studies such as Kitwood (1990) analyse the role   73 
of  external,  or  social-psychological  factors  in  maintaining  personhood. 
Acknowledging assumptions that self-identity is constituted by and through 
social  interaction  (Coupland  et  al.,  1993;  Mead,  1934),  these  studies  have 
shown that the way in which other people interact with the dementia sufferer 
has a significant impact on the individual’s own sense of identity and well-
being. However, only when turning the attention from academic to popular 
literature, one fully understands the importance of this insight, or rather its 
urgent  appeal.  It  is  reflected  in  a  growing  body  of  personal  journals  of 
caregivers of people with Alzheimer’s disease, and a few first-hand accounts 
of individuals living with the disease. One of them is Richard Taylor, a former 
psychology professor who was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease more than 
a  decade  ago.  Challenging  the  above-mentioned  scholarly  attitude  that 
theorises the ongoing ‘unbecoming of self’ in individuals with Alzheimer’s, 
Taylor named his collection of essays:  ‘Alzheimer’s – From the Inside out’ 
(2007).  Pondering  the  diagnosis,  we  learn  from  Richard  Taylor  that 
relationships with other people are among the crucial factors that shape and 
impact his life with Alzheimer’s disease:    
 
“What is it like to have Alzheimer’s? This, too, depends on many 
things:  Do  you  have  an  existing  group  of  individuals  who  are 
committed  to  your  well-being?  Are  you  a  proactive  or  a  reactive 
person  when  it  comes  to  dealing  with  doctors,  your  health 
insurance  company,  and  yourself?  Where  do  you  live:  Houston, 
Texas,  or  Houston,  Nigeria?  Do  you  have  insurance?  Especially 
long-term  care  insurance?  Does  your  culture  and  economic  class 
encourage and promote younger generations taking responsibility 
and care of their family’s older generations? There are dozens of 
important  factors  outside  of  yourself  that  will  directly  and 
significantly  influence  you  and  your  inner  experiences  with  the 
disease.” (Taylor, 2007: 15)  
 
 
Relationships  with  other  people  are  thus  the  central  topic  of  his  book. 
However, the reader does not only learn about how he feels and reflects upon 
his interactions with his environment and the role he plays, but he provides 
us with an invaluable, and sometimes angry voice that reminds us that it is in   74 
no  man’s  power  to  decide  when  another  one’s  ‘reasoning’  and  self  has 
‘unbecome’ or is ‘lost’:   
 
 
“I feel as if I am sitting in my grandmother’s living room, looking at 
the world through her lace curtains. From time to time, a gentle 
wind blows the curtains and changes the patterns through which I 
see the world. There are large knots in the curtains and I cannot see 
through them. There is a web of lace connecting the knots to each 
other, around which I can sometimes see. However, this entire filter 
keeps shifting unpredictably in the wind. Sometimes I am clear in 
my vision and my memory, sometimes I am disconnected but aware 
of memories, and other times I am completely unaware of what lies 
on the other side of the knots. As the wind blows, it is increasingly 
frustrating  to  understand  all  that  is  going  around  me,  because 
access  to  the  pieces  and  remembering  what  they  mean  keeps 
flickering on and off, on and off.” (Taylor, 2007: 75)  
 
 
On the one hand, the image Richard Taylor gives us describes the mystery of 
subjective experience, occupying a private mental world. We have no access 
to his memory of his grandmother’s living room and the specific curtains he 
recalls. On the other hand, his image allows for an interpretation of self that 
goes beyond a purely mental entity, as it is grounded in the sentient, physical 
body. One could say that he narrates the experience of an  embodied  self, 
sitting  in  the  chair,  feeling  the  wind,  the  visual  information  of  shifting 
curtains, all embodying his memory, or recall. However, his body is not an 
entity  independent  of  the  other  bodies  or  objects  surrounding  him.  The 
previous  chapter’s  review  has  given  striking  examples  of  the  cues  we 
encounter in our everyday life that can work as memory ‘handles’, with verbal 
language being only one of them. This, of course, also works the other way 
round, and can also be learned from Taylor: when we share memories and do 
remembering we do not only do this with the help of verbal language but use 
the multimodality we are capable of as human beings.   
In  the  existing  literature,  it  is  common  ground  that  the  language,  and  in 
particular, the conversational skills of individuals with Alzheimer’s reflect the   75 
progressive  decline  of  cognitive  functions.  Hence,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
Kontos  (2004)  refers  to  these  works  as  “a  catalogue  of  horrors  and 
documents of fear, dread and loss” (ibid: 845). One can argue that this fear 
and stigmatization of Alzheimer’s is a product of the ‘hypercognitive’ culture 
(Post, 2000) we are living in, where people who are best at rapidly processing 
symbols  are  most  competitive.  At  the  same  time,  the  commonly  held 
assumptions  concerning  the  degenerative  nature  of  the  disease,  which 
implies  a  limited  ability  of  patients  to  learn  new  information  have 
“discouraged  speech-language  pathologists  from  attempting  therapeutic 
programs that might help to overcome the communication deficits of patients 
with  Alzheimer’s  disease”  (Golper  &  Rau,  1983),  creating  a  climate  of 
“therapeutic nihilism” (Cheston & Bender, 1999: 77).  
This  attitude  of  ‘nihilism’  can  also  be  found  in  discourse  studies  with 
Alzheimer’s patients. Certain features of speech such as word substitutions, 
pauses, and a slowing down, are established as markers of the deterioration 
of verbal communication. An alarmingly high number of authors come to a 
similar conclusion like Appell, Kertesz and Fishman (1982) who state that 
discourse eventually becomes “circuitous and verbose, yet empty” (ibid: 87). 
This  has  two  very  specific  implications.  The  first  one  concerns  the 
conceptualization  of  ‘self’  in  Alzheimer’s,  and  the  second  one  how  this 
presumed  ‘empty’  speech  of  one  individual  affects  the  ‘quality’  of 
communication in interactions with others.  
Considering  the  use  of  the  expression  ‘quality  of  conversation’  in  existing 
research,  it  has  to  be  pointed  out  that  the  word  ‘quality’  is  used  in  an 
ambiguous way. In Bourgeois (1990), for instance, ‘quality’, on the one hand, 
refers to the “quality of the conversational content” (ibid: 29). On the other, 
the term seems to be used synonymously when talking about the interactants’ 
subjective sense of wellbeing and comfort of interactants who find themselves 
involved  in  conversations  with  Alzheimer’s  patients.  For  instance,  family 
caregivers are frequently described as feeling ‘discomfort’ and ‘burdened’ in 
such  situations,  while  at  the  same  time  having  the  tendency  to  act  in  a 
‘patronizing’ way (see for instance, Joaquin, 2010). In contrast to their family 
members, individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s tend to react ‘embarrassed’,   76 
‘frustrated’,  and  ‘anxious’,  which  leads  to  ‘further  withdrawal’  (see  for 
instance, Cohen, 1991). As a result, the interactants’ behaviour causes further 
reduced opportunities for ‘meaningful interaction’ (ibid).  
We will see further down that in many cases data is mapped against these 
assumptions. It has to be considered that the studies presented below aim at 
developing  communication  strategies  for  caregivers  in  conversations  with 
Alzheimer’s  patients.  Setting  these  studies  in  the  context  of  ‘therapeutic 
nihilism’, these strategies, as we will see, inevitably cannot aim at improving 
the  quality  of  the  conversational  content  (as  this  perspective  implies  that 
content will get lost at some point, and is irretrievable due to the Alzheimer’s 
patient’s  increasing  loss  of  memory,  reasoning,  etc.).  Thus,  these 
communicative strategies aim at influencing the interactants’ behaviour in 
interactions;  namely  strategies  that  work  on  the  negative  emotions,  like 
frustration, anxiety, embarrassment and discomfort, that can occur in these 
conversations. Accordingly, one can find a number of studies that focus on 
verbally  aggressive  outbursts  (Spayd  &  Smyer,  1988)  and  negative 
accusations (Green, Linsk & Pinkston, 1986), for instance. If the proposed 
strategies, or interventions, are successful, these behaviours have been shown 
to  decrease  and  social  interaction  to  increase,  as  for  instance  Blackman, 
Howe & Pinkston (1976) and Carstensen & Erickson (1986) point out. Pulling 
the strings together, the quality of social interaction can thus, first of all, be 
measured in conversations with Alzheimer’s patients. Secondly, the content 
of these interactions is close to irrelevant, as it is assumed that the language 
of an individual with Alzheimer’s is potentially empty.  
Anticipating  and  guessing  at  least  one  party’s  inner  emotions  in  these 
situations,  these  works  then  agree  in  advising  families  to  modify  their 
communicative behaviours – almost exclusively linguistic behaviour, such as 
simplified speech (Kemper et al., 1994) - to manage the Alzheimer’s sufferer’s 
emotions, in particular to avoid outbursts of anger, or anxiety. This in turn 
will affect their own emotions through reducing frustrating experiences. In 
Savundranayagam,  Ryan,  Anas  &  Orange  (2007)  we  can  find 
“communication-enhancing  strategies”  (ibid:  47).  Among  other  strategies 
they  focus  on  simplified  language,  concluding  that  “simplified  language   77 
enhanced those effects by showing staff as less patronizing and residents as 
more  competent”  (ibid:  62).  Normann,  Norberg  &  Asplund  (2002)  test 
similar strategies in what they perceive to be the small window of ‘lucidity’: 
“Patients  with  severe  dementia  sometimes  surprise  the  care  providers 
because they seem to be much more aware of their situation and function 
much more adequately than usual. Such episodes are labelled ‘episodes of 
lucidity’  (ELs)”  (2002:  370).  Based  on  their  results,  they  conclude  that 
lucidity  is  promoted  by  “sharing  the  patient’s  view,  repeating  and 
reformulating  the  patient’s  utterance,  reinforcing  the  patient  by  using 
positive  utterances,  not  emphasizing  errors  and  supporting  the  patient’s 
language in various ways, and avoiding making demands” (ibid). According 
to the authors, the relation between the patient and her conversation partner 
during ELs is characterized by “confirmation and communion” (ibid). 
Lucidity  and  clear  communication  in  the  face  of  advanced  Alzheimer’s 
disease are inexplicable, given that cognition and memory have come to be 
equated with selfhood in Western culture (Basting 2003 in Kontos, 2006). 
This representation of selfhood is itself the legacy of western philosophy’s 
tendency to split mind from body in a Cartesian fashion, and to position the 
former as superior to the latter. There are thus deep philosophical roots to 
the  prevalent  assumption  that  cognitive  impairment  implies  a  loss  of 
selfhood. In this sense, the presumed existential erosion of selfhood is, to a 
large extent, owed to a certain philosophical inheritance (see Kontos, 2006). I 
want to stress here, that I certainly do not ignore the fact that Alzheimer’s is a 
neurodegenerative  disease.  I  think  that  one  of  the  biggest  challenges  in 
contemporary research in neuropathology is to identify at what stage which 
markers occur and how to best treat them. But because of this lack of detailed 
understanding of the disease’s progression, I agree with Kontos that there is a 
tendency to philosophically ground the notion of personhood.    
As  already  introduced  in  chapter  1  (p.  5),  Pia  Kontos  challenges  the 
mind/body  dualism  that  underlies  the  assumed  loss  of  selfhood  in  this 
particular  understanding  of  Alzheimer’s  disease,  endorsing  a  theoretical 
framework of embodiment (Kontos 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). In her seminal 
ethnographic study (2004, 2005, 2006) of an Orthodox Jewish Alzheimer’s   78 
support unit in Canada, Kontos explored the notion of selfhood in the face of 
‘severe cognitive impairment’9.  
 
She  integrates  Merleau-Ponty’s10  (1962)  radical  reconceptualisation  of 
perception and Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) theory of the logic of practice (see for 
instance  Kontos,  2004:  830  ff.).  Drawing  in  particular  on  the  works  of 
Merleau-Ponty, an embodied understanding of cognition is manifest in her 
perspective. Kontos approaches the body focusing on its “concrete, spatial, 
and  pre-reflective  directedness  toward  the  lived  world”  (2006:  203), 
endorsing an understanding of the “active presence of the past in the body 
itself” (2006: 209). From this perspective, contrary to studies cited above, the 
construction of self is not reliant on language per se, but can be “enacted in 
the  actual  movements  of  the  body”  (ibid:  209).  Shifting  the  focus  on 
appearance, etiquette and dance, for instance, 
 
 
 “[t]he residents did not communicate with each other with words 
alone. Gestures, movements of the body, limbs, hands, head, feet 
and  legs,  facial  expressions  (smiles,  frowns),  eye  behaviour 
(blinking, winking, direction and length of gaze and pupil dilation) 
and  posture  carried  implication  and  meaning.  Constantly  and 
everywhere these gestures were employed. They played a large role 
in  inter-personal  communication,  and  often  conveyed  praise, 
blame,  thanks,  support,  affection,  gratitude,  disapproval,  dislike, 
sympathy, greeting or farewell. Slight head nods, eye and small lip 
movements,  chin  thrusts,  shoulder  nods,  hand  and  finger 
movements,  as  well  as  leg  and  foot  shifts  were  intentional, 
informative,  communicative  and  interactive.  A  short  sequence  of 
acts might signal for another resident’s attention: a directed gaze 
                                                 
9  In particular the studies cited here conducted in psychology use so-called mini-mental-
state examination (MMSE) questionnaires to define the nature and severity of participants’ 
cognitive  impairment.  Just  like  this  thesis’s  author,  Kontos  does  not  make  use  of  this 
questionnaire.  Since  we  both  argue  for  an  embodied  and  distributed  perspective  on 
cognition, the insights one can gain from MMSEs are considered to be insufficient – at least 
in my opinion.  
10 “I experience my own body as the power of adopting certain forms of behavior and a 
certain world, and I am given to myself merely as a certain hold upon the world; now, it is 
precisely my body which perceives the body of another, and discovers in that other body a 
miraculous prolongation of my own intentions, a familiar way of dealing with the world. 
Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise a system, so my body and the other's 
are one whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon…" (1962/2003: 412). 
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towards another person, a smile, a lift of an eyebrow, a wave, and a 
quick head nod. Likewise, gaze avoidance signalled a desire not to 
communicate, often accompanied by particular body movements or 
postures, such as turning away” (Kontos, 2004: 835). 
 
Considering the remarkable observations in her studies, I am certainly with 
Kontos, when she argues that “[i]f we could shift the discourse on selfhood in 
Alzheimer’s disease towards a greater recognition of the way that humans are 
embodied, it would critically challenge the widespread presumption of the 
loss of agency with cognitive impairment. It would do so by disentangling 
selfhood from the cognitive categories upon which long-standing notions of 
selfhood are presumed, and it would ground selfhood in corporeality. Rather 
it promotes a perspective on the body and selfhood that provides new insight 
and  direction  for  future  investigation  of  Alzheimer’s  disease,  and  more 
broadly  of  embodied  ways  of  being-in-the-  world”  (Kontos,  2004:  846).  I 
would  add  that  researchers  who  investigate  the  speech  of  Alzheimer’s 
patients nowadays have the option to embed their data analyses within this 
established Discourse. However, as we have seen, this potentially implies that 
researchers perpetuate what Kontos called ‘horror stories’ of Alzheimer.  
The following study exemplifies this once more. Tappen, Williams, Fishman 
& Touhy (1999) conducted conversations with nursing home residents with a 
diagnosis of probable Alzheimer’s disease. They focused specifically on their 
use of the “first person indexical and other evidence, such as awareness and 
reactions to the changes that had taken place, in support of and counter to 
the notion of persistence of self, were sought” (ibid: 121). The authors found 
that  “respondents  used  the  first  person  indexical  frequently,  freely  and 
coherently” (ibid). Hence, they conclude that this is evidence that “awareness 
of self persists into the middle and late stages of Alzheimer’s disease” (ibid).  
Considering the claims so far, it can be concluded that there seems to be the 
following consensus, or line of argumentation. The behaviours outlined above 
(e.g.,  anxiety)  are  considered  ‘trouble’  or  ‘troublesome’.  These  behaviours, 
however,  occur  with  and  are  signalled  through  specific  linguistic  markers 
(e.g., slowed down speech, errors in the lexicon or syntax). In the Cartesian   80 
tradition,  these  signal  a  dysfunct  self  which  emerges  in  interactions. 
Accordingly,  it  has  been  highlighted  that  the  effects  of  the  disease  on  the 
communicative competence of the sufferer, and the quality of the relationship 
with  their  caregivers,  are  almost  exclusively  negative  for  both  parties 
involved.  
Now, a second reason that explains why conversation analysis is increasingly 
being used to analyse conversations with people with neurogenic language 
disorders  is  because  “it  allows  for  the  description  of  how  trouble  in  a 
conversation  is  signalled,  how  it  is  repaired  and  to  what  extent  these 
conversational repairs are successful” (Watson et al., 1999: 195). Schegloff, 
Jefferson & Sacks (1977) distinguish between several interactional types of 
repair. First of all, there is a distinction between the initiation of repair after a 
trouble-spot  (‘initiation’),  and  the  potential  outcome  of  the  repair 
(‘correction’).  
As far as repair-initiation is concerned, Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks (1977) 
make a distinction between initiation by the speaker herself (‘self-initiation’), 
or initiation by another participant (‘other-initiation’). Accordingly, there is 
correction  by  the  speaker  herself  (‘self-repair’)  and  correction  by  another 
person (‘other-repair’): 
“SELF-initiation of repair (i.e by speaker of the trouble source) and OTHER-
initiation of repair (i.e. by any party other than speaker of the trouble source).  
Examples follow. 
 
2.21. Self-repair can issue from self-initiation: 
 
(10) N:                              She was givin me a:ll the people that 
                                    ->       were go :ne this yea: r I mean this 
                                    ->       quarter y' // know 
         J:                               Yeah             [NJ:4] 
 
(11) Vic:                 En- it nevuh happen. Now I could of 
                                              wen' up there en told the parents 
                                    ->      myself but then the ma- the husbin 
                                              liable tuh come t'd'doh ...       [US:4] 
 
2.22. Self-repair can issue from other-initiation: 
 
(12) Ken:     Is Al here today? 
        Dan:     Yeah. 
       (2.0)   81 
        Roger:          -> He is? hh eh heh 
        Dan:                    -> Well he was.                   [GTS: 5:3] 
 
 
2.23. Other-repair can issue from self-initiation: 
 
(13) B:                   -> He had dis uh Mistuh W- whatever k- I can't 
                                       think of his first name, Watts on, the one thet wrote  //  that piece, 
       A:                   ->Dan Watts.           [BC: Green: 88] 
 
 
2.24. Other-repair can issue from other-initiation: 
 
(14) B:                Where didju play ba: sk//etbaw. 
        A:                              (The) gy:m. 
        B:                              In the gy:m? 
        A:                              Yea:h. Like grou(h)p therapy. Yuh know= 
        B:                               Oh:::. 
        A:                               half the group thet we had la:s' term wz there en we jus' playing 
                                             arou:nd. 
        B:                         -> Uh- fooling around. 
        A:                               Eh-yeah...             [TG:3]” 
                                                                                      (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977: 364/365) 
Altogether this system allows for four different scenarios: Self-initiated self-
repair,  self-initiated  other-repair,  other-initiated  self-repair,  and  other-
initiated  other-repair.  There  is  agreement  in  CA  that  self-repair  is  always 
favoured and self-initiated other-repair virtually impossible (Levinson, 1983).  
Self-initiated repair can occur in any of the three positions in the turn-taking 
sequence: 
(a) in the same turn as the trouble-spot source (which can be a lexical 
‘error’, but repair is not restricted to these) 
(b) in the ‘transition relevance place’ (TRP) of that turn 
(c) in the ‘third turn’, which is the turn subsequent to the one following 
the trouble-spot turn 
 
The defining characteristic of conversational repair is that the current activity 
is  put  on  hold  and  dealing  with  ‘trouble’  is  made  the  business  of  the 
interaction.  Once  the  problem  is  resolved,  the  main  activity  is  resumed. 
Repair operations may include reformulations, word searches, corrections, 
and clarification requests.   82 
In their conversational data that includes one Alzheimer’s patient, Watson et 
al.  (1999)  identified  and  analysed  ‘trouble  indicating  behaviour’,  specific 
repair types, and the successfulness of these repair types. They claim that 
trouble indicating behaviour signals a “breakdown” in the conversation (ibid: 
195). Whilst the authors acknowledge that indicating trouble is an interactive 
enterprise, they state that the “normal partner” (ibid) is the one who carries 
“a greater burden” (ibid) negotiating the repair sequence. Concerning the role 
of the individual with Alzheimer’s in these interactions, Watson et al. claim 
that “there were more instances of inappropriate repair by individuals with 
AD that were sometimes accepted by the normal partner in an attempt to 
preserve the self esteem of the subjects with AD or to maintain the flow of 
conversation” (ibid: 216). Or, as Small, Gutman, Makela & Hillhouse (2003) 
put  it:  “Caregivers  carry  the  burden  of  managing  breakdowns  in 
communication  because  people  with  AD  are  often  unable  to  modify  their 
communicative behaviour” (2003: 353).  
As we can see here, CA’s notions of ‘trouble’, ‘repair’ and ‘appropriateness’ in 
these  studies  come  dangerously  close  to  Chomsky’s  ‘ideal  speaker’  and 
eventually  play  a  significant  role  in  sustaining  the  Cartesian  view  on 
cognition that links the self to appropriate verbal expression. In the following 
chapter we will see that this application of CA’s repair tools cannot be found 
in the work of Harvey Sacks, and I would argue that re-contextualising them 
in this fashion is oddly contrary to his beliefs and the reasons why he set out 
to study conversations in the first place. To give another example, Gentry & 
Fisher (2007) define in their study two types of listener repair responses, 
indirect and direct repairs. They claim that there are two repair types: in an 
indirect  repair,  the  listener  paraphrases  the  speech  of  the  person  with 
Alzheimer’s disease, while in a direct repair response, the listener interjects 
with corrective. They conclude that indirect repair responses may decrease 
“the  risk  of  excess  verbal  deficits”  (2007:  97).  In  line  with  their 
argumentation  they  hence  recommend  that  caregivers  should  “reinforce 
rather  than  punish  verbal  behaviour”  (ibid:  97)  and  thereby  improve  the 
“quality’ of life” (ibid) for both parties. 
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4.3. A distributed view on language and cognition  
 
In his research on the active participation in conversations of individuals who 
suffer  from  brain  damage,  Charles  Goodwin,  and  also  his  wife  Marjorie, 
choose CA for very different reasons: “CA provides a theoretical framework in 
which the visible displays of the body are thoroughly integrated into language 
practice,  something  that  is  especially  important  for  the  analysis  of  the 
language ability of parties whose speech production is impaired” (Goodwin & 
Goodwin,  2000).  Through  changing  participation  displays,  including 
concurrent assessments and appropriate use of the visible body, hearers not 
only co-construct an assessment being given voice by another speaker but, 
more  important,  display  through  their  embodied  actions  their  detailed 
understanding of the events in progress. Hence, the focus is not just on the 
(proper) language abilities of the individual whose brain has been damaged, 
but  he  takes  as  the  basic  unit  of  analysis  sequences  of  talk  constructed 
through the collaborative actions of multiple parties.  
 
In particular Goodwin’s research with ‘Chil’, a New York lawyer who after 
having had a stroke is left with the ability to produce merely three distinct 
words  (yes,  no,  and),  provides  striking  examples  of  distributed  cognition 
(Goodwin, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2003; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000, 2002). In 
contrast to the studies presented above, Chil’s communicative ‘problems’ are 
never  contextualized  in  the  light  of  declining  cognitive  functions.  In  fact, 
what Goodwin focuses on is how Chil gets others to produce the words he 
needs, by embedding his talk within sequences of action co-constructed with 
his interlocutors. If analysis were restricted to the structure of his utterances 
in isolation, most of his competence to understand and use language to build 
meaningful action in concert with others would be hidden.  
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                                                                                                             (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2002: 5) 
 
The Goodwins (2000) show that someone who is not able to produce multi-
word utterances on his own might nevertheless display understanding of the 
talk in progress, by performing relevant participation displays at appropriate 
places.  Yet,  to  ‘display  understanding’  and  also  ‘relevant  participation 
displays’ have to be clarified. In his fictive ‘Pacific Palisades’ dialogue, Harvey 
Sacks  suggests  that  in  order  to  demonstrate  understanding  the  speaker 
would  “provide  clear  EVIDENCE  of  recognition  of  the  referent  that  (…)  
would  normally  have  to  involve  some  expansion  or  transformation  of  the 
reference”  (Heritage,  2007:  268).  In  Sacks’s  example  this  would  imply  to 
“DEMONSTRATE  a  grasp  of  the  place  reference  ‘Pacific  Palisades’  by  re-
referencing  it  in  other  words.  In  this  way  it  shows  a  recognition  of  the 
location  that  is  amenable  to  correction”  (ibid:  255).  To  simply  repeat  the   85 
place reference “Oh Pacific Palisades” (Sacks, 1992, Vol.2: 141) “may CLAIM 
recognition of the location, but it does not demonstrate it in a fashion that is 
amenable to correction” (Heritage, 2007: 255).   
 
Coming  back  to  Chil  now,  the  Goodwins  developed  an  approach  to  the 
analysis of action within interaction that takes into account the simultaneous 
use of multiple semiotic resources. In the data extract presented above we 
can thus find a most interesting instance where Chil, despite his impaired 
language,  demonstrates  understanding  through  different  kinds  of  signs 
which are produced in different media and which mutually elaborate each 
other. Following Linda’s inquiry where the children usually play when they 
visit in line 1, we can see in line 16 and 18 that Chil uses sounds and gestures 
to expand his wife’s original reply that they play on two floors, adding the 
information that they ‘go  up and down and up and  down’  which his wife 
repeats in line 19. The Goodwins thus provide evidence that in concert with 
other semiotic resources, “the human body is made publicly visible as the site 
for  a  range  of  structurally  different  kinds  of  displays  implicated  in  the 
constitution of the actions of the moment” (Goodwin, 2000: 1491).  
     
In  investigating  action  as  contextual  configurations,  in  their  analysis  the 
Goodwins  bridge  the  (disciplinary)  analytical  gap  between  language  and 
material structure, analysing both as integrated components of the process of 
the  social  production  of  meaning  and  action.  Inspired  by  the  pioneering 
works of Bateson (1967) on distributed cognition, Goodwin claims that the 
interplay between the semiotic resources provided by language on the one 
hand,  and tools, documents and artefacts on the other constitutes a most 
important  future  direction  for  the  analysis  of  participation.  However,  he 
points out that this multimodal framework should not be seen as something 
new but as recognition of the rich contextual configurations created by the 
availability  of  multiple  semiotic  resources  which  has  always  characterized 
human  interaction  (see  2000:  1491).  The  emphasis  is  on  cognition  as  a 
public, social process embedded within a historically shaped material world. 
In  showing  how  meaning  arises  as  gestures  are  co-ordinated  with  verbal 
activity,  the  Goodwins  document  that  “[h]uman  sense-making  integrates   86 
wordings  with  what  we  hear,  expectations,  physical  events  and,  indeed, 
contents of working memory” (Cowley, 2009: 8).  
Cowley (2006, 2007, 2009) argues that language is distributed. According to 
him (and others) language is behaviour that serves in constructing a world 
where,  using  experience,  we  modify  each  other’s  perception  and  action. 
“Speaking and understanding depend – not on wordings – but physical and 
cultural experience” (Cowley, 2009: 5).  
 
His position is backed up by research in developmental psychology. Studies 
on conceptual thinking in pre-linguistic infants (see Brown, 1973; Trevarthen 
1985, 2004, 2010) have shown that there is no inevitable connection between 
concepts and words. There is both developmental and comparative evidence 
that the human brain is formed prenatally with adaptations at all levels to 
motivate activity and emotions (Trevarthen, 1985, 2004, 2010). Trevarthen 
explains that this indicates that the cortico-subcortical integrations necessary 
for learning the codes for intersubjective communication, including those for 
language, are already functioning at this early stage in proto-conversation: 
 
“How can a newborn baby, a being with no meaningful knowledge, 
no  education  in  the  habits  of  culture  and  language  at  all  and 
therefore,  it  is  assumed,  incapable  of  reflective  intelligence,  be  a 
person?  An  infant  must  be  unable  to  understand  anything  and 
unable to infer anything about an outside reality or to articulate 
meanings  in  communication.  That  is  what  our  psychological 
science, attending to measurable products of intelligence, especially 
well-defined  cultural  and  linguistically  sophisticated  intelligence, 
rather than to any essential motive/emotional creative processes, 
has assumed must be the state of a newborn mind. It follows that 
the human newborn has no 'self-awareness', no awareness of other 
human selves, and is not a person”  (…) “It awaits a consciousness 
that  depends  on  development  of  a  special  facility  to  acquire 
articulate language (Rolls, 2005). Thus developmental science has 
conceived the initial state of the human mind as lacking intentions, 
feelings and consciousness. It  is  hardly a  mind at all. But, when 
calm, healthy, comfortable and well supported, an awake newborn 
infant,  observed  closely,  shows  a  remarkably  coherent  rhythmic 
purposeful consciousness – a spontaneous directing of well-formed   87 
movements,  selective  awareness  and  affective  appraisals  in  a 
precisely regulated, brain-generated time” (2010: 2). 
 
With reference to Trevarthen’s research, Cowley (2009) exemplifies in his 
own data how in mother-infant dyads both parties attribute similar values to 
interactional  moves  (ibid:  13).  Over  time,  but  long  before  learning  verbal 
language,  infant  motivations  engender  specific  expression.  Conversely, 
changing adult behaviour alters infant expression (ibid: 14). Emerging out of 
mother-infant  dyads  by  the  4th  month  of  life  (see,  Cowley  et  al.,  2004), 
Cowley (2010) and Steffensen (2010) use the term co-action to describe “the 
capacity for each party to exploit the context of other’s behaviour to come up 
with something that could not have been achieved alone” (Steffensen, 2010: 
210). Cowley (2009) concludes that infant expression combines mimetic and 
instinctive expression with aspects of normative display (ibid: 14).  
 
The  emotional  displays  hence  become  “the  essential  regulatory  feature  in 
human  life”  (Trevarthen  and  Aitken,  2007:  24):  “In  games  with  others, 
infants  negotiate  at  the  growing  borders  of  shared  purposefulness  with 
powerfully expressed emotions of self- and self-other-experience, and they 
learn  rituals  of  body  movement  and  of  joint  intention  with  others” 
(Trevarthen,  2010:  12).  Infants,  it  appears,  are  born  with  motives  and 
emotions for actions that sustain human intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 2010: 
12). We can see now that those claims Goodwin makes in his work with Chil 
that concern the  sharing of intentions and  feelings with other humans by 
means of many expressive forms of body movement that may be perceived in 
several  modalities  can  be  backed  up  by  extensive  research  on  early 
development in human infants. But maybe the most important message is 
that we, as human beings, use a ‘feeling of what happens’ (Damasio, 2003) as 
“we  hear  what  people  mean  –  not  just  words  that  are  actually  spoken” 
(Cowley, 2009: 8).  
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4.5. Summary 
 
This  chapter  discussed  approaches  to  cognition  in  discourse  studies,  and 
more  specifically  the  position  put  forward  by  discursive  psychology. 
Opposing the cognitivist attitude commonly found in particular in cognitive 
psychology, DP does not make ascriptions of speaker intention to support 
claims about discourse meanings, but instead relies on the analysis of the 
discourse  objects’  composition  and  positioning.  We  have  seen  that 
conversation analysis’s analytical framework and tools play a shaping role in 
this regard.  A comparison of studies with Alzheimer’s patients then outlined 
a number of short-comings these share.  
 
In particular, I argued that these works, though grounded in CA, promote a 
rather untypical perspective on conversations in shifting the focus on what 
participants ‘should’ do, rather than to provide detailed descriptions of what 
they  actually  do.  Accordingly,  CA’s  repair  tools  are  modified  and  used  to 
detect ‘impaired’ speech in conversations with Alzheimer’s patients. Coming 
back to Richard Taylor, I think that the majority of studies presented in this 
chapter  describe  the  ‘curtain’,  in  using  their  data  to  decide  whether  an 
individual is ‘lucid’ or not; somewhat assuming that “behind the curtain there 
is nothing to see, but it was all the more important each time to describe the 
curtain” (Deleuze, 1988: 54).  
 
The  works  of  Pia  Kontos  and  the  Goodwins  who  are  proponents  of  an 
embodied and distributed perspective on cognition were then discussed. Both 
researchers  provide  interactional  data  that  contradict  a  Cartesian  view  on 
self,  which  then  in  the  last  part  of  this  chapter  is  further  backed  up  by 
research in developmental psychology. In particular, Trevarthen’s research 
with  infants  makes  a  strong  point  that  “[w]e  must  respect  these  intuitive 
beginnings  if  we  are  to  comprehend  the  elaborately  representational  and 
rationally regulated minds of speaking humans” (Trevarthen, 2010: 14).  
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We will see in the following, and final, chapter of the theoretical section of 
this thesis, that in his lectures, Harvey Sacks’s notion of mind encompasses 
the  innate  intersubjectivity  Trevarthen  suggests.  In  putting  the  above-
mentioned famous quote back into its original context within the lectures, I 
argue that those studies presented in this chapter that refer the reader to CA 
have nothing in common with the original inspiration that motivated Harvey 
Sacks.  
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5 
  
You are always on my mind 
Harvey Sacks and the mind 
 
 
 
Don’t worry about the brains that these persons couldn’t 
have but which the objects seem to require. Our task is,  
in this sense, to build their brains.  
(Sacks, 1992: 115, Vol.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I introduce Harvey Sacks’s position on the mind as it unfolds 
over  his  lectures  (1964  –  1972).  This  will  underpin  the  method  for  data 
analysis which I consider appropriate for this thesis. In particular, his socio-
cognitive stance on memory suits best  this  study’s hypothesis that acts of 
remembering  in  emotion  management,  as  well  as  adaptive  learning 
processes,  are  co-constructed  within  specific  contexts  which  have  specific 
situational affordances. Integrated within Sacks’s framework for the analysis 
of story-telling in conversations, his ideas about how participants do this on-
going process of ‘bringing their minds together’ seem to be best suited to 
understand  how  participants  in  this  study  co-construct  emotion 
management. This will be elaborated in the following and in particular in the 
final section of chapter 6. In the spirit of Harvey Sacks, the general approach   91 
to data analysis is one of ‘any-direction’ considerations (Sacks, 1986: 128). 
This means that “various theoretical, methodological, and analytic issues are 
raised by reference to items which happen to occur” (Sacks, 1986: 127). This 
expresses the necessity and commitment to integrate the insights we have 
gained  in  previous  chapters  into  data  analysis  as  they  have  essentially 
contributed  so  far  to  the  process  of  finding  approximate  answers  to  this 
study’s research questions. In the following section, I first summarise again a 
cognitivist  perspective  on  memory  before  I  contrast  such  a  position  with 
Sacks’s ideas about how we do understanding and how memory seems to be 
‘at the service of conversation’. 
 
In  chapters  3  and  4,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  prevalent  assumption 
underlying  both  memory  tests  in  psychology  as  well  as  CA  studies  with 
Alzheimer’s patients is that one can discover how individual word meanings 
are  represented  in  memory  independent  of  how  they  may  be  used  in  the 
dynamic context of conversations. In particular with regard to the findings in 
chapter 4, I argue that results of these tests are insufficient because they lack 
the  social  context.  Context-specific  details  are  omitted  and  the  reader  is 
merely confronted with the categories which are based on language. It has 
been shown that a linguistically grounded notion of memory in the strongest 
sense presents cognition as a state. In focussing on the neural underpinnings 
of  memory,  researchers  run  the  risk  of  expressing  the  belief  that 
remembering  happens  in  the  brain.  This  in  turn  potentially  implies  that 
researchers miss the public, social process that remembering certainly also is. 
In chapter 2, a discussion of Ibarra’s work (2002) offered a related critique of 
data  analysis  that  is  grounded  in  the  monological,  rather  than  dialogical 
individual.  I  argued  that  the  most  apparent  short-coming  of  such  an 
approach is that it does not allow for the conclusions about the nature of the 
relationships between participants the author arrives at.  
 
In cognitive psychology, the representation of knowledge is conceptualised as 
schemata (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Piaget, 1954; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977) and 
behavioural  scripts  (see  Schank  &  Abelson,  1977).  Whereas  the  latter  are 
thought  to  contain  information  about  how  people  behave  under  varying 
circumstances, schemata have been defined as “organized representations of   92 
prior experience” that allow “a person to screen, code, and assess the full 
range of internal or external stimuli and to decide on a subsequent course of 
action” (Kovacs & Beck, 1978: 526). Modern understanding of schemata was 
fundamentally impacted upon by Bartlett’s famous experiments on recall of 
folk-stories  (1920).  He  observed  that  recall  of  a  story  was  not  mere 
duplication of the same pattern over and over again. Rather, it was flexible, 
with participants adding new details or leaving out information. Hence, he 
concluded that memories are not stored as static entities, but form parts of 
larger constructs, called schemata. This concept of schemata allowed Bartlett 
to  integrate  his  observation  that  one  can  form  new  combinations  of 
individual memories, with individual components possibly changing any time 
there is a retrieval act. Whereas Bartlett’s experiments certainly highlight the 
assumed internal, subjective processes of schemata formation, Harvey Sacks 
explores  in  his  lectures  the  publicly  observable  social  practice  that 
remembering also is. Focussing on story-telling in conversations, he unfolds 
and  outlines  the  ways  in  which  remembering  is  also  an  inherently 
interactional business.   
 
 
 
5.1. Reading people’s minds 
 
It  is  in  his  first  lecture  about  the  rules  of  conversational  sequence  where 
Harvey Sacks’s often-quoted statement on the mind appears: 
 
“When  people  start  to  analyze  social  phenomena,  if  it  looks  like 
things occur with the sort of immediacy we find in some of these 
exchanges, then, if you have to make an elaborate analysis of it - 
that is to say, show that they did something as involved as some of 
the things I have proposed - then you figure that they couldn't have 
thought that fast. I  want to suggest that you  have to forget that 
completely. Don't worry about how fast they’re thinking. First of 
all, don't worry about whether they’re ‘thinking.’ Just try to come to 
terms with how it is that the thing comes off. Because you'll find 
that they can do these things” (1992: 11, Vol.1)    93 
We will see in the following how this quote, and also his remark on ‘building 
brains’ that introduced this chapter, can be grounded in the context of his 
lectures.  In  the  previous  chapter  it  was  argued  that  within  discursive 
psychology, Sacks’s position is commonly equated with an ‘anti-cognitivist’ 
one:  “Conversation  analysis,  in  the  hands  of  Harvey  Sacks,  however  is  a 
wholly  different  animal,  necessitating  no  appeal  whatsoever  to  interior, 
‘mental’, ‘unconscious’ or ‘cognitive’ processes, mechanisms or operations” 
(Coulter, 1999: 178).  
 
While Harvey Sacks certainly does not represent a cognitivist perspective, I 
claim  that  we  can  find  evidence  in  his  works  that  defy  labelling  on  the 
grounds of Coulter’s definition. In the last section of the previous chapter, I 
have drawn attention to the very last sentence of the above-mentioned quote: 
“Because you’ll find that they can do these things” (1992: 11, Vol.1). In the 
following, this sentence is contextualised in such a way that we follow closely 
how Sacks himself explains his opaque references to “you”, “they” and “these 
things”. Instead of explicitly explaining what he means, Sacks sets the first 
assignment:  an  observation  of  the  use  of  glances  in  interactions. 
Furthermore,  instead  of  equipping  his  students  with  guidelines  and  a 
method, Sacks describes the following situation to his students:  
 
“I was walking down the hall the other day, to give an exam to one 
girl. She was standing, leaning up against the wall. In between us 
walked another girl. She passed this girl first, and then me. And the 
girl who was standing leaning against the wall looked at me and 
gave a shrug of her shoulders with a big smile, which I returned. 
And I don’t think it was a big puzzle over what was going on. The 
girl who walked by was smoking a pipe” (1992: 82, Vol. 1).  
 
 
Worried  about  the  assignment,  one  student  gives  voice  to  her  confusion 
claiming  that  she  can  usually  tell  what  “sort  of  interaction  is  occurring”  
(1992: 82, Vol. 1) when someone is looking at her. “But if someone is looking 
at someone else, it’s going to be kind of hard to differentiate between people 
that  just  happen  to  be  looking  at  each  other”  (ibid).  In  response  Sacks 
nonchalantly replies: “Try it and see” (ibid); and he adds that he would be   94 
“willing to make a fair bet that you can guess, seeing somebody get up and 
start to move out of a place, whether they will be somebody that others will 
notice.  And  you  can  probably  say  who  will  notice  them,  knowing  nothing 
about the persons except what they look like; both the person who gets up 
and  the  other  persons  around.  Because  after  all,  when  persons  look  at 
somebody  passing,  they  know  from  having  scanned  the  room  in  the  first 
place, who to turn to get an exchange of glances” (ibid).  
 
Although  this  approach  to  teaching  may  seem  sphinx-like,  in  frequently 
offering  examples,  either  from  his  own  data  or  based  on  the  human 
experience, he shows his students as a matter of fact that they can “notice 
them  [other  human  beings]  doing  it”  (1992:  96,  Vol.  1).  Sacks,  hence, 
continuously proves and reminds us that as human beings we have a feeling 
for certain things. Accordingly, he introduces his examples very often in this 
way: “Picture yourself in the scene. Here’s Estelle driving by. … ” (1986: 135). 
This innate intersubjectivity, however, gets scaffolded by the norms of the 
society one is a member of. Based on this, Sacks argues that we can detect 
‘incongruities’  which  we  frequently  apply  in  the  meaning-making  process: 
“People seem to know what others are thinking without having any idea who 
they are, apart from their class membership” (1992: 93, Vol. 1). Yet again, 
Sacks immediately offers his students an example. He wants them to imagine 
“a worn old man and a very pretty young girl” (1992: 90, Vol. 1) together. He 
claims that the most likely scenario to happen is that this couple gets noticed. 
Immediately an exchange of glances takes place, which act as a confirmation 
of  the  spotted  incongruity  (see  ibid).  Just  like  Trevarthen  (2010),  Sacks 
points out that we learn about the ability of others to ‘read our minds’ as 
children (see 1992: 115, Vol. 1).  
  
After highlighting the crucial role of (shared) culture to explain how people 
‘read’  each  other’s  minds,  he  draws  attention  to  how  we  achieve  this  in 
everyday interactions. Sacks argues that very early in a conversation one can 
see that interactants ‘bring their mind to each other’ (see 1992: 166, Vol. 1). 
To exemplify this, he tells his students to imagine the situation of someone 
visiting you who has been to your house before:  
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“And they walk through the house and say, “Gee that’s new isn’t 
it?”. And you say “Yeah, I got it a couple of months after the last 
time you were here,” or “I just got it,” etc. Consider that as one of 
the ways in which, as between two parties, one goes about showing 
the other ‘how much you’re in my mind,’ i.e., on any given occasion 
of looking through your place, I can see the sorts of changes that 
have been made since I last visited you, and show them to you. I 
can find things that have changed in ‘our time,’ i.e., time that is 
only marked by our relationship” (1992: 166, Vol. 1). 
 
With the help of this example, Sacks claims that at a very early point in the 
conversation  participants  show  that  they  are  ‘turning  their  mind’  to  the 
history of that particular relationship. Early into a conversation participants 
would therefore use different ways of showing that they have found “that part 
of ‘us’ that is involved in our last interaction” (1992: 193, Vol. 1). The example 
he uses above clearly shows that in their effort to ‘bring their minds together’, 
individuals draw on a broad range of cues that include verbal language, but 
also visual ones (e.g., furniture as seen above), as well as personal, nonverbal 
ones  (e.g.,  voice,  tone,  mimics).  He  gives  a  second  example  of  a  phone 
conversation where ‘How’s your mother?’ is used as a way of saying ‘I know 
who you are and I know that the last time we talked your mother was sick’ 
(see 1992: 167, Vol. 2). Apart from signalling in general that one is “attentive 
to the other party” (1992: 257, Vol. 2), his line of argumentation suggests that 
in doing so we “show that the things they say have full control over your 
memory. That is to say, you put your memory utterly at their service” (ibid.).  
 
In a conversation, showing that ‘my mind is with you’ is, according to Sacks, 
an  on-going  analysis  to  find  things  to  say,  and  more  specifically  finding 
things to say within ‘conversation time’ (1992: 27, Vol. 2): “That is not merely 
to say that it can take place such that the person remembering can do it in the 
same  conversation,  but  can  announce  the  memory  when  you  finish  your 
utterance,  or  even  before.  And  that  the  usual  timing  constraints  of 
conversation – that people start up very rapidly after somebody finishes – 
can  accommodate  remembering  is  a  kind  of  impressive  fact”  (ibid).  It  is 
probably a universal human experience that what one remembers is closely 
related to what has just been going on in a conversation and if one does not   96 
get the opportunity to say it, chances are one will forget it. Therefore, Sacks 
suggests that it does appear “that memory is in some perhaps quite dramatic 
way at the service of the conversation” (ibid).  
 
“I’ll give a much more dramatic instance, from these kids in group 
therapy  session.  One  kid  is  talking  about  a  job  he  got.  At  some 
point the therapist says “Last week you were mentioning something 
about the fact that you uh -” and he’s cut off by the kid saying “I got 
lost in one job? Yeah” (…) How does he know? Of all the things he 
said  last  week  that  it  is  this  he’s  being  invited  to  remember. 
Obviously what it turns on is things having been said right now in 
this conversation, where one can use what you’re being invited to 
remember (…) you know that they remember it in just the same 
way that you remember it” (1992: 24, Vol. 2).  
 
 
In  approaching  public  remembering  as  an  ‘utterance  by  utterance 
phenomenon’ (1992: 24, Vol.2), Harvey Sacks gives special attention to the 
fact that something “pops into one’s head within these very severe timing 
constraints” (1992: 28, Vol. 2): “they haven’t found themselves working to do 
it, it just literally pops into their head. Which is to say, perhaps, that it may be 
possible that this thing we think of as an extremely private repository but 
which we’re also aware of as operating quite without control, is something 
that operates by virtue of procedures which are socially organized and are 
characterizable” (1992: 7, Vol.2). He raises the question if the organization of 
conversation has some relevance for the study of memory, in such a way that 
time constraints in conversation may be some basis for the time constraints 
of memory (1992: 28, Vol. 2). At the same time, he stresses that he is “a bit 
leery of moving from people saying things like: ‘I remember’ to talking about 
‘memory’” (1992: 28, Vol. 2). Connecting this remark with his initial famous 
quote, I argue that taken out of context this quote certainly blends in with 
discursive psychology’s agenda. However, following the line of his argument 
here,  namely  the  analysis  of  how  memory  might  be  at  the  service  of 
conversation, it should be clear that in thinking this through he trespasses 
back and forth between the interactional and subjective level, identifying “I 
remember” as a sequential locator, meaningful within the turn-taking system,   97 
but also as a ‘co-participant verb’, “one that should be used as between these 
two participants, in the doing of such an activity as ‘showing that I had my 
mind on you’” (1986: 131).  
 
 
 
 
5.2. On story-telling 
 
Coming  back  to  Bartlett,  the  crucial  question  certainly  is  where  exactly 
Harvey Sacks locates the mind, by which I mean the place where memories 
are stored. As Sacks puts his ideas on how people bring their minds together 
in the bigger picture of how he imagines knowledge transfer to happen, he 
provides answers himself: “[O]ne kind of problem a culture faces is getting its 
known  things  kept  alive.  A  basic  thing  it  uses  is  people’s  heads.  Where 
people’s heads are not just to be repositories for known things, but they have 
to be repositories that are appropriately tapped so that those known things 
get passed to others. And, having been put in some others’ heads, there need 
to be ways that those known things again get tapped and put into yet others’ 
heads”  (1992:  468,  Vol.  2).  With  regard  to  face-to-face  interaction,  Sacks 
explains in the following way how he imagines this ‘tapping’ to work: People 
store  experiences  in  terms  of  their  own  involvement,  “but  have  them  be 
available to anybody who taps them right. Anybody can get the story if they 
ask in the right way. And the right way is to tell one just like it” (1992: 258, 
Vol.  2).  Offering  a  similar  experience  hence  can  be  a  way  of  confirming 
aspects of the told experience: “I can solve that uniqueness problem by just 
telling  somebody  else  the  story  –  not  even  specifically  asking  them  for 
another – and they will simply come up with one if they have one. And not 
only will they come up with one if they have one, they will often know one 
that somebody else has come up with. The consequence of that is the familiar 
phenomenon of ‘Until I had this problem I didn’t think anybody had it. When 
I had it it turned out that lots of people have it’” (1992: 258, Vol. 2).  
 
This  is  what  Sacks  describes  as  people’s  ‘preference  to  be  ordinary’.  Even 
while sharing the extraordinary with others, one continues to do ‘being an   98 
ordinary person’. While Sacks focuses on how this creates a tricky situation 
for  psychotherapists  who  have  to  learn  strategies  for  how  to  undo  this 
automatic  response  of  ‘popping  up  stories’,  I  argue  that  this  affects 
researchers who are doing ethnographic fieldwork as well. I will come back to 
this in chapter 7 and 8. Departing from the common problem of psychiatrists 
falling asleep during sessions, Sacks suggests that this possibly has to do with 
“that they know that they can’t say any of the things that are interesting, that 
they might think of when somebody might tell them something, and therefore 
they have no good way to listen to find anything interesting” (1992: 260, Vol. 
2). However, given that the therapist does not respond with offering the same 
experience, this violates the idea that “the way you find out you’re not crazy is 
that people who you figure aren’t crazy tell you that they’ve had exactly the 
same experience you had” (ibid.).  
 
Conceptualising memory in Sacks’s fashion, the starting point for analysis 
would hence be radically different to the studies I discussed in chapter 4, in 
that researchers acknowledged that “the teller’s position is in each case key” 
(1992: 28, Vol. 2). Sacks refers to a remarkable psychological paper by David 
Rappaport “on a fellow who had amnesia. And they gave him a story that they 
figured was similar to his circumstances, and he read the story aloud, burst 
into tears and his amnesia  disappeared. So the issue of the way in which 
stories  operate  to  produce  memories  is  maybe  a  curious  one”  (ibid.).  As 
unbelievable as this story may seem this is one of many of Sack’s examples 
where a story is not only told on an occasion that it seems to be “powerfully 
relevant” to (1992: 469, Vol. 2), but where Sacks’s relentless effort to describe 
how meaning-making is done by participants’ themselves becomes strikingly 
evident. This effort includes that he harshly criticised the research practices 
found in linguistics: “It happens to be perfectly reasonable for linguistics and 
philosophy to proceed by considering, ‘Well, let’s take a certain locution, a 
sentence.  Would  anybody  say  that?  If  they  said  it  would  we  figure  it 
grammatical? Or a puzzle? Or not? (…) That is to say, they feel that they have 
control over what it is someone might say. They recognize someone as loony 
or not loony’ (1992: 5, Vol. 2). 
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Rather  than  treating  the  occurrence  of  ‘errors’  in  conversations  in  the 
research fashion he criticised so fiercely, Harvey Sacks understands them to 
be integral elements in participants’ signalling their understanding. Based on 
‘Ken’s  story’  (1992:  42o  ff.,  Vol.  2),  Sacks develops  his  argument  that the 
occurrence of an ‘error’ and the somewhat abrupt ending of the story are in 
fact most relevant to finding an object that signals understanding. The story 
is told by seventeen-year old Ken who is telling his friend Louise about his 
twelve-year old sister’s odd behaviour. She has pictures of the Beatles on the 
“roof”  and  would  lie  in  her  bed  at  night  staring  up  at  them.  There  is  an 
occurrence of an error in the story (‘roof’ rather than ‘ceiling’) and the story 
stops  before  some  obvious  sense  of  its  appropriate  completion.  At  the 
perceived completion where a recipient is expected to signal understanding 
for the story (see 1992: 422, Vol. 2) Louise then uses a proverbial expression 
to create the pun ‘they need something to look up to’ (1992: 421, Vol. 2).  
 
Sacks claims that in general the ‘understanding-object’ (ibid) used “stands in 
some methodic relationship to the form of the story, i.e. the story is a puzzle 
and  the  understanding  is  an  explanation”  (ibid).  Hence,  he  proposes  that 
“these two matters [the abrupt ending and the ‘error’] could have a bearing 
on where her mind is” (ibid) while Louise searches for a pun. So, what Louise 
does  “is  to  use  materials  from  the  story  that  were  themselves  needing  of 
treatment, as resource for arriving at a proverb” (1992: 430, Vol. 2). Put in 
another way, she picks up on the “relevantly-to-be-picked-up-on aspects of 
the story” (ibid). That is, “a correctable thing was said, and she didn’t correct 
it,  and  nobody  corrected  it”  (1992:  429,  Vol.  2).  In  chapter  4,  it  was  a 
common occurrence that recipients reacted to a perceived word misuse and 
often corrected it aloud. Since Louise does not show that she saw an error 
when she could have shown it, but nevertheless signals through the specific 
pun she uses at some later point that she did see it and understood the story, 
Sacks proposes that she must have ‘mentally corrected’ it (ibid).  
 
It  is  not  clear  what  Sacks  exactly  means  with  this  expression.  It  certainly 
allows for a cognitive reading, that is, that Louise did the repair in her head. 
However, I argue the opposite that this mental repair and the concluding pun 
were in Trevarthen’s sense intersubjectively co-constructed. Although Sacks   100 
provides minute observations, they are reduced to a focus on verbal language. 
Sacks pointed out himself that “[i]t might be possible to do some things with, 
say, facial expressions, but I don’t know what to do with them now. (…) It 
would be great to study them. It’s an absence” (1992: 26/ 27, Vol. 2). I think 
that a deeper insight into the understanding that Ken and Louise signal can 
only  be  achieved  through  thick  descriptions  that  include  detailed 
observations of nonverbal behaviour because it has been shown that “cues in 
any  modality  can  prime  human  perception,  categorization,  and  decision-
making” (Streeck & Jordan, 2009: 94).  
 
Furthermore, the fact that Louise offers a humorous conclusion to the story 
in  the  form  of  this  pun  carries  crucial  information  about  the  relationship 
between  these  two  individuals.  Sacks  does  not  stress  this  aspect  that 
individuals when bringing their minds together do not merely signal what 
they  remember  to  be  their  last  encounter  but  their  actions  are  also 
meaningful  statements  about  their  relationship.  Locating  Sacks’s  research 
within the broader field of ethnomethodology, Erving Goffman and George 
Herbert Mead provide answers to how social scientific research can deal with 
these ‘absences’.  
 
 
 
 
   
5.3. Goffman and Mead  
 
For Goffman, social order is based on the collective maintenance of particular 
definitions of the situation which allow the systematic exclusion of ‘troubles’. 
Here it is particularly important to understand how events are ‘framed’, that 
is, how people establish and negotiate “definitions of a situation” (Goffman, 
1974:  11).  More  specifically,  Goffman  argues  that  “each  participant  is 
expected to suppress his immediate heartfelt feelings, conveying a view of the 
situation which he feels the others will be able to find at least temporarily 
acceptable.  The  maintenance  of  this  surface  of  agreement,  this  veneer  of 
consensus, is facilitated by each participant concealing his own wants behind   101 
statements which  assert values to which everyone present feels obliged to 
give lip service” (1959: 9).  
 
We have seen in chapter 2 that this is the essential idea Arlie Hochschild 
borrowed  from  Goffman  and  adapted  to  her  framework.  However,  while 
Hochschild  focuses  on  the  emotion  management  strategies  an  individual 
develops to work on her own emotions, Goffman gives an account of how the 
self is embedded in the collective effort of keeping up a shared definition of a 
situation: “In noticing the tendency for a participant to accept the definitional 
claims made by the other present, we can appreciate the crucial importance 
of  the  information  that  the  individual  initially  possesses  or  acquires 
concerning  his  fellow  participants,  for  it  is  on  the  basis  of  this  initial 
information that the individual starts to define the situation and starts to 
build up lines of responsive action” (1959: 10).  
 
He elaborates that when individuals know each other, they partly rely on “the 
persistence and generality of psychological traits as a means of predicting his 
present  and  future  behaviour”  (1959:  1/  2).  In  his  ethnography  of  the 
Shetland  Islands,  however,  Goffman  shows  that  “[m]any  crucial  facts  lie 
beyond  the  time  and  place  of  interaction  or  lie  concealed  within  it.  For 
example, the ‘true or – real’ attitudes, beliefs and emotions of the individual 
can  be  ascertained  only  indirectly,  through  his  avowals  or  through  what 
appears to be involuntary expressive behavior” (see 1959: 8): 
 
“Knowing that the individual is likely to present himself in a light that 
is favourable to him, the others may divide what they witness into two 
parts; a part that is relatively easy for the individual to manipulate at 
will, being chiefly his verbal assertions and a part in regard to which 
he seems to have little concern or control, being chiefly derived from 
the  expressions  he  gives  off.  The  others  may  then  use  what  are 
considered to be the ungovernable aspects of his expressive behaviour 
as a check upon the validity of what is conveyed by the governable 
aspects.  In  this  a  fundamental  asymmetry  is  demonstrated  in  the 
communication  process,  the  individual  presumably  being  aware  of 
only the stream of his communication, the witnesses of this stream 
and one other. Now given the fact that others are likely to check up on 
the  more  controllable  aspects  of  behaviour  by  means  of  the  less   102 
controllable, one can expect that sometimes the individual will try to 
exploit this very possibility, guiding the impression he makes through 
behaviour felt to be reliably informing” (1959: 7).  
 
In Conversation of Gestures (1934), Mead regarded gestures as early parts of 
social actions, which come to stand for these actions, thus taking on objective 
significance,  displaying  intent  to  other  and  self.  He  describes  how  two 
organisms, in this case dogs, display to one another their imminent actions 
and thereby afford each other the opportunity to adjust to these: 
 
“I  have  given  the  illustration  of  a  dog-fight  as  a  method  of 
presenting the gesture. The act of each dog becomes the stimulus of 
the other dog for his response. There is then a relationship between 
these two; and as the act is responded to by the other dog, it, in 
turn,  undergoes  change.  The  very  fact  that  the  dog  is  ready  to 
attack another becomes a stimulus to the other dog to change his 
own position of his own attitude. He has no sooner done this than 
the change of attitude in the second dog in turn causes the first dog 
to change his attitude. We have a conversation of gestures” (1934: 
42/ 43).  
 
The  facial  expression  that  indicates  an  incipient  attack  allows  the  other 
animal to adjust by readying itself, retreating, or displaying submission. The 
two  dogs  thus  negotiate  their  relationship  through  quasi-symbolic 
communication.  In  a  climate  dominated  by  Skinner’s  behaviourism,  the 
social psychologist Mead pointed out the relevance of the social context of the 
learning  environment.  He  rejected  the  idea  so  prevalent  in  cognitive 
psychology  that  mind  is  something  pre-existing  to  interaction.  Rather  he 
figured that the mind is a process, found in social phenomena and not within 
individuals.  The  ‘essence  of  thinking’  is  to  him  the internalisation  of  the 
external conversations of gestures in our experience, which we carry on with 
other individuals in the social process. Hence, according to Mead “[m]eaning 
is thus not to be conceived, fundamentally, as a state of consciousness, or as a 
set of organized relations existing or subsisting mentally outside the field of 
experience  into  which  they  enter;  on  the  contrary,  it  should  be  conceived 
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response of one organism to the gestures of another in any given social act is 
the meaning of that gesture” (1934: 78).  
Mead’s  analysis  of  gestures  eventually  led  him  to  critically  question  the 
traditional  notion  of  language  in  a  fashion  that  reveals  parallels  to  the 
position of those scholars introduced in the last section of chapter 4 that have 
been chosen to represent an embodied and distributed stance on language: 
 
“We are too prone, however, to approach language as the philologist 
does, from the standpoint of the symbol that is used. We analyze that 
symbol and find out what is the intent in the mind of the individual in 
using that symbol, and then attempt to discover whether this symbol 
calls out this intent in the mind of the other. We assume that there are 
sets of ideas in persons’ minds and that these individuals make use of 
certain  arbitrary  symbols  which  answer  to  the  intent  which  the 
individuals had. But if we are going to broaden the concept of language 
in  the  sense  I  have  spoken  of,  so  that  it  takes  in  the  underlying 
attitudes, we can see that the so-called intent, the idea we are talking 
about, is one that is involved in the gesture or attitudes which we are 
using. The offering of a chair to a person who comes into the room is 
in itself a courteous act. We do not have to assume that a person says 
to himself that this person wants a chair. The offering of a chair by a 
person of good manner is something which is almost instinctive. This 
is the very attitude of the individual. From the point of view of the 
observer it is a gesture. Such early stages of social acts precede the 
symbol proper, and deliberate communication” (1934: 13/ 14). 
 
It is part of the human experience that we get the meaning of what people do 
in social interactions. I think we can draw on our very own experiences to 
confirm that “communication set up in this way between individuals may be 
very perfect” (Mead, 1934: 14) and most importantly it “cannot be translated 
into articulate speech” (ibid).  
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5.4. Summary 
 
This chapter’s purpose was to highlight, first of all, the tradition in the social 
sciences  that  describes  meaning-making  as  an  external,  inter-individual 
process. Mead, Goffman, and Sacks have produced pioneering descriptions of 
the means and spectrum of human meaning-making processes. In chapter 2 
and 4, on the other hand, we have seen striking examples of social scientific 
research that reduces the complexity of interactional meaning-making to an 
individual’s  monologue,  and  breaches  of  the  interaction  order  and/or  the 
conversational organisation. Furthermore, the role of linguistic contributions 
to social interaction is paramount in these studies, despite the fact that it is 
part of the human experience that “[t]here is something that reveals to us 
what  the  purpose  is  -  just  the  glance  of  an  eye,  the  attitude  of  the  body” 
(Mead,  1934:  14).  Hence,  there  is  a  danger  of  mapping  data  against  a 
Cartesian notion of self. In ascribing ‘lucid episodes’, we learn a great deal 
about  how  the  researcher  makes  sense  herself,  but  little  about  how 
participants themselves do it; let alone about those relationships which these 
studies set out to observe.  
 
Therefore, the research tradition introduced in this chapter, and in particular 
Harvey Sack’s work, shall be the guiding light for this study’s goal to realise 
an interactional approach to Alzheimer’s disease and emotion management. 
The following and final chapter of the methodological section outlines this 
study’s data collection methods and proposes a method for data analysis.  
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6 
 
A toolkit for the analysis of  
(inter)subjective remembering 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study focuses on three research questions:  
 
1.  How  do  the  individual  participants  describe  subjective  emotion 
management? 
2.  How  are  emotion  management  strategies  embodied  in 
interactions? 
3.  What impact do these strategies have for the manner in which care 
is provided for an Alzheimer’s patient who is in the late stages of 
the disease? 
 
In  order  to  address  these,  methods  of  data  collection  are  required  which 
allow  for  a  rich  description  of  everyday  interactions  of  participants.  An 
ethnographic framework that seems to be most suitable to blend with this   106 
thesis’s critical perspective can be found in the works of Blommaert (2005, 
2009) and Scollon & Scollon (2003). These three scholars are among the few 
exceptions in sociolinguistics that put the focus on the interrelationship of 
physical context and language. Their stance on ethnography assumes that it is 
a theory of situated knowledge production on situated objects (Blommaert & 
Huang, 2009) which I very much share. The following sections describe the 
data collection process for this study, introducing the different ethnographic 
data collection methods used. Considerations of ethical issues are included at 
each stage. The last section of this chapter, deals with data transcription and 
analysis.  
 
 
 
6.1. Recruitment of participants - online and offline 
 
Different access methods were used for both online and offline fieldwork. In 
the  following  I  will  outline  the  online  methods  first.  For  ethical  and 
methodological reasons I wanted to avoid accessing Polish women through 
their employers, i.e. the agencies. One disadvantage is that employers can act 
as  gatekeepers  in  preventing  access  to  families  who  might  otherwise  be 
interested  in  participating.  I  saw  the  main  disadvantage,  however,  in  the 
practices  of  the  agencies  I  have  outlined  in  chapter  2.  Getting  agencies 
involved  would  have  ignored  the  potential  risk  of  ‘feeding’  this  thesis’s 
research into the ‘marketing machinery’. However, in order to understand the 
role of the agencies (e.g., the terms and conditions of employment, as well as 
processes  involved),  I  conducted  telephone  interviews  between  December 
2007 and June 2008 with four representatives; three in Germany and one in 
Poland.  
  
I approached approximately 20 Germans and 50 Poles in internet forums 
where both parties had placed ads offering their services, or searching for 
homecare assistants. Since this is an exploratory study of a ‘hot topic’ I did 
not expect as high a response rate as the 14 percent I received which is higher 
than the average response rate of 12.5 percent in mail surveys (Anderson, 
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happy to get the opportunity to share their experiences. Some mentioned that 
they would like to write a book themselves. Those who indicated interest in 
this  study  received  an  information  sheet  (see  Appendix  2)  and  the 
questionnaire, either in Polish or in German. Further down in the section on 
data analysis I will come back to the issue of translating data. As an optional 
follow-up to the questionnaire, I asked participants to keep online diaries. 
However, less than one-third who returned the questionnaires agreed to keep 
a diary. 
 
I chose the small town G. in the German-Dutch border region as the field site 
for the offline fieldwork. Apart from the fact that I could draw on personal 
contacts,  this  rural  region  has  a  long  history  of  circular  migration  from 
Poland, dating back as early as the early 1980s (see Becker, 2010). In order to 
get access to the Polish community in G., I contacted Mirco, a Polish priest in 
G., enclosing an information sheet which outlines the research study and a 
request to meet. Mirco replied, but based his decision to participate on the 
outcome of a personal meeting and my willingness and ability to secure every 
participant’s  anonymity.  In  the  meeting,  I  thus  explained  in  detail  the 
research aims and emphasised the voluntary nature of participation. In the 
following section on written consent I will come back to the crucial topic of 
confidentiality.  
 
Mirco  decided  to  help  me,  and  I  only  then  found  out  that  he  not  only 
organises an evening language class specifically for Polish care workers, but 
that families in G. who want to hire a Polish care worker frequently turn to 
him. He is therefore probably the only one who knows exactly where and how 
many migrants work in home eldercare in G. It has to be stressed though that 
Mirco refuses to compare his service with the work of the agencies. To him, 
helping these families is an act of compassion. He does not charge them, but 
speaks of “building intercultural bridges”. At the same time, he is well aware 
of the risks and dangers of illegal employment. Therefore, he considers it his 
obligation to keep in close contact with the Polish women and the German 
families he brought together, in order to be able to mediate, or intervene if 
necessary.  
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Usually, Mirco approached families and individuals first and explained the 
research study to them. Based on his introduction I was then able to make 
contact  with  potential  interview  partners.  Snowballing  from  these  initial 
contacts  was  crucial  to  the  success  of  the  project.  With  prior  notice  and 
arrangement (to ensure group members are in agreement), I also attended 
the  language  course  in  order  to  explain  the  research.  Only  once  did  we 
conduct  an  interview  immediately  after  class.  If  a  person  expressed  an 
interest,  a further meeting was arranged  with the individual at a separate 
time and location convenient to them. This was usually either Mirco’s or the 
teacher’s (Margareta’s) place. Between December 2007 and March 2008, and 
July 2008 and October 2008, fourteen Polish women, seven German family 
members, and six nursing service employees were recruited to the study. In 
two households participant observation of interactions including all network 
members  of  a  typical  ‘migrant-in-the-family’  household  was  possible.  The 
interactional data of one of these two case studies to which I will come back 
further down form the analytical body of this thesis. During and in-between 
both  fieldwork  phases,  I  remained  in  close  contact  with  both  Mirco  and 
Margareta,  so  that  where  appropriate,  (and  within  the  boundaries  of 
confidentiality), support could be facilitated for participants as necessary.  
 
Half of the Germans that participated were recruited drawing on my own 
personal contacts in this town. However, it is unlikely that methodological 
issues arise from this because although my contacts made initial contact with 
participants, I had not met any of them prior to the study. Thus, although 
there was undeniably a certain level of trust because of the contact we have in 
common, the formality of the interview situation, as well as the nature of the 
topic created in all instances a cautious distance within the first minutes of 
the  interview,  comparable  with  the  interview  situations  with  the  other 
participants. 
 
A  factor  that  influenced  the  approach  to  recruitment,  and  ultimately  all 
aspects of the research process, is the need to ensure that all voices are heard. 
People with dementia can be marginalised in situations where ‘competent’ 
adults are present, potentially because they are viewed as being unable to 
express a meaningful or informed opinion (see Wilkinson, 2002). Therefore,   109 
initial contact with the family and the nature of the first meeting is crucial in 
establishing  the  characteristics  of  future  involvement.  Furthermore,  I 
established early on the intention of the research to include as many family 
members as possible, and to hear all family members’ views who are involved 
in the homecare. Unfortunately, this was only possible in the ‘Wilma’ case 
study. 
 
Once  initial  contact  had  been  made  with  the  families  that  agreed  to 
participant observation, I arranged to meet with the family to assist them to 
understand the research aims, process and methods. Since the study involved 
non-native German speakers and people with dementia, a certain degree of 
flexibility in regard to how the research was explained was needed. While in 
some  cases  seeing  the  family  together  was  possible,  I  was  very  careful  in 
assuring understanding. Whenever possible, but always when it was needed, 
Mirco or Margareta accompanied me. Alongside verbal explanations of the 
research project, I provided written information in two formats as required 
by  the  participants  (the  English  original  and  a  German  translation). 
Questions were encouraged not only in the first meetings, but throughout the 
entire process of producing this thesis. I therefore provided all participants 
with my personal contact details. 
 
It was anticipated that people with dementia may experience varying capacity 
in regards to comprehension, concentration and language use. In order to 
address this, I only arranged meetings where a person of trust was present 
and  who  assisted  me  in  facilitating  understanding.  Also,  the  recording 
equipment (mini-disc recorder and microphone) was shown, so that potential 
participants could become familiar with, or evaluate the intrusive potential of 
these objects. Conversations were recorded as audio. Participants did not give 
their consent to video recordings; however, notes of shifts in body postures 
and gazes were taken during the  interactions.  With regard to  this thesis’s 
research aims and the focus on bodies, acknowledging confidentiality to such 
an extent that video recordings do not form the basis of analysis is a crucial 
point. There are certainly ways to use video footage and nevertheless secure 
participant’s anonymity. However, this study would not have been possible if 
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employing a Polish live-in range from a very high fine to imprisonment. The 
trust that is needed to justify such risk cannot be built within a few months. 
To compensate for the lack of video material, I attempted to obtain adequate 
coverage  of  events  through  frequent  participation  and  written  records  of 
observed conversations while they were actually occurring. I developed a very 
simple  sign  system  that  allowed  me  to  rapidly  make  notes  of  body 
movements,  tone  of  voice  and  facial  expressions  in  these  records.  These 
observations  were  then  compared  with  significantly  related  events  that 
occurred at a later point either in the same interaction or a related one. 
 
 
 
 
6.1.1. Informed Consent 
 
 Consent  to  be  involved  in  the  research  was  sought  from  every  single 
individual  that  decided  to  participate.  While  family  members  and  nursing 
service employees were able to give informed consent, the other two groups 
were potentially vulnerable participants, as they potentially are not able to 
give informed consent. Nevertheless, I do not want to marginalise them by 
the method of proxy consent (Cowdell, 2006). This study therefore takes the 
position  of  consent  as  an  ongoing  process  (Wilkinson,  2002).  I  sought  to 
clarify the views of the individuals within the family about their continued 
participation in the research each time a visit took place. In this context I 
utilised a reflexive approach, maintaining vigilance throughout the research 
process  with  regard  to  the  verbal  and  non-verbal  indicators  of  assent  or 
consent to participate. Furthermore a research diary was kept and regular 
research supervision with my supervisory team took place while on fieldwork 
to further consider that the rights of participants are being upheld.  
 
After consulting Jenny La Fontaine, who at that time worked on a project 
about grandfathers with Alzheimer’s disease at the Centre for Research on 
Ageing based at Oxford University, consent was addressed in the following 
stages. The provision of information during the first meeting with prospective 
participants  followed  the  guidance  set  out  in  the  regulations  governing   111 
informed  consent.  During  the  discussion  of  the  research  process  with 
interested families, I assessed the capacity of the individuals to give informed 
consent with reference to the following criteria: 
 
 
a.  That the proposed participants have been presented with adequate 
information  
b.  That the proposed participant is able to assimilate the information 
about the study 
c.  That the participant is able to make a response to the information 
 
 
If family members who decided to participate in the study were able to give 
informed consent, the consent process was explained and they were asked to 
consider giving their written consent (see Appendix C and D). The consent 
form was then explained to them, and any further clarification was provided. 
Those  who  agreed  to  give  written  consent  were  asked  to  sign  the  form.  I 
explained,  however,  that  they  can  certainly  withdraw  at  any  time.  Each 
person who signed a consent form received a copy of the signed form.  
 
One  family  withdrew  consent  before  the  actual  interviews  started.  This 
created a dilemma since the family members had decided not to participate at 
all in the study (neither interviews nor participant observation), while the 
Polish  live-in  was  most  interested  in  taking  part.  Unsure  as  to  how  to 
proceed, I discussed this matter with my supervisor and advisor, and decided 
not  to  include  this  woman  in  the  study  since  she  brought  her  two  highly 
demented wards to the first interview in a neutral space, although she knew 
that the family members had withdrawn. The second dilemma was created by 
the paradoxical situation of asking the Polish women to sign a consent form 
after having promised absolute anonymity. I therefore decided together with 
them that they should sign consent forms with the pseudonym they want me 
to use for them in the study. 
   
Before focussing in the following on the issue of consent and dementia, I 
want to mention the parallel, second snowballing that started immediately   112 
upon  my  arrival  in  G.  Participating  individuals  were  asked  to  keep  their 
participation a secret. However, this turned out to be an impossible request 
considering  the  small  size  of  the  town.  In  many  cases  Polish  women 
welcomed me saying that they had already heard about my project. However, 
they never asked me about the situation of other live-ins. The reason for this 
may be that many of them regularly saw each other in the language classes, or 
met  at  other  meeting  points  in  town  and  talked.  In  contrast  to  this,  the 
German  families  were  most  interested  in  finding  out  about  other  families 
involved  in  the  study.  Approached  like  this,  I  explained  again  the  highly 
confidential  nature  of  co-operation.    However,  I  could  not  prevent  the 
families  from  doing  some  research  themselves,  but  I  never  gave  away 
inappropriate information and names. 
  
Consent with people with dementia is challenging not only because of  the 
afore-mentioned issues of capacity and cognitive abilities, but also because of 
the progression of dementia over time. Previous studies have found changes 
in a person’s capacity to consent and retain a memory of the research during 
the course of the research and in their willingness to participate (Pratt and 
Wilkinson, 2001). It is therefore crucially important to treat consent as an 
on-going process, in which the willingness to participate is clarified through 
verbal  interaction,  as  well  as  observation  of  non-verbal  behaviour  at  each 
occasion  when  the  research  is  taking  place  (Hubbard  et  al.,  2002). 
Recommendations regarding informed consent indicate that where informed 
consent is not possible, in this case proxy  consent from a family member 
should be used. In the case of Wilma who  is in  a very advanced stage of 
Alzheimer’s disease, her oldest daughter who is also her guardian gave proxy 
consent. However, this process runs the risk of undermining the person with 
dementia’s capacity to assent. I therefore did treat her consent as an on-going 
process in line with the practices outlined above. In every single session, I 
paid close attention to her nonverbal communication and I also requested the 
present family members and/ or live-ins who know her well to pay attention.  
 
As indicated earlier, a meeting was arranged with the person with dementia 
and a person of trust during which the project was explained. During this 
meeting, I assessed the capacity to give informed consent, with reference to   113 
the above criteria. Jenny La Fontaine again helped in defining a number of 
possible outcomes that could have arisen at this point: 
 
a. The person with dementia understands and is able to give written  
     informed consent. 
b. The person with dementia is able to understand and give informed                                                                                               
     consent but is unhappy about or unable to provide written consent.      
     The researcher will ask if the person with dementia is happy for a     
     family member to witness their verbal consent. If this is not     
     acceptable, verbal consent will be accepted. 
c.  The person with dementia understands, is able to give informed    
     consent, but refuses to participate, in which case the research will  
     not take place. 
d.  The person with dementia is unable to give informed consent but is 
able  to  understand  enough  to  assent  to  participation.  An  assent 
form will be completed and a family member asked to witness the 
researchers’ actions in achieving assent. A family member will also 
be asked to give proxy consent. 
e.  The person with dementia is unable to give informed consent and 
in addition indicates through verbal or nonverbal communication 
that they do not wish to take part. The research will not take place. 
 
When  consent  or  assent  was  achieved  with  the  person  with  dementia,  I 
nevertheless requested their consent to continue in each session. If at any 
time the person with dementia indicated verbally or nonverbally that they did 
not wish to continue with the research either at that time, or completely, then 
I respected this. It occurred twice that I left Wilma’s home before starting the 
research  because  the  present  live-in  at  that  time  found  her  increasing 
restlessness alarming. I once decided myself to leave when Wilma not only 
showed nonverbal signs of stress but also clearly intelligibly said “Go away”. 
In the case of the second case study, Ludwig’s guardian called me once to 
cancel a meeting because he thought that Ludwig was not in the mood for my 
visit. On another day, the live-in told me at the doorstep to come back on the 
following day because according to her Ludwig was very aggressive that day.  
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Following the agreement to consent, where possible, I spent some time with 
the person with dementia and the person of trust, agreeing with them the 
procedures for the interviews, and the participant observation. The final part 
of  the  meeting  was  a  negotiation  of  the  setting  and  boundaries  of  the 
interview process including a discussion about the nature of the meeting. In 
the  case  of  Wilma,  it  was  decided  that  I  could  join  her  and  her  second 
daughter on their Tuesday routine, which often included visiting the GP, a 
dermatologist, or taking Wilma to the podiatry or hair dresser. However, as 
outlined above, every single time I accompanied them the rules of ongoing 
consent applied. Furthermore, I decided with the live-in Elisabeta to keep my 
visits around lunch to a minimum since this is the time of day where Wilma’s 
restlessness is at peak level and Elisabeta finds it most difficult to feed her 
even without any further distractions. 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Overview of research instruments 
 
In the following an overview of the research instruments used in this project 
will  be  discussed.  There  were  minor  differences  between  the  research 
instruments developed for online and offline fieldwork which I will explain in 
the following section. I also needed to design different instruments for re-
surveys or re-interviews. It is important to emphasise again that this research 
project was designed to be exploratory. The participants interviewed do not 
comprise  a  representative  sample,  but  patterns  within  the  questionnaires, 
interviews and the interactional data could be revealed which indicate certain 
tendencies and relations.  
 
While the qualitative interviews were designed to be conducted face to face, 
the quantitative instrument was a self-completion questionnaire. Just like the 
in-depth interviews with Polish women and German family members in G., 
the  online  questionnaires  were  also  translated  into  the  participants’  first 
language (Polish or German). I believe that the fact that instruments were 
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participant’s  first  language  was  crucial,  both  to  their  openness  and  in 
ensuring consistency across interviews. The accurate translation of research 
instruments  to  ensure  comparability  was  thus  of  crucial  importance,  and 
especially  the  Polish  translations  were  discussed  with  two  different 
translators. 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1. Questionnaires 
 
Both questionnaires for Polish women and the German host families included 
20 questions that could be answered in approximately 60 minutes. Separate 
ones  were  used  for  either  party.  However,  the  two  questionnaires  were 
designed to ensure comparability of results. The questionnaires for live-ins 
and host families were both designed as self-completion mail questionnaires. 
This constrained the  number, scope  and  depth of questions that could be 
asked. The emphasis was on exploring the relationship from both points of 
view, with particular focus on the use of kinship terms in these descriptions. 
It was anticipated that for the second fieldwork four months later the same 
participants would be approached, thus a second set of questionnaires was 
required with a focus on the development and changes in the relationships in 
the mean time.  
 
For  the  quantitative  questionnaires  I  was  not  concerned  with  obtaining  a 
‘representative sample’. Rather, the questionnaires, on the one hand, tested 
the  reproducibility  of  the  findings  of  Ibarra  (2002)  which  I  discussed  in 
chapter 2, and which concerned the nature of employment, as well as the use 
of  kinship  terms  in  these  relationships.  On  the  other  hand,  these 
questionnaires were then used as a pilot study for the fieldwork in G., and 
hence  results  helped  in  refining  the  questions  used  in  the  offline 
questionnaires. 
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6.2.2. Online diaries 
 
As an optional follow-up to the online questionnaire, I asked participants to 
keep virtual diaries in the form of emails. The idea was to give the women 
space to record their thoughts and experiences in a semi-structured way, in 
their own language, and when their time allowed it. I have already mentioned 
that less than one-third of those who completed the questionnaire agreed to 
keep  a  virtual  diary.  The  frequency  of  submitted  ‘entries’  was  very 
inconsistent.  Some  sent  emails  every  month,  others  every  three  months 
(before and after employment) and a few sent only one ‘entry’. One year later, 
I chased up all who had participated a year earlier. Although the response 
rate  was  very  low,  these  very  personal  accounts,  specifically  those  that 
described the trajectories of relationships over time, greatly contributed to 
the shaping of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
6.2.3. Interviews 
 
The  qualitative  interviews  took  place  in  G.  between  December  2007  and 
September  2008.  I  began  with  the  same  questions  as  the  quantitative 
questionnaires to triangulate the responses. Once consent had been achieved 
a date and venue for interviewing a participant was agreed. In the section on 
consent  I  have  already  outlined  that  prior  to  the  commencement  of  an 
interview,  I  asked  if  participants  had  any  further  questions  about  the 
research, and confirmed that we would stop the interview immediately if this 
was the participant’s wish. The research interviews followed a conversational 
style, using open-ended, non-directive questions asking the participants to 
describe their relationships with every single individual involved in the home 
care. In interviews with Polish live-ins and German family members, their 
perceptions of the nature of their relationship with the person cared for were 
of  most  interest  to  me.  Participants  were  asked  to  consider  how  they 
experienced  the  onset  and  progression  of  dementia,  how  the  disease 
impacted on their relationship, and what changes had occurred.    117 
With regard to the very sensitive nature of the topic, I monitored participants 
closely for signs of distress. When a participant signalled discomfort I did not 
insist on pursuing the interview but let the participant decide in what way (if 
at  all)  to  continue  narrating  a  specific  event  or  emotion.  The  individual 
interviews with live-ins and German family members lasted between 30 min 
and three hours, allowing for breaks. As mentioned earlier, in all interviews 
the use of a mini-disc recorder was discussed again before I switched it on. 
 
Interviews with a person with dementia were always organised to take place 
in their home. In all interviews a trusted family member or guardian was 
present. In these meetings I tried to flexibly adapt the interview according to 
the level of communication abilities and other needs (e.g., impaired hearing, 
restlessness) of the participant. Again, the interviews were conducted in a 
conversational  style  which  followed  the  agenda  agreed  upon  in  the  initial 
meeting. In the initial meetings, a family member had also been asked to 
provide me with biographical information and significant events (e.g., with 
regard to the onset of dementia) to help me with placing the conversation in 
context. As outlined earlier, I was careful not to cause any distress in the 
interview  situations.  This  of  course  also  included  a  consideration  of  the 
impact of the conversation. When the interview had  ended, I thus sought 
feedback from the participants, and allowed for some extra time to discuss 
any issues that might have arisen.  
 
 
 
 
6.2.4. Participant Observation 
 
During the recruitment and consent phase of the research, originally three 
families  were  asked  if  they  would  agree  to  the  collection  of  observational 
data. As outlined earlier, one of the three approached dropped out prior to 
the  first  session.  The  observational  process  first  of  all  involved  revisiting 
consent  with  the  individuals  involved.  With  regard  to  the  use  of  tape 
recordings, strategies to protect participants’ anonymity were outlined again. 
Also,  the  dates  for  observational  visits  were  checked  again.  This  included   118 
discussions about the types of interaction I intended to record and what I 
would  be  doing  as  a  participant  observer.  As  outlined  earlier,  everyone 
involved in the home care was involved in these discussions to minimise the 
potentially  disturbing  impacts  of  my  visits  on  the  daily  routines. 
Furthermore, we discussed the process of ending the relationship once data 
collection was complete. I will come back to this ‘tricky’ aspect further down 
in  the  section  on  ‘taking  sides’  with  participants,  and  the  inevitable 
development of emotional bonds in long-term observations. 
 
I pursued an active participation approach, which actively incorporated the 
views of participants. Participants who had been recorded were interviewed 
about  the  interaction  at  hand.  This  created  further  opportunities  to 
understand the perspectives of those being recorded, thus reducing the risk of 
marginalisation  or  misinterpretation.  However,  sometimes  further 
clarifications, or interpretations were simply needed.  
 
After the first three months of fieldwork, I had some difficulty negotiating the 
boundaries with Wilma’s family members and also one Polish live-in. I found 
myself ‘taking sides’ (see Armbruster & Laerke, 2008) with the Polish live-ins 
and Wilma. This issue and its impact on data analysis will be addressed in the 
two analysis chapters and the last chapter of this thesis. In general, I began 
boundary  work  right  from  the  start  in  stressing  frequently  that  I  am  a 
researcher not a member of Wilma’s care network. The intimacy of a family, 
the  requirement  that  the  researcher  develops  the  form  of  relationship 
necessary for participant observation, needs to be balanced against the reality 
that the researcher will ultimately withdraw. Hence, I tried to be reflexive and 
considerate  in  the  actions  I  got  involved  in  during  the  observation;  in 
particular those actions I performed frequently as outlined earlier, i.e. going 
on walks with Wilma and the live-ins, to the dermatologist, hairdresser, etc. 
The impact of my presence was monitored regularly within supervisions and 
through the use of a research diary.  
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6.3. Data Transcription 
  
All transcripts of interviews and material collected through observations were 
anonymised  in  a  structured  way.  Participants  were  given  a  code,  with  a 
different set of sub-codes for the participants of the two case studies. This 
also  includes  the  translations.  German  translations  of  the  Polish 
questionnaires and online diaries were made between April and August 2008 
by a certified translator I had worked with on another project in Germany in 
2007. These translations were then double-checked by a German friend of 
mine who had been living and studying in Poland for many years. Only after 
the  completion  of  data  analysis  I  translated  the  chosen  transcripts  from 
German into English. The accuracy and appropriateness of these translations 
was discussed with my supervisor and advisor who are native Germans. The 
next  step  included  a  review  of  all  transcripts  of  interviews  as  well  as  the 
interactions recorded during the observations. In this process, the thematic 
framework, the task or interaction categorised as feeding, was identified in 
the raw data, which then led to a selection of interactional data in line with 
this thematic framework. The main corpus of data presented in this thesis’s 
analysis chapters was collected in the ‘Wilma’ Case Study.   
 
In line with Jefferson (2002), I employed CA conventions for a line-by-line 
transcription (see Appendix A). However, a number of important questions 
arose  with  regard  to  the  role  of  transcribing  in  the  actual  analysis.  The 
participation  framework  is  strongly  affected  by  ‘Wilma’  who  is  not  fully 
competent.  Thus,  the  focus  is  on  her  participative  status.  A  multilayered 
analysis  would  have  probably  been  able  to  capture  more  precisely  the 
different processes involved; however, I chose to make it more accessible to 
readers. Also I wanted to increase transparency by not overly systemising and 
categorising it. At the same time, applying a CA transcription as the basic 
transcription should also serve as a reminder to readers that what is in front 
of their eyes is ‘the data’, or rather what I have made of it. I was cautious to 
avoid  the  many  ways  in  which  I  could  have  manipulated  Wilma’s  speech. 
Thus, there are no instances of ‘guessing’ the meaning and correcting her 
accordingly, and no parts of data are omitted in selected real-time sequences.  
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/6.4. Data Analysis 
 
Adhering  to  the  critical  perspective  and  framework  established  over  the 
course of the previous chapters, the data analysis attempts to trace the role of 
memory in ‘emotion management’ with regard to its assumed functions as 
introduced  in  the  chapters  2  and  3.  Therefore,  this  thesis’s  toolkit  should 
potentially allow for conclusions concerning the way participants subjectively 
frame the home care situation, as well as the interdependent, situated nature 
of memory as it is intersubjectively (re)enacted and scaffolded by partners in 
care interactions.  
 
Having spent a considerable amount of time with Wilma and those who care 
for and about her, apart from scientific curiosity, I feel heart-felt respect and 
an  obligation  to  follow  Sacks’s  suggestion  to  “work  at  some  single 
conversation as elaborately as one can; to subject any particular conversation 
you happen to have your hands on to investigation in any direction that can 
be produced of it” (ibid.: 127/ 128). The initial approach to data analysis was 
therefore one of ‘any-direction’ considerations (Sacks, 1986: 128). This means 
that “various theoretical, methodological, and analytic issues are raised by 
reference to items which happen to occur” (Sacks, 1986: 127). Following this 
spirit, one important aim of section A and B of this thesis is therefore to set 
out  a  path  in-between  those  Discourses,  terminologies  and  practices  that 
frequently produce data analysis at the expense of the studies’ participants. 
Of  course,  I  am  not  immune  to  bias  but  this  study  hopes  to  avoid  those 
practices we have seen in chapter 4 and that in their extreme forms touch 
upon questions of dignity and human rights.  
 
Earlier in this chapter, the data collection methods were outlined. Apart from 
the  interactional  data  collected  during  participant  observations,  subjective 
reports in the form of interviews have also been sought. As I have mentioned 
elsewhere  (p.11),  I  neither  side  with  the  ‘cognitivist’  camp,  nor  the 
‘anticognitivist’ one; partly, because in line with Duncan & Fiske (1977), I 
think we have seen examples in chapter 3 (in particular p. 53 ff.) that show 
that  internal  states  may  reflect  situational  and  interactional  factors  and 
should  thus  be  considered  (inter)dependent  rather  than  independent   121 
variables  in  analysis.  Also,  we  have  seen  that  there  are  alternative 
conceptualizations, such as grounding cognition and emotion in the body, but 
I  will  come  back  to  this  further  down.  The  crucial  point  here  is  that  the 
method  of  eliciting  specific  types  of  information  from  individuals  in 
interviews, who are in turn aware of this specific type of situation and are 
assumed to consciously select to a certain degree their responses, shall be 
matched by corresponding data analysis.  
 
We  have  seen  that  there  is  a  tradition  of  analysing  exactly  these  types  of 
conscious, subjective responses in terms of mental representations, or more 
precisely  in  terms  of  frames,  scripts  and  schemata.  In  the  following  data 
analysis,  participants  hence  generated  the  characteristics  (environmental, 
emotional,  social,  and  cognitive)  that  they  found  characteristic  of  the 
homecare situation. With a focus on frames and schemata, my analysis will 
show  that  participants  frame  the  homecare  situation  based  on  prior 
experiences. However, the data extract (Donna) used in chapter 1 (p. 8) made 
a strong point that over the course of time changes occur. These changes can 
be due to various factors, for instance, the progression of a certain disease, or 
changes in the network that makes up a migrant-in-the-family household. In 
combining  Donna’s  report  on  the  perceived  effects  of  certain  changes  on 
attitudes (her own, her grandson’s), and also behaviour (her mother, the live-
ins),  with  the  emergence  of  certain  coping  or  care  strategies,  as  seen  in 
chapter 2 (p.34 ff.), this analysis pursues the following line of argumentation.  
 
In order to trace these assumed ties between a subject, its actions, and the 
environment, specific situational and personal cues will have to be identified. 
Here, for instance, emotion appraisal theories in psychology that cue bodily 
actions and feeling expressions with internal feedback and coping strategies 
in  emotion  generation  processes  will  serve  to  trace  the  instantiation  of 
schemata. I will not go into detail here as this will be developed hand-in-hand 
with the data. Since from this ‘cognitivist’ perspective, the observed feedback 
and  coping  strategies  are  assumed  to  be  actions  that  are  steered  by  the 
individuals’ internal goals, schemata are, first of all, understood to potentially 
give insight into the individual’s goal-specific actions, and furthermore, are 
identified  based  on  specific  recurring  patterns.  Since  this  thesis,  however,   122 
above all promotes an interactional perspective, data analysis will also focus 
on  the  situational  meaning  of  it  in  interactions.  Schemata  are  hence 
approached  on  two  levels:  subjectively,  based  on  the  individual’s  unique 
cognitive  appraisal,  however,  the  context  in  which  this  happens  is 
interactionally  and  intersubjectively  co-constructed.  Results  are  also 
discussed  in  terms  of  how  participants  in  interaction  orient  to  the  social 
function of emotions, how relationships are affected.  
 
Concerning  the  data  on  face-to-face  interaction  between  participants,  I 
argued in particular in chapters 4 (p. 83 ff.) that participants build action by 
assembling a range of quite different kinds of sign systems in different media. 
Rather than being coded entirely in a single semiotic system, meaning and 
action are constituted by the mutual elaboration of these different kinds of 
sign systems. I, therefore, argue in reference to general studies on feeling 
expressions  in  psychology,  and  Trevarthen’s  research  on  mother-infant 
interactions (p. 86 ff.), as well as Mead’s research on gestures (p. 100 ff.) in 
particular, that we have seen considerable proof so far that understanding 
meaning does not rely solely on verbal language – let alone its ‘appropriate’ 
use.  
 
Thus, while it is a common assumption in modern CA that participants orient 
to the turn-taking system and the linguistic information, in acknowledging 
that  we  are  born  with  an  innate  intersubjectivity,  I  take  on  board  a 
perspective that sees language as only one of many possible cues. I will trace 
instances  in  the  data  where  participants  potentially  do  not  orient  to  the 
verbal  level  (as  the  main  point  of  reference  in  meaning-making)  but  to 
emotions. This will be identified through shared attention and synchronous 
movements  but  mostly  through  feeling  expressions  (including  facial 
expressions, tone, gestures and body posture). If emotions are oriented  to 
other people’s actions and reactions, then their expression will be affected. 
So,  for  example,  one  can  assume  that  perceptions  of  Wilma’s  facial 
expressions  can  affect  her  daughter’s  appraisal  of  the  situation,  and 
emotional orientation towards Wilma. This type of analysis will be embedded 
in  instances  of  story-telling.  Following  Sacks,  a  focus  on  how  participants 
achieve ‘my mind to your mind’ and unfolding second actions will at the same   123 
time  then  pay  also  equal  attention  to  the  role  of  verbal  language  in  the 
organisation  of  stories,  as  well  as  the  fit  between  story-telling  and  the 
ongoing  conversation,  the  story  preface,  the  story  response  and  the  re-
activation of turn-by-turn talk (Sacks, 1992: 421, Vol. 2).  
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7 
  
Cake or meat? 
 
An embodied perspective on emotion management and 
(inter)subjective remembering in the collective 
activity of feeding Wilma dinner11 
 
 
 
 
 
Starting  from  the  hypothesis  that  emotion  management  strategies  are  not 
present  prior  to  the  setup  of  a  ‘migrant-in-the-family’  care  network  but 
constant learning processes which can be traced, this chapter’s data analysis 
and  discussion  provide  results  that  allow for  approximate  answers  to  this 
thesis’s  guiding  research  questions.  Starting  off  with  the  first  research 
question  which  asks  about  the  subjective  emotion  management  strategies 
individuals  employ,  the  literature  reviews  in  chapter  2,  3  and  4  provided 
crucial insights. First of all, it has to be said that a number of studies do exist, 
both in research with migrant live-ins and with Alzheimer’s patients, that do 
provide answers to the question how subjective emotion management works. 
The  literature  reviews,  however,  have  also  provided  evidence  that  such  a 
research  question  may  in  fact  be  utterly  inadequate  if  one  wants  to  learn 
                                                 
11 Parts of this chapter have been published in Engfer (2011).   125 
about a phenomenon which seems to be interactional in nature. This in turn 
diverges into a number of methodological issues. Drawing on Goffman’s work 
on  appearance  before  others,  Arlie  Hochschild  developed  a  widely  used 
framework that divides actions which an individual uses to regulate primarily 
his or her own emotions into ‘surface’ and ‘deep acting’. Applied to homecare 
settings, it has been shown in chapter 2 that these strategies are not easily 
transferable, let  alone universal. In  tracing the monological subject in her 
own data, one major short-coming of Ibarra’s work is that in focussing on her 
main informant (Mrs. Archuleta), ‘the other’ is absent and only exists within 
Mrs. Archuleta’s experience. This chapter therefore presents a case study that 
investigates  how  participants  in  interaction  achieve  understanding 
dialogically.  
 
Following  Harvey  Sacks’s  unconditional  commitment  to  how  participants 
themselves  ‘do  understanding’  this  chapter  attempts  to  utilise  an  ‘any-
direction’ analysis. This means that participants will be ‘held responsible’ for 
the accounts given prior to the observation. Acknowledging the concepts of 
frames  and  schemata  as  mental  representations  of  experiences  these  will 
work  as  a  compass  for  observed  interactions.  Analysis  then  combines  the 
perspective of subjective experience with observed task-related interactions 
of  participants  to  find  evidence  for  emotion  management  strategies  in 
Ibarra’s sense. With regard to the participants’ inter- and intrapersonal aims, 
the  communicational  and  emotional  effects  of  the  individual  grounding 
strategies will be analysed through embodied affective reactions, including 
(linguistic)  actions  and  feeling  expressions.  Acknowledging  that  the  social 
and psychological aspects of meaning-making are in dialogical interchange, 
the  array  of  situational  and  personal  cues  that  participants  potentially 
assemble  will  be  discussed  in  the  light  of  relevant  findings  in  psychology 
presented in chapter 3 and integrated into Sacks’s proposed analysis of how 
participants do this on-going analysis of ‘bringing their minds to each other’. 
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The frames participants apply to the homecare situation 
 
Prior  to  the  observations,  selected  interviews  were  recorded  to  provide 
insight into how participants frame the home care situation. Asked about her 
mother,  Gudrun,  Wilma’s  oldest  daughter  and  guardian,  reported  that  in 
2006, when she was 53 years old, she “had to” admit Wilma into a psychiatric 
unit.  She  explained  that  due  to  Wilma’s  increasingly  aggressive  behaviour 
“we couldn’t handle her anymore”. Gudrun did not want to talk about this 
experience, but repeatedly stated that it was “horrible” for both Wilma and 
her. Faced with the personality-changing effects of Alzheimer’s disease on the 
one hand, and the dissatisfying care facility they had chosen on the other, this 
event marks a significant experience and a kind of climax in the course of 
Wilma’s disease. Gudrun realised after a few weeks that she could not leave 
Wilma  in  the  psychiatric  unit.  She  brought  her  back  home,  and  soon 
afterwards  the  Polish  nurse  Elisabeta  moved  in.  Based  on  the  memory  of 
experiencing how Wilma was (mis-)treated at the psychiatric unit, Gudrun 
explained that she learned that at all times her mother has to be treated “in a 
calm and loving way”.  
 
Elisabeta, the Polish live-in involved in the conversation extract below, is a 
trained nurse and experienced in the care of dementia patients. She worked 
for 35 years in a Polish hospital prior to retirement. In August 2008, the 57-
year-old woman had been working for almost one-and-a-half years in this 
family.  Asked  about  Wilma,  she  replied  that  she  is  able  to  “cope”  with 
working as a live-in because she is a nurse and “a nurse has to be strong”. She 
thinks that it is very important that Wilma’s children visit her “so that Wilma 
does  not  forget  that  she  is  a  mother”.  Elisabeta  is  a  mother  herself,  and 
treating Wilma as such, while framing the overall live-in situation based on 
her professional experience as a nurse, helped her to bond with Wilma in the 
beginning. Asked about Wilma’s children, Elisabeta reported: “The family is 
good. No problems. However, I am not integrated. Don’t get me wrong. I 
have to care for their mummy. But the moment I decide not to return from 
Poland, another woman will replace me”. 
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Introducing these two participants in this fashion, a parallel can be drawn to 
Ibarra’s work. According to her, Mrs. Archuleta used the little information 
she had about her ward’s life story to bond with her. This in turn helped her 
to provide better care which Ibarra categorised in terms of different strategies 
which are marked by specific verbal and non-verbal behaviour. One could 
thus say that Wilma’s daughter potentially developed a certain strategy based 
on ‘calm and loving’ behaviour following her mother’s traumatic stay at the 
psychiatric  unit,  while  Elisabeta  primarily  draws  on  her  experience  as  a 
‘nurse’.  Furthermore,  one  could  also  argue  in  the  fashion  of  Ibarra  and 
Degiuli  that  Elisabeta’s  account  foreshadows  the  cold  and  anonymous 
relationship between live-in carers and relatives. These hypothetical claims 
will be tested in the following interactions which were recorded on a Saturday 
evening. 
 
 
Dinner with Wilma – the episode to be examined 
 
On Saturdays, Gudrun usually visits them and takes over the task of feeding 
her mother. Prior to her arrival at around 6 pm, Elisabeta prepares dinner for 
Wilma and joins them at the table once Gudrun is there. Gudrun sits next to 
Wilma, Elisabeta sits opposite her. In front of Wilma on the table is a plate 
with two sandwiches with ham and cheese and tomato slices.  
  
        
 
        > = direction of chair facing   128 
Kitchen – 16/8/08 - 6 pm - Wilma (W), daughter Gudrun (G), live-in Elisabeta (E), 
and I (I*) 
 
 
 
1  W: ich will da weg ge gehen (tries to get up from the chair) 
    i want to go away 
 
2  G<quiet>: dat tun wir gleich zuSAMMEN schatz  (pushing down her shoulders) 
                    we will do that together in a minute my darling 
 
3  W<loud>: machte da hab ich ja (eyes on G) 
                  made there I have 
 
4  G<whispers>: wir (.) zwei (.) gleich (.) zusammen (eyes on W) 
            us        two        soon         together 
 
5  =E:                aber besser zuerst ESSEN schatz (eyes on W) 
                    but better eat first darling 
 
6  =W:           aber wenn wir rausgehen dann machen wir ne  
                but when we go outside then we make a  
 
7      neue (eyes on G)  
      new one 
 
8  G<confirming>: dann machen wir ne neue schatz (eyes on W) 
                then we make a new one darling  
 
 
9  E: essen ist immer eine stunde (glances at I*) <laughs> 
    meal takes always an hour 
 
10 =G:                  aber  weisst du (eyes on W) 
                      but do you know 
 
11 <whispers>: wir machen das gleich zuSAMMEN. das machen wir zusammen (eyes on W) 
                     we do it soon together.             we will do it together 
 
12 <loud>: WIR ZWEI gehen dann gleich(eyes on W) 
             us two go soon 
 
13  W: ja 
    yes 
 
14  G: SIEHste (eyes on W) und man muss immer so auf diese leute EINgehen (glances at E &  
                                  I*) 
            see             and this is how one always has to respond to these people 
 
 
In  chapter  5,  the  idea  has  been  introduced  that  early  in  a  conversation 
participants use some way of showing that they have found “at least that part 
of ‘us’ that is involved in our last interaction” (Sacks, 1992: 193, Vol. 1). A first 
glance at this sequence shows that it is Wilma who provides the theme (lines   129 
1 and 6) that defines the course of this interaction. Her desire to leave the 
table causes Gudrun to react with repeated confirmations (lines 2, 4, 11, 12), 
adding the rheme ‘together’ to the established theme ‘I want to leave’. Her 
posture, facing Wilma, as well as her gaze signal Gudrun’s engagement (see 
Goodwin,  1981)  with  Wilma.  ‘Being  together’  is  thus  expressed  through  a 
variety of modes ranging from holding the gaze, and sitting close with bodies 
facing  each  other,  to  the  stressing  of  syllables  (lines  11,  12,  14),  and  the 
intimacy of a whisper (line 11).  
 
Holding the topic of ‘being together’ in abeyance, attention will focus first on 
Gudrun’s final comment ‘And this is how you always have to respond to these 
people’  (line  14).  This  seems  to  stand  in  stark  contrast  since  within  the 
sequential order of events, Gudrun provides the appropriate second to her 
mother’s definitional claim and ‘invitation to remember’ that it is Saturday 
which means that the two of them always go for a walk together. It is an 
essential part of their Saturday routine. The transcript indicates that what 
happens is that she notably shifts her gaze from Wilma to me and Elisabeta. 
This shift in gaze is crucial because in turning her attention to me she signals 
that  she  knows  that  I  am  here  because  Wilma  was  diagnosed  with 
Alzheimer’s. She establishes as common ground not only that all three of us 
understand that she refers to Alzheimer’s patients in general, when she says 
‘these  people’,  but  that  all  her  actions  in  this  short  interaction  are 
recognisable  as  a  proper  way  of  responding  to  people  with  Alzheimer’s. 
Gudrun herself never received any specialist training in dementia care, but 
‘learns by doing’. Her use of the specialist term ‘eingehen’ (respond, validate) 
possibly refers back to Wilma’s stay at the psychiatric unit in 2006, where 
Gudrun was in contact with qualified staff. Taking this as an instance where 
Gudrun  self-monitored  her  actions,  this  supports  the  idea  that  this  is 
essentially  a  demonstration  of  her  care  strategy.  Focussing  in  detail  on 
Gudrun’s actions should help to find proof for this assumption. 
 
The high frequency and stress of the word ‘together’ (lines 8, 10, 17) draws 
attention to Gudrun’s intrapersonal aims. Gudrun described Wilma’s stay at 
the psychiatric unit as a “horrible” experience for both of them. As Wilma’s 
guardian,  she  was  the  one  who  made  the  momentous  decision  that  she   130 
cannot  talk  about  even  two  years  later.  From  this  perspective  Gudrun’s 
repeated confirmation that she will leave ‘together’ with Wilma supports her 
positive assimilation process of the traumatic experience. She learned to treat 
her  mother  with  ‘love  and  calm’,  performing  what  she  perceives  as  best 
possible care for Wilma. Gudrun thus aims for coherence through engaging in 
actions  appropriate  to  the  activated  concept12. In her first turn (line 8), 
Gudrun  embodies  ‘love  and  calm’  through  a  range  of  semiotic  modes, 
including tone (‘leise’), stress of syllables (‘zuSAMMEN’) and her choice of 
the emotional address ‘Schatz’. In the following turns she modulates these 
cues, attentive to Wilma’s actions; lowering her voice to a whisper (line 10) 
and  adding  pauses  (line  10)  to  soothe  Wilma’s  growing  anxiety,  while 
validating on the semantic level Wilma’s request to leave. The coherence of 
her actions, as well as the actions themselves, identify her above-mentioned 
‘love  and  calm’  strategy.  Thus,  when  she  validates  in  this  sequence  her 
affective  meaning  through  embodied  affective  reactions  the  intended  aim 
serves intrapersonal coherence (see Centerbar et al., 2008).   
 
In line 11 (‘but better eat first, darling’), Elisabeta establishes what she thinks 
is common ground in this situation: stressing the word ‘ESSEN’ (eat), she 
draws attention to the task of feeding Wilma. Bearing in mind that Elisabeta 
stated  earlier  that  she  cares  for  Wilma  drawing  on  her  many  years  of 
experience as a professional nurse, her request that overlaps with Gudrun’s 
turn (line 10), alongside the use of the word ‘better’, and the fact that she 
addresses Wilma mimicking Gudrun’s emotional language (‘schatz’), indicate 
a  proposed  reciprocal,  or  business  relationship  (Fiske,  1992).  However, 
whereas Elisabeta offers reciprocity, Gudrun signals dominance, overlapping 
Elisabeta’s  turn  (line  10)  and  not  providing  a  second  pair  part  after 
Elisabeta’s request in line 11. Elisabeta’s laughter following her turn might 
indicate the emotional cost of awkwardness resulting from this relationship 
mismatch. Elisabeta makes a remedial effort in line 9, sharing her knowledge 
that  ‘eating  always  takes  one  hour’  (‘essen  ist  immer  eine  stunde’).  This 
exclamation  contextualizes  her  first  remark,  stressing  that  the  task  of 
successfully feeding Wilma is not only of most importance, but that it is a 
                                                 
12 See for instance Freedman & Fraser (1966) on their famous foot-in-the-door-technique 
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routine she developed over the past 1.5 years that ‘always’ takes one hour. 
This is the average time she needs to keep Wilma’s attention focussed on the 
dinner,  and  physically  present  at  the  table.  Within  the  first  weeks  of  the 
observation,  Elisabeta  asked  me  if  I  could  keep  my  visits  to  a  minimum 
during breakfast, dinner, and especially lunch. For her, feeding Wilma is a 
crucial, but very stressful and sensitive part of her everyday routine, and she 
prefers  to  keep  factors  that  can  potentially  affect  Wilma’s  attention  to  a 
minimum. This is an experience I share with Elisabeta because before making 
the final decision, I did join the two for meals at times. Hence, our exchange 
of glances  expresses this knowledge that ‘I  know that you know it always 
takes an hour’. 
 
Since Gudrun holds my gaze, I shift the topic and bring up what I remember 
to be significant about our last encounter. That is, her use of dialect with 
Wilma; signalling that despite my initial interest  in Wilma because of the 
diagnosis,  I  have  gotten  to  know  her  and  I  have  memories  of  Gudrun 
interacting with her. 
 
 
 
15  I*: sprechen sie fliessend platt? (E rearranges slices of bread.) 
        are you fluent in the local dialect? 
 
16  G (eyes on W) <quiet>: sach ma nee  <loud> (glances at I*) UNSERE MUTTER KONNTE 
                 say no                                 our mother could 
 
17  DAT FRUEHER (eyes on W) sach ma, ne? PAPA nich, ne? (E frowns, starts feeding W)  
  Do it back then                          say yes, eh? papa couldn’t, right? 
 
18  W<chewing>: nee (eyes on bread) 
            no 
 
19  I*: wurde zuhause platt gesprochen?(eyes on G) 
    did you speak dialect at home? 
 
20 G: nee (eyes on I*) 
    no 
 
21  E (eyes on W): bitte schön TRINKEN frau wilmusz (gives W the glass) (.) <quiet> JA 
             please drink this nicely mrs wilmusz                               yes 
 
22 =G (eyes on I*):        mit den nachbarn, mit den bekannten und so 
                with the neighbours, acquaintances and such  
 
23 mit dem MILCHbauern, mit dem briefträger und all die, ne (.) (glances at W) dat 
  with the milk farmers, the postman and all those, right 
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24 =E:                                  hier tomate (eyes on W) 
                         here tomato 
 
25 =G (eyes on I*): ham wir natürlich auch gehört eh also auch FRÜHER. vater war ja 
                of course we also heard it eh I mean back then.               father  
 
26  =E (eyes on W):                      ↑GUCK ↓MA 
                      LOOK   HERE 
 
27 =G (eyes on I*): selbstständig im baugewerbe  
               had his own construction business 
 
28  =E (eyes on W):   ↑HMMMMMMMMMMMM (.) lecker tomate 
                                 tasty tomato 
 
29 =G (eyes on I*): und da ham die auch viel platt gesprochen (glances at W) 
               and there they also used to speak a lot of dialect 
 
30 =E: (eyes on W): sehr lecker 
                very tasty 
 
31  G (eyes on I*): das haben wir immer MITgekriegt (.) (glances at E) 
            and we were exposed to it 
 
32 =W (eyes on E): du oder ich 
                you or me 
 
33 =E (eyes on W):  das ist viel frau wilma (.)↑HHHHHHHHHMMMMMMM ↑SCHÖN 
          that’s a lot mrs wilma                     nice 
 
 
34  G (eyes on I*): aber WIR (.) so (.) sprechen (.) mit den geschwistern kein platt. (.) ABER 
                                   but   we   like     don’t speak dialect with our siblings              but 
 
35  =E (eyes on W):             das is lecker 
                that is tasty 
 
36  G (eyes on I*) <loud>: ich hab in X ein geschäft bei uns sind viele holländer und da red ich 
                            i have a business in X and there are many Dutch and there i talk 
 
37 =E (eyes on W) <loud>:          SOO hast du ↑GUT GE↑MACHT 
                  So     well done 
 
38 G (eyes on I*): also platt, ne? 
            eh dialect, right? 
 
39 E (eyes on W) <smiling>: WUNDERSCHÖN 
                    wonderful 
 
40 G (eyes on I*): ja das funktioniert gut 
             yes that works fine 
 
41  W (eyes on G): na ΚΟΜΜΑ (attempts to get up from chair) 
        let’s go 
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Analysis  of  this  sequence  pursues  three  themes:  First  of  all,  having 
established in the first sequence the definitional claims of the individuals as 
expressed  in  their  initial  effort  to  share  their  memory  of  significant  past 
encounters  with  each  other,  attention  will  be  given  to  how  participants 
manage the on-going process of keeping their minds on each other. Secondly, 
keeping in mind the perceived relationship mismatch between Elisabeta and 
Gudrun, the question is if and how participants continue to signal that this is 
meaningful to them. Finally, analysis will also focus on how Gudrun deals 
with my invitation to remember.   
 
Upon first glance, the sequential order of events seems to suggest a ‘struggle’ 
between  Elisabeta  and  Gudrun  for  Wilma’s  attention.  Gudrun’s  attention 
initially rests on me,  which is indicated by her gaze  and posture. Gudrun 
hands over my question to Wilma (line 16), who frequently reacts to gazes as 
invitations to contribute to conversations, and thus aims to involve her. We 
can see here that Wilma, whose eyes are fixed on the sandwiches in front of 
her,  signals  understanding  of  Gudrun’s  second  request  (line  18).  To  say, 
however, that this can be understood as an instance of remembering would 
imply drawing the connection between co-active verbs as ‘remember’, or here 
‘say’, and memory. In chapter 4, we have seen that this is a typical example 
used  by  discursive  psychologists  to  exemplify  the  analytical  reasoning  of 
cognitive  thinking.  Nevertheless,  this  idea  is  relevant  because  Gudrun 
described Wilma in the previous sequence as one of ‘these people’, meaning 
Alzheimer’s  patients,  which  implies  that  one  feature  ‘they’  all  have  in 
common  according  to  public  Discourse  is  severe  memory  loss.  Hence, 
Gudrun’s action is interesting in that she asks her mother to remember her 
own, as well as her husband’s use of dialect, but incorporated in her request 
what she thinks to be the correct answer to it (lines 16 and 17). So, while 
signalling to Wilma that they are ‘together’, that she is still on her mind, she 
also continues to stress that her mother suffers from Alzheimer’s disease.  
 
We  can  see  in  the  transcript  that  while  Gudrun’s  attention  rests  on  me, 
Elisabeta rearranges the slices of bread (line 15). However, as soon as Gudrun 
addresses Wilma, Elisabeta’s glance at Gudrun can be clearly identified as 
frowning. What happens next is that Elisabeta leans across the table and puts   134 
a piece of bread into Wilma’s mouth. In the course of the sequence Elisabeta 
employs  a  number  of  different  strategies  to  keep  Wilma’s  attention 
successfully  focussed  on  the  food  through  addressing  all  her  senses.  She 
strategically shows her the food or drink and denominates it (line 21, 24 and 
28), she hands it over to her (line 21), she puts it in front of her own mouth, 
or tries it herself, followed by sounds of enjoyment, thus inviting Wilma to 
mimic her behaviour (line 28). Any time Wilma cooperates, Elisabeta praises 
her  (line  33,  37,  and  39).  Over  the  course  of  the  sequence,  repeatedly 
successful  feeding  is  accompanied  by  an  increasing  intensity  of  tone  and 
voice (lines 28, 33, 37), and a smile (line 39). 
 
Bearing  in  mind  how  Elisabeta  frames  her  work,  her  performance  is 
recognisable as the practice of feeding someone who is unable to feed herself, 
which is associated with the way mothers or nurses feed. Elisabeta’s memory 
of 35 years of professional nursing is embodied in this skilled performance of 
feeding.  From  a  psychological  perspective,  her  feeling  expressions  can  be 
discussed  as  resulting  from  the  affective  coherence  Elisabeta  experiences 
while  engaging  in  an  activity  that  is  appropriate  to  the  activated  concept. 
Furthermore,  successfully  feeding  Wilma  is  consistent  with  her  goal  as 
expressed in sequence 1: If feeding Wilma always takes an hour, this means 
that she has to be fed efficiently.  
 
I suggested in sequence 1 with regard to Gudrun’s actions that achievement of 
intrapersonal coherence potentially affects interpersonal alignment. In this 
respect, one can see a continuation of subject-positioning and relationship 
matching  here.  In  line  42,  Elisabeta’s  turn,  slightly  delayed,  overlaps 
Gudrun’s turn, and the voices of both women are of equal volume. Although 
Gudrun glances frequently (lines 23, 29, 31) at Elisabeta and Wilma she does 
not interrupt them. In fact, Gudrun’s concluding comment ‘Yes that works 
fine’ (line 40), indicates alignment. However, her gaze reveals that this turn 
connects  with  her  command  of  Low  German  (lines  38,  40)  and  not 
Elisabeta’s successful task management.  
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Wilma’s request in line 41 (‘Let’s go’) draws Gudrun’s attention back to her: 
 
42 G<quiet> (eyes on W): ja aber effkes (.) effkes ma nie so unröstich (pushes W down) 
                                         yes but now             now not so       uneasy                 
 
43 =E:                                                       ICH mach das schon. (glances at G) (.) <quiet> schön 
                          i do it                   nice
   
 
44 G: <loud> (eyes on I*): und sie merkt das SCHON (.) also ICH MUSS SAGEN ich hab viel 
                and she does notice  it    well I must say that i am a lot  
 
45 von meinem VATER weg und wenn ICH hier bin hab ich immer das gefühl dat die dann 
  like my father and when I am here i always have the feeling that she then 
 
 
46 meint, (.) ne? 
  thinks      you know 
 
47 W: xxx 
 
48 G: ↑ja? set ↑römmelich? is et ↑römmelich? (kisses W) die braucht sehr viel 
      yes is it noisy             is it noisy             she needs a lot of 
 
49 ZUNEIGUNG und so 
  affection and stuff 
 
50 =E:                  OCH frau wilma SELber SELBER. (W reaches for slice but puts it back)  
         oh mrs. wilma yourself yourself 
 
51  G: wa, ma↑ma? 
       right mama 
 
52 W: nee dat glaub glaub (W gets up, goes towards the corridor, then turns around) 
    no this believe believe 
 
53 G<quiet, encouraging>: Na TU MA mama <whispers> nur effkes komm (eyes on W) 
                 Do it mama                       just now come 
 
54 =W:                                                                                   nee ich nich (eyes on G) 
                         no not me 
 
55 G: ↑komm hier (eyes on W) 
       come here 
 
56 W: NEE (eyes on G) 
     no 
 
57 G<loud>: NA ↑KOMM (.) SCHATZ (eyes  on W) 
                         come on darling 
 
58 =E<whispers>:          bisschen warten (eyes on W) 
           wait little 
 
59 W: dat is aber schön (eyes on E) 
    but that is nice 
 
60 G<loud>: ↑SCHÖN? (gets up from chair, facing W) 
        nice 
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61  W<loud, agitated>: JA NEE GAR NIX (eyes on G) 
                  yes no nothing at all 
 
This sequence is remarkable in that a highly emotional conflict occurs which 
climaxes in line 61. This climax is made visible through the enhanced prosody 
(which cannot be adequately captured in the transcript) that seems to convey 
increasing emotional involvement. This is also expressed through aspects of 
Wilma’s and Gudrun’s body movements (Wilma moving away from Gudrun 
with Gudrun following her). As actions unfold towards the climax, we can try 
to make sense of Wilma’s and Gudrun’s continuous assessment of not only 
linguistic structure in the stream of speech, but also prosody, their  visible 
bodies  (gesture  and  orientation),  and  potentially  also  the  structure  of  the 
environment as Wilma gets up and moves through the kitchen.  
 
The prelude to the climax is that Elisabeta signals that she wants to shift 
Gudrun’s and Wilma’s attention back to dinner. In line 50, she places the 
plate directly in front of Wilma and encourages her to grab a slice. But Wilma 
does not comply this time. She leaves the table (line 52) and walks in the 
hallway. She stops in front of the locked front door and turns her head, facing 
Elisabeta, Gudrun and me again, who can see her from the kitchen table; a 
distance of approximately three metres. Whereas Elisabeta watches Wilma 
silently, Gudrun starts calling her (line 53, 55, 57). Although Wilma signals 
twice  that  she  does  not  want  to  come  back  to the  table (line  54  and  56), 
Gudrun  insists  and  changes  her  voice  from  a  whisper  (line  53)  to  high-
pitched calling (line 57). Watching Wilma’s anxiety grow, Elisabeta tries to 
intervene (line 58) and advises Gudrun to give Wilma time.  
  
In line 42 and 48, one can see that Gudrun is aware of a change in Wilma’s 
behaviour. She uses the Low German variety to point out that she recognises 
this behaviour as growing restlessness13, ‘unröstig’ (restless) behaviour, and 
asks Wilma if she thinks it is ‘römmelig’ (noisy). Gudrun and Elisabeta are 
both  familiar  with  the  markers  (including  voice,  tone,  facial  expressions, 
                                                 
13 As Schlosberg has shown, facial expressions are readily arranged on a circular scale, but 
the variety can be described fairly well in terms of two dimensions of variation, namely, the 
pleasant-unpleasant and the acceptant-rejectant (Schlosberg, 1952: 229-237).Wilma’s face 
frequently showed expressions of disgust, confusion, joy, or anger.   137 
gestures,  walking)  of  such  a  mood  swing  as  this  happens  fairly  often.  In 
chapter  3,  I  showed  that  the  dominant  perspective  on  mood  swings  in 
Alzheimer’s patients was that it is pathological in the sense that mood swings 
occur  with  the  disease.  Mood  swings  are  then  located  within  the  field  of 
clinical depression because the individual despairs, upon realising the decline 
in cognitive functions. As seen in chapter 4, it is not unusual to adopt this 
view and to label emotional situations like the one at hand as ‘conflict’ which 
require a specific set of emotion management strategies from nursing staff 
and relatives to be properly dealt with. Accordingly, a popular research topic 
in  gerontology  is  ‘conflict  management  in  dementia  units’.  For  instance, 
Small (2005) theorises that “in conflicts awareness of and resistance to the 
violation of their desires by others was a clear expression of an intact self. 
However, because conflict is an undesirable event, the residents’ behaviour in 
conflict can be viewed as a negative expression of self.”  
 
Contextualising this ‘conflict’ with the preceding sequence will show that this 
mood swing does not just happen like this, but actions and meanings that 
lead  up  to  this  conflict  are  built  in  concert  with  Gudrun,  Wilma  and  me. 
Going  back  to  line  42  where  Gudrun  first  highlights  a  change  in  Wilma’s 
behaviour, her use of the dialect here relates back to her statement in lines 38 
and  40  that  she  has  no  problems  speaking  Low  German  with  her  Dutch 
customers. However, within the six months of fieldwork, Gudrun frequently 
spoke Low German with her mother as well, in order to stimulate memory 
retrieval. She repeatedly stated ‘Von früher, das weiss die alles noch!’ (She 
still  recalls  everything  that  happened  in  the  past).    Accordingly,  she 
repeatedly asked Wilma questions, such as ‘Mama, wie was de Dragoner? En 
de Roje?’ (‘Mum, who was the dragon? And the redhead?’). ‘De Dragoner’ 
(‘the  dragon’)  was  Wilma’s  sister-in-law’s  nickname,  while  ‘de  Roje’,  the 
redhead, was Wilma’s nickname. Gudrun pointed out that especially these 
two questions are highly emotionally charged, because Wilma and her sister-
in-law did not like each other; yet, she is unaware of the emotional arousal 
she  induces.  In  her  replies  to  my  question  concerning  Low  German  she 
furthermore modulates a number of verbal emotional stimuli, such as ‘daddy’ 
(line 17), ‘father had a construction business’ (lines 25 and 27), ‘the siblings’   138 
(line 34), ‘I have got my own business in X’ (line 36) - all of which are likely to 
induce emotional arousal because they work as memory ‘handles’ for Wilma.  
 
Furthermore, Gudrun frequently re-enacts highly emotional situations with 
her  mother  based  on  her  personal  memory  of  her  parents’  emotional 
relationship  and  activities  they  shared.  I  have  seen  her  dancing  with  her 
mother  the  way  her  father  used  to  dance  with  Wilma,  holding  her  very 
closely, and humming the tune. Every single time I witnessed this, Wilma 
cheered up, and not only started swaying but also singing the lyrics of this, 
her favourite song. Gudrun refers to this as ways to ‘activate’ her mother. She 
announces  the  activities  to  follow  quoting  her  father:  ‘Wat  sacht  Albert? 
Immer Turnen, hoch das Bein!’ (‘What does Albert say? Work out! Lift your 
leg!’), or ‘Was hat Papa gesagt? Der Kopf muss arbeiten?’ (‘What did daddy 
say? The head has to work!’). Her remark in lines 44 and 45 (‘And she does 
feel it. I have to say that I am a lot like my dad, and when I am here I always 
have the feeling that she thinks - you know?’) refers to this. Since she stops 
her sentence in the middle and neither Elisabeta nor I offer a second action it 
can  be  argued  in  line  with  Sacks  (1992)  that  this  confirms  our  and  her 
understanding: “the sheer fact that others don’t continue can in some way 
evidence that they see what you were saying. And furthermore, that you don’t 
continue can inform them that that’s what you were indeed going to say” 
(Sacks, 1992: 430, Vol.2).  
 
This is true, at least in my case, as I immediately recall the above-mentioned 
instances of what Gudrun calls ‘activation strategies’. I also remember that in 
some  cases  a  negative  development  in  Wilma’s  mood  follows.  However, 
Gudrun  herself  never  indicated  that  this  is  possibly  in  relation  to  her 
strategies. Yet, I propose that we can indeed find proof for this, starting off 
from  the  idea  that  Wilma  is  given  a  range  of  cues  in  language  structure, 
prosody and the body that work as memory triggers. The term ‘trigger’ here is 
potentially misleading, as Gudrun’s and Wilma’s shared memory enactments 
touch upon a weaker understanding of embodied remembering. While Oliver 
Sacks certainly provides most fascinating insights into the effect of music on 
coma patients, my concern aims at the opposite direction. I do not think that 
Wilma  needs  to  be  ‘activated’,  but  that  her  actions  are  recognisably   139 
meaningful in interactions with others. As the interaction further develops, 
the following sequence will exemplify this. Leading her mother back to the 
table after her emotional outburst, Gudrun and Wilma co-construct a story 
about grief and loss:   
 
 
62 G<whispers>: komma hier bei schatz. wir zwei schatz. wir zwei (takes W in her arms) 
        come to me darling        us two darling   us two 
63  machen das schon. siehst du? KALTE ARME haste mein schatz (eyes on W) 
       will do it                see     you have got cold arms my darling 
 
64  W: ja (eyes on G) 
            yes 
 
65  G<loud>: wie KANNET? (eyes on W) 
             how come 
 
66  W: ja ich weiss et auch nich (eyes on G) 
              yes i don’t know that either 
 
67  G<loud>: ↑weisse ↑nich? (eyes on W) 
    you don’t know 
 
68  W: ja 
            yes 
 
69  G: och dat hat man schon ma, ne? findse nich? (eyes on W) 
           och this sometimes simply happens, eh? Don’t you think? 
 
70  W: hm hm 
 
71  G: gleich gehn wa inne SOnne (.) ich war schon aufem FRIEDHOF (.) und da 
            soon we will go into the sun     i’ve already been to the cemetary and there 
 
72  war es so warm da hab ich die jacke alles ausgeschmissen mama. hab ich frische 
        it was so warm that i threw off the jacket and everything mama. i put fresh 
 
73  blumen drauf getan. (.) weisst du? ne KERze (feeds W, still holding W in her arms) 
       flowers on it                    you know  a candle 
 
74  W<bitter, chewing>: die können ja nix 
       they aren’t good at anything 
 
75  G<confirming>: die können nix. nee, die können nix 
            they aren’t good at anything. Nothing at all 
 
76  W<chewing>: xx 
 
77  G<quiet>: ja? 
              yes 
 
78  W<chewing>: xxx 
 
79  G<quiet>: ja? 
              yes 
 
80  W: ja jetz komma 
             yes let’s go   140 
81  G<whispers>: gleich gleich schatz 
        soon   soon  darling 
 
82  =W:                                    komm mit (moves body towards the door) 
            come with me 
   
83  G (keeping W in her arms) <whispers>: tun wa auch. gleich gleich schatz. tun  wa 
                  we’ll do it. soon soon darling. we’ll do 
 
84  dat gleich zusammen. (.) tun wa gleich zusammen schatz (.) hm? hm? 
       it together soon                  we’ll do it together soon darling 
 
85  ↑guck ↓ma wo die Elisabeta (.) (points and turns head and looks at slices of bread) 
           look     here where Elisabeta 
 
86  hm? schön ne? 
       hm   nice eh 
 
87  W<bitter>: die haben alles vernommen 
                 they heard everything 
 
88  G<loud>: ALLES haben die genommen? 
             they took everything 
 
89  W<quiet>: schöne 
               nice 
 
90  G<quiet>: alles SCHÖNE ham die nich genommen schatz (.) hm? (.) 
              they didn’t take everything nice darling 
 
91  DU hast doch alles schöne (feeds W) 
       you do have all the nice things 
 
92  W<chewing>: ja aber woll wir ma rissen 
        yes but we want ma rissen 
 
93  G<quiet>: musst du auch wissen ne? 
              you have to know it, eh 
 
94  W<quiet>: ja 
               yes 
 
95  G<whispers>: ja schatzilein (.) (feeds W) 
        yes darling 
 
96  W<chewing>: wo gehse jetz hin? 
        where are you going now 
 
97  G: ich bleib bei DIR. is dat   
               i stay with you.  is this fine? 
 
98  W: dat is schön 
  that’s nice 
 
99  G<tender, quiet>: siehste (.) ich bleib jetz bei dir 
               see             i’ll stay with you now 
 
100  W: mussfuss 
  mussfuss 
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101  G<whispers>: schön ne? (feeds W) 
           nice eh 
 
102  W<chewing>: jetz stell dich grün hier 
          now put yourself green here 
 
103  G<tender,quiet> IMMER bei dir mama (.)<whispers> immer bei dir (G’s & W’s  
        foreheads touch) 
               always with you mama         always with you 
 
104  W <firm>: da musse dat sagen 
    then you should tell me  
 
105  G<quiet>: tu ich doch. das sag ich doch <loud> GUCK MA HIER (turns head) 
                but i do          i do tell you                       look here 
 
106  was die elisabeta lecker gekocht hat hier. nimm das ma das kannse auch 
         what elisabeta cooked. tasty. take this you can do it yourself 
 
107  JA ↑siehse? (.)↑NE? (.) HM lecker ne? 
         yes   see                 eh          hm tasty right 
 
108  W: ja 
             yes 
 
Holding Wilma in her arms, Gudrun expands the topic ‘together’ that she 
introduced in the first sequence. Lowering her voice to a whisper again, she 
confirms Wilma that ‘us two, darling. We can do it’ (lines 62, 63). Once more, 
her  behaviour  shows  all  of  the  semiotic  modes  established  in  the  first 
sequence that are coherent with her ‘love and calm’ strategy, adding a tight 
embrace in this sequence. Picking up the analysis of Gudrun’s ambivalent 
behaviour initiated in the previous sequence, this action yet again blurs the 
boundary  between  ‘loving’  and  ‘violating  behaviour’.  Wilma  twice  rejected 
Gudrun’s request to come back into the kitchen in the previous sequence.  In 
her turn that follows after Elisabeta’s intervention in line 58, where, based on 
her  experience  with  Wilma,  Elisabeta  advises  Gudrun  to  ‘wait  little’. 
However, she keeps up her loud, high-pitched voice and rises from her chair, 
thus indicating a follow-up action.  
 
This  in  turn  is  met  by  a  high  degree  of  emotional  arousal  in Wilma.  Her 
emotion  experience  is  displayed  in  facial  expressions,  gestures,  tone,  the 
semantic level of the verbal information, all of which signal an event that in 
research  with  Alzheimer’s  patients  is  described  as  ‘communicative 
breakdown’. However, Gudrun performs the action she announced when she 
got up from her chair. She walks over to Wilma, takes her into her arms and   142 
leads her back to the table, but holding her tightly all the time. Something 
most interesting follows this perceived emotional climax. Gudrun initiates a 
story about her Saturday afternoon routine which includes visiting her dead 
father’s grave (lines 71-73).  
 
To  start  with  what  might  be  called  the  preface  to  Gudrun’s  story,  it  is 
interesting to see that she points out the coldness of Wilma’s arms (line 63) 
only to express a little later in line 69 that this is perfectly normal (‘Well, this 
sometimes happens, doesn’t it?’). I think that this sheds light in a significant 
way on the structure of the actions to follow. I argue that Gudrun signals a 
remarkable  change  in  behaviour  that  is  entirely  new  in  this  interaction. 
Whereas in the previous sequences her interactions with Wilma and me have 
been predominantly grounded in her own subjective experiences of different 
stages of her mother’s disease, either in terms of her ‘love and calm’ strategy 
that goes back to the times of Wilma’s stay at the psychiatric unit, or what she 
calls  ‘activation  strategies’,  what  happens  here  seems  to  be  what  Harvey 
Sacks observed to be people’s preference to be ‘ordinary’.  
 
In the sequences so far I have stressed those aspects of Gudrun’s behaviour 
which seem to be carefully devised appearances in front of me and Elisabeta. 
This  does  not  mean  that  I  consider  certain  ways  of  behaving  to  be  more 
authentic than others; yet, I think that the analysis so far provides some proof 
for  this  claim.  In  this  respect,  Gudrun’s  actions  in  the  present  sequence 
provide us with some important information, because, as I said, I do think 
that something new is happening here. Telling us what she usually does and 
where she goes on Saturdays, the important change is that through telling 
this story Gudrun for the first time claims her position in the story, which is 
her being Wilma’s daughter. In chapter 5, Sacks’s idea was introduced that 
one could imagine experience as stored with regard to the role we play within 
it (p. 97). In the following, this idea will be developed with a focus on the 
position provided for Wilma through this story, and how Gudrun and Wilma 
achieve this understanding in concert with each other. 
 
What Gudrun talks about is that she visited her father’s grave. She describes 
that she has been ‘ to the cemetery. And it was so warm there, that I threw off   143 
the jacket, everything, mum. Put fresh flowers on it. You know? A candle’ 
(lines 71-73). Immediately after, Wilma indicates in her turn (74) ‘trouble-
indicating  behaviour’;  the  negative  information  Wilma  expresses  on  the 
linguistic level is presented with a notably bitter tone of voice. In line 90, 
Wilma once more picks up the same bitter tone she expressed earlier, but 
here the semantic information she provides does not match the tone in such a 
way,  that  a  distinct  emotion  that  shows  coherence  on  all  levels  is 
communicated. Gudrun initiates a sequence of repairs (line 88 and 93) which 
aim  at  creating  coherence  between  the  semantic  level  and  the  tone.  She 
substitutes consonants (lines 87/88 and lines 92/93), changing ‘vernommen’ 
(heard) to ‘genommen’ (took), thus forming ‘ALLES haben die genommen?’ 
(they took everything). The question is why does she co-construct with Wilma 
a markedly depressive mood here?  
 
If we consider the idea that memory is at the service of conversations, which 
means that participants control each other’s mind contents in such a way that 
they influence which memories ‘pop into’ the other’s head, we can approach 
this, as Sacks suggests, as an utterance-by-utterance phenomenon to find out 
how Gudrun’s story provides a participation framework. Upon learning that 
Gudrun  visits  her  dead  father’s  grave  before  coming  to  her  mother  on 
Saturdays the position reserved for Wilma within the story according to her 
own  perspective  is  notably  that  of  a  widow.  I  argue  that  the  ‘achieved 
similarity’ (Sacks, 1992: 4, Vol.2) that Gudrun and Wilma display sheds light 
on how crucially this story can be seen as a way to analyse the psychological 
aspects of the situation; however, the notion of ‘situation’ then transcends the 
present sequence as the story can be fitted to the overall interaction which 
implies all the previous actions, as well as those to come.  
 
Sacks suggested that once the hearer has analysed a story, she searches her 
memory and produces a “story in such a way that its similarity to A’s will be 
seeable; that is, in such a way that A can see that what B is telling A is ‘a story 
similar to the story that A told B’” (Sacks, 1992: 4, Vol.2). Sacks elaborates 
that “[w]hen the listener does the job of understanding, he puts the original 
teller in precisely the position that the listener was put in originally, i.e., when 
the listener produces his understanding the teller himself has to keep in mind   144 
the  story,  to  understand  that  the  story  is  understood”  (Sacks,  1992:  427, 
Vol.2).  
 
In lines 87 to 94, we can find evidence for this ‘interactional business’ of 
doing understanding, as Wilma and Gudrun mutually and consistently signal 
and  confirm  understanding  in  the  positions  reserved  for  these  actions.  In 
chapter 4, the majority of studies focused on instances where participants use 
the first slot to signal that they have spotted an error. I have criticised the use 
of the term ‘error’ in these studies in chapter 4, but this sequence at hand will 
be  used  to  exemplify  that  researchers  have  to  be  careful  not  to  identify 
instances as ‘errors’ in their data when there is evidence that participants 
signal understanding. I argue that when Gudrun initiates repair (line 88 and 
93) this gives us a hint that Gudrun’s mind is on the emotion conveyed. One 
possible  explanation  is  that  Gudrun  perceived  an  incongruity.  As  seen  in 
chapter 5 (p.94), we are able to spot social incongruities. This certainly also 
holds  true  for  the  emotion-related  aspects  of  interactions.  Hence,  there 
should be an incongruity in line 87, a mismatch of affective behaviour and 
verbal  information.  However,  there  is  nothing  ungrammatical  about  ‘they 
heard everything’. Rather, following the idea that her story is key, and the 
focus on the fit between it and the on-going conversation, Gudrun’s repair 
move (‘they took everything’) indicates that she understands and enhances 
the emotional impact of Wilma’s contribution in such a way that it can be 
seen as an appropriate emotional response to her story.  
 
As we can see in the following two lines 89 and 90, there is agreement in 
recognising and accepting each other’s responses, as they mutually establish 
a shared mourning over the loss of everything beautiful in Wilma’s life. What 
is specific about ‘loss’ is that it expresses time. One can only mourn the loss of 
something that is gone. Considering that Gudrun’s story significantly changes 
participant alignment in that she positions herself as a daughter who visits 
her  father’s  grave  before  visiting  her  mother,  this  draws  the  attention  to 
Wilma’s position which is that of a widow. So, in a way one could argue that 
Gudrun performed repair to make visible also on the verbal level what she felt 
to be Wilma’s reaction to her story. 
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In chapter 5 (p.100), we saw that Sacks stated that despite its crucial role in 
human communication, he thought that he does not really know yet how to 
analyse feeling expressions. However, in persistently focussing and carefully 
describing how participants signal understanding, he shows that we can learn 
and talk about things as vague as ‘gut feelings’ first of all because we are 
ourselves human beings. Asking the following question, “When people tell a 
story about a car wreck they saw yesterday, could somebody, e.g. report on a 
wreck they read about in the paper?” (1992: 5, Vol. 1), he suggests that in 
terms of experience and emotional impact it would not be appropriate. We 
have the gut feeling, as human beings, that this is not the proper response. In 
order to deal with this as a researcher, Sacks advice is simply to watch what 
interactants do in the following, how they solve it themselves, and possibly 
find that we understand it, too, because of our own experience. I think that 
this  sequence  provides  striking  proof  for  this.  When  Gudrun  states  twice 
‘always with you’ in line 103, we can tell that her every action in this sequence 
has expressed that she is with Wilma. Research in developmental psychology, 
and specifically the work of Trevarthen discussed in chapter 4, has provided 
evidence  that  the  expressive  gestures  of  another  person  convey 
intersubjectively salient information, such as a person's mood or particular 
emotional states. In a way, “self and others are ‘coupled’” (Downing 2000: 
256) and this also includes the researcher who is present.  
 
The transcript shows that Gudrun starts feeding Wilma in line 94 and keeps 
up  feeding  her  over  the  course  of  this  interaction  (lines  95,  101).  This  is 
noteworthy, first of all, because of the mere fact that this is the first time in 
the whole interaction that she feeds Wilma. Secondly, we can see that Gudrun 
displays the same strategies Elisabeta used in sequence 2: She points in the 
direction of the plate (line 85, 105, 106), puts a slice of bread into Wilma’s 
hand (line 106), and voices in line 110 the ‘gustatory Hmm’ (Wiggins, 2002). 
Furthermore,  she  highlights  twice  that  it  was  Elisabeta  who  prepared  the 
dinner (line 85, 106). The second time she mentions this she also adds ‘tasty’ 
(line 106). The action of synchronizing her style with Elisabeta’s strategies 
and voicing that it was Elisabeta who prepared the food for Wilma are clearly 
produced in reference to Elisabeta’s interests and not necessarily by reference 
to Gudrun herself (see Sacks, 1986: 131). Considering Gudrun’s behaviour   146 
towards Elisabeta in the previous sequences, I argue that she shows that she 
is keeping her mind on Elisabeta as well, which can be understood as an act 
of reconciliation.   
 
The following analysis therefore specifically concentrates on the trajectories 
of  what  seems  to  be  a  conflict  between  Elisabeta  and  Gudrun  concerning 
Wilma’s eating habits. 
 
 
109 E: ja jetzt mutti nehmen tabletten (.) ist ein bisschen 
    yes now mum take new pills           is a little 
 
110  G: RUHIGER (glances at W) 
     calmer 
 
111  E: ja, ist ein bisschen ruhiger 
    yes is a little bit calmer 
 
112  G: wir haben sie jetzt ja glaub ich vor einem MONAT umgestellt, ne? (glances at E) 
    i think we changed her medication a month ago, right? 
 
113  E: ABER <clears throat> jeden tag ist andere 
    but                                  every day is different 
 
114   =G:             anders 
                  different 
 
115  E: zum beispiel HEUTE <laughs> das essen war schlecht 
    for example today                         food was bad 
 
116   G: ↑ ehrlich? (glances at W) 
         really? 
 
117 E: GANZE zeit laufen laufen 
    whole time walking walking 
 
118   =W:  xxxxx 
                     xxxxx 
 
119 =G: ja (.) ja. (glances at W) 
      Yes  yes. 
 
120 E: gestern war gut. aber heute ist schlecht 
    yesterday was good. but today is bad 
 
121 G: hm 
    hm 
 
122 E: isch weiß nischt ob das ist WETTER oder  weiß isch  weiß nischt 
    i don’t know if it’s the weather or what, i don’t know 
 
123 G: aber das hab ich auch gelesen (glances at E) 
    but I’ve read this too 
 
124 =E:       FÜR MICH IST GUT WIE LAUFEN. das ist 
            For me is good if walking. that is   147 
125 =G:              ja 
                   yes 
 
126 E:  ja, ne? 
     yes, right? 
 
 
127 G: ja 
    yes 
 
128 E: (.) BESSER die mutti bisschen ESSEN bisschen DENKEN 
         better mum eat a bit think a bit 
 
129 =W:    xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
          xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
 
130 G: ja (glances at W) 
    yes 
 
131 E: mutti gut essen eh gegessen dann ich bin FROH. aber so 
    mum well eat eh eaten then i’m happy. but like this 
 
132 =G:        hm      hm 
             hm      hm 
 
133   wie heute das isch bin NICH froh  <laughs> (.) zu WENISCH 
    today i’m not happy               too little 
 
134 =G:            hm 
                 hm 
  
 
The  conversation  extract  starts  with  a  brief  exchange  about  Wilma’s 
medication  (lines  109  to  115).  Elisabeta  states  that  the  new  medication 
positively  affects  Wilma’s  behaviour  (line  109).  In  the  following  lines, 
Gudrun’s anticipative statement ‘calmer’ (line 110), the inclusive ‘we’ and the 
directive  ‘right?’  (line  112),  as  well  as  simultaneous  speech  (line  114),  all 
indicate alignment. Both women agree that Wilma is less restless, but that 
‘every  day  is  different’  (line  113).  Especially  this  latter  information  is  an 
observation that is based on Elisabeta’s daily experience of living with Wilma 
for almost one-and-a-half years. Since Gudrun does not live with her mother 
and thus lacks knowledge of Wilma’s daily eating habits, Elisabeta provides 
information. The high frequency of disagreement markers (line 113: ‘but’ and 
<clears her throat>; line 115: ‘for example’  and <laughs>) reflects that, in 
contrast  to  Gudrun,  she  perceives  a  ‘misunderstanding’  (Pomerantz  1984) 
rather than an alignment.  
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This  can  be  explained  with  regard  to  the  lack  of  shared  background 
knowledge and can be explained in the following way. Sacks argues that “for 
every  day  one  can  have  events  in  that  day  which  are  day’s  events, 
mentionable  to  somebody  one  talks  to  on  that  day  whom  one  talks  to 
regularly” (1992: 16, Vol.2). However, Gudrun comes to visit once a week on 
Saturdays. This implies that the two women do not talk on a daily basis about 
Wilma  and  therefore  Gudrun  cannot  understand  the  full  meaning  when 
Elisabeta says that ‘every day is different’. It can be assumed that because 
Gudrun anticipates Elisabeta’s actions this indicates that they have a very 
similar conversation maybe not every Saturday but fairly frequently.  Hence, 
if Gudrun signals ‘I know what you are thinking and based on our shared 
experience I can anticipate what you are going to say next’, Elisabeta’s actions 
show that this does not mean that she actually knows. What Gudrun knows is 
what Elisabeta is going to say next. Talking about the change in medication, 
that counts over a week, seems to be more appropriate to the frequency of the 
times they see each other. Elisabeta’s preface seems to express this.  
 
In  lines  116  to  123,  Gudrun  notably  changes  her  actions  and  signals 
misalignment.  Her  clarification  request  (line  116:  ‘really?’)  precedes  her 
disagreement (‘but’) and her attempt to take over in line 123. The clarification 
request ‘really?’ is an immediate response to Elisabeta’s statement ‘the food 
was  bad’  (line  115).  Whilst  Elisabeta’s  further  explanation  in  line  117 
(‘WHOLE time walking walking’) indicates that she intended to convey that 
feeding  Wilma  was  problematic,  rather  than  as  a  comment  on  the  poor 
quality of the food. This time Gudrun’s attempt to repair the conversation by 
signalling  understanding  (as  previously  performed  in  line  114)  is  absent. 
Nevertheless, Gudrun’s minimal turn in line 121 (‘hm’) seems to signal to 
Elisabeta that she understands her, because rather than further explaining 
the  connection  between  the  medication  and  its  impact  on  Wilma’s 
restlessness at lunchtime, Elisabeta gives another possible explanation why 
Wilma did not eat properly (line 122: ‘weather’). Here, Gudrun unsuccessfully 
attempts to take over the turn in line 123, stating that she ‘read this’, probably 
referring  to  an  article  or  a  book  about  dementia-related  eating  disorder. 
However, Elisabeta overlaps her turn and explains how both she (line 131:   149 
‘Mum well eat eh fed then I’m happy’) and Wilma (line 133: ‘better mum eat 
little think little’) would benefit from regular eating. 
 
Gudrun’s  high  frequency  of  backchannel  cues  between  lines  132  and  134 
precedes  turn  taking  in  line  135.  Mirroring  Elisabeta,  Gudrun  starts  her 
narration proclaiming that she will also give an example (‘for instance’): 
 
135 G: aber das is zum BEISPIEL sie hat 
    but for instance she never liked 
 
136  früher nie gern gekocht, ne? zwar für uns kinder und so aber mutter war 
    to cook, right? of course, for us children, but mother didn’t really like 
 
137  nicht so für fleisch und so. die hat lieber immer kuchen oder so 
  meat and stuff. she always prefers cake and stuff 
 
138      süßigkeiten. wa Mama? 
  sweets. right mama? 
 
139 W:  ja, frisch 
  yes, fresh 
 
140 G: und ich mein immer DANN SITZT das heute auch noch SO drin 
  and I always think that today this is still inside her 
 
141 W: ja, das is wahr 
   yes, that’s true 
 
142 G: dann WILL DIE NICHT jeden mittag essen. dann isst die SO (.) 
    and she doesn’t want to eat lunch every day. she eats like this then 
 
143   NE? so wat GEREGELTES und dann mittagessen und auch noch mit 
  right? something structured and then lunch and also with  
 
144  DESSERT und PUDDING und so 
  dessert and flummery and stuff 
 
145   also (.) da mein ich dann kommt et wie früher dann auch immer so 
  so I think she does what she always used to do 
 
146   wa mama? 
  right mama? 
 
147 W: ja 
  yes 
 
148  G: PUDDING JA (.) FLEISCH nich. und das ändert sich nicht (.) 
    flummery yes         meat no. and this doesn’t change 
 
149   also ich könnte jetzt mit der nach dem essen wenn se nicht isst, wa 
  i could take her now if she doesn’t eat, right 
 
150   sofort nach café X 
  straight away to café x 
 
151   <laughing voice>:  zwei stückchen KUCHEN (.) da würd die, NE? (glances at E) 
        two pieces of cake                    she would, right?   150 
 
152 E: <laughing voice>: JA JA 
             yes yes 
 
 
153 G: die würd den kuchen essen, der kaffee STEHT noch nicht da 
  she would eat the cake even if the coffee hasn’t arrived yet 
 
154  =E <laughing voice>:  JA JA  aber kuchen gucken <laughs> 
        yes yes  but watch cake 
 
155 G: da wär das stück weg (.) WA MAMA? (glances at W) 
  simply disappeared, right mama? 
 
156 W: NEE, wa? 
   no, right? 
 
157 G: <laughs> 
 
158 E: FLEISCH AUCH. will muss sein 
  meat too. wants must be 
 
159 G: IST  DIREKT WEG 
  immediately gone 
 
160 E: wenn SCHMECKT ihnen GUT dann ESSEN. nee wenn NISCH <laughs> 
  when tastes good she eats. if not then doesn’t 
 
161 =G:       JA 
            yes 
 
162 G: das ist direkt weg, wa MAMA? (glances at W) 
  it’s gone immediately, right mama? 
 
163  DANN IS DER KUCHEN WEG <loud> WA schatz? (glances at W) 
  then the cake is gone                                  right darling? 
 
164 W: ja, wat willse haben? 
   yes, what do you want? 
 
165 G: <quiet>  nix will ich haben (kisses W.) 
i don’t want anything 
 
166 W: dat kannse weg tun 
   you can put this away 
 
167 G: <loud>  Hm Hm ALSO DAS IS IMMER NOCH WIE FRÜHER 
      hm hm so this is still the same as before 
 
168   was sie früher gerne gemacht haben oder NICH gerne gemacht haben dat is 
  what they liked to do in the past or did not like to do that is 
 
169  NACH WIE VOR. dat sitzt ganz tief drin 
            still the same. that is deep down inside  
 
Saying that she will ‘also give an example’ announces that what is about to 
follow will be “topically coherent” with the  conversation (Sacks, 1992: 22, 
Vol.2; he uses the expression ‘I remember’), but what follows is an account of   151 
Wilma’s eating and cooking habits when Gudrun and her siblings were young 
and  her  mother  healthy.  Considering  that  “one  announces  that  one 
remembers something when what has just been said stands as an explanation 
for  how  it  is  you  remembered  that”  (Sacks,  1992:  19, Vol.  2)  this  tells  us 
where  Gudrun’s  mind  was  while  Elisabeta  was  talking.  In  contrast  to 
Elisabeta, who initially highlights the positive effects of the new medication 
on  Wilma’s  eating  habits  –  thereby  contextualizing  these  as  markers  of  a 
disorder  caused  by  Alzheimer’s  disease  –  Gudrun  interprets  Wilma’s 
behaviour with regard to the biographical knowledge she has of her mother. 
Based  on  this  knowledge,  she  constructs  Wilma’s  behaviour  as  a  unique 
personality trait of hers (line 136: ‘mother didn’t really like’), which she has 
retained to the present day, according to her daughter (line 137: ‘she always 
prefers cake and stuff’). Gudrun turns to her own childhood because she is 
Wilma’s daughter. At the same time, one could argue that “if we’re taking the 
situation  as  being  one  in  which  the  storyteller  is  a  character,  then  which 
character they are can matter a good deal for what the others are” (1992: 6, 
Vol.2). Thus, one could argue that she is not only a daughter but the daughter 
of a ‘sick’ person because Elisabeta provided the perspective of a nurse.  
 
Contrary  to  Elisabeta,  who  identified  Wilma’s  restlessness  as  her  main 
characteristic (line 117: ‘whole time walking walking’), Gudrun explains two 
habits she thinks are distinctive about her mother: First, her mother never 
liked the structured routine of having lunch every day (line 143: ‘Something 
structured’);  second,  she  always  preferred,  and  still  prefers,  cake  over  a 
typical lunch that includes meat (line 143: ‘She eats like this then’; line 148: 
‘pudding yes, meat no.’). In line 138 and line 146, Gudrun seeks validation 
from her mother, and thus seemingly co-constructs Wilma’s eating behaviour 
in concert and agreement with her. Whilst Gudrun’s posture, facing Wilma, 
and  her  gaze  between  lines  138  and  150  signal  her  engagement  with  her 
mother, her orientation notably shifts to Elisabeta in line 151.  
 
Having  established  this  history  of  her  mother’s  eating  habits,  Gudrun 
initiates  a  topic  change,  referring  to  the  situation  ‘now’  (line  149),  thus 
reconnecting with Elisabeta’s account of Wilma’s behaviour ‘today’ (line 115). 
Whereas  in  lines  113  and  115  Elisabeta  signalled  disagreement  due  to  the   152 
perceived lack of shared background knowledge, her contributions in line 152 
(‘<laughing voice>: yes yes’) and line 154 (‘<laughing voice>: yes yes. but 
watch cake <laughs>’) signal that she actively supports achieving common 
ground (see Clark 1996) through the shared experience of taking Wilma to a 
café.  In  shifting  the  story,  Gudrun  significantly  restructures  participant 
alignment  (see  Goodwin,  M.,  1982).  At  the  café  both  are  guests.  The 
interesting observation here is that despite the fact that Wilma’s behaviour, 
or in particular the speed of it as indicated in line 153, is not in line with the 
script for having a coffee and cake at a café, yet, Elisabeta gives no indication 
that this breach of script is a clue to Wilma’s disease.  
 
Gudrun and Elisabeta frame the live-in situation and their relationship to 
Wilma based on different perspectives: personal experiences and childhood 
memories in the case of Gudrun, professional experiences and everyday care 
interaction in the case of Elisabeta. The frames they apply are a result of an 
ongoing adaptive learning process that is closely linked with the progression 
of Wilma’s disease. In Gudrun’s case, her experience of Wilma’s stay at a 
psychiatric unit is engrained in the strategy to treat her mother in a ‘loving 
and calm way’, which functions as one of her main care strategies. Elisabeta, 
by  contrast,  consciously  manages  interactions  with  regard  to  her  work 
experience as a nurse (‘I can stand this kind of work because I am a nurse’). 
By  the  time  Elisabeta  moved  in,  Wilma  already  exhibited  a  number  of 
behavioural changes typical of the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease. Thus, 
based on her experience and the changes she has witnessed while living with 
Wilma, to her Wilma’s eating habits are a clear marker of the disease and are, 
therefore,  a  disorder.  This  is  in  conflict  with  Gudrun’s  care  strategy  that 
draws on biographical knowledge of her mother’s eating habits. 
 
The way Gudrun frames the home care situation also allows for conclusions 
about the extent to which her actions are specific to her own goals. It can be 
argued that Gudrun prioritizes the preservation of a ‘shell of normalcy’ by 
restoring  a  past  version  of  Wilma  in  her  interactions  with  Elisabeta  and 
Wilma. The data presented in this sequence does not provide sufficient proof, 
but  Gudrun’s  significant  change  in  address  from  ‘darling’  to  ‘mama’  in 
interactions with Wilma seems to signal a shift – with ‘mama’ being more   153 
likely to respond to normal/healthy behaviour, and ‘darling’ more likely to 
occur with trouble-indicating behaviour. In her interactions with Elisabeta, 
Gudrun  indicates  twice  that  she  is  aware  of  standardized  dementia  care 
practices (line 15: ‘but I’ve read this too’; lines 57–58: ‘what they liked or did 
not  like  to  do  that  is  still  the  same’).  However,  she  contextualizes  this 
information with regard to achieving her overall aim of restoring Wilma’s 
normal eating behaviour. In the last two lines (168 and 169), Gudrun states 
that ‘What they liked or did not like to do that is still the same. That is deep 
down inside’. The newly introduced third person plural form clearly indicates 
that Gudrun no longer refers only to her mother. In fact, the use of ‘they’ 
seems to refer back to the first sequence and in the present sequence to line 
123 where Gudrun indicates that she does have a certain knowledge about 
Alzheimer’s  patients  and  probably  even  about  Alzheimer-related  eating 
disorders. Here, it is essential to have knowledge about Elisabeta’s, Wilma’s 
and Gudrun’s shared care history. Although Gudrun states in line 168 that 
Wilma “does not want to eat lunch every day”, her and Elisabeta’s actions, as 
well as the nursing record contradict this statement. In fact, the ability to feed 
Wilma properly seems to be the most important task that everyone involved 
in Wilma’s care has to be able to perform, as the nursing record informed me 
of Wilma’s weight loss, and Gudrun’s subsequent arrangement to get Wilma’s 
weight checked on a regular basis.  
 
Essentially, the analysis of the conversation shows that the distribution of 
knowledge between the two main carers, Gudrun and Elisabeta, is uneven. 
The clash between Elisabeta’s apparent lack of biographical knowledge about 
Wilma on one hand, and Gudrun’s lack of knowledge about the day-to-day 
business of living with her on the other, provoke a relationship mismatch. 
Enfield (2011) explains this uneven distribution of knowledge in relation to 
power  in  the  following  way:  “source-based  authority  concerns  actual 
experience and what it enables (…) namely, the range of things I can say or do 
as a result of that knowledge” (Enfield, 2011: 300). He continues that “by 
contrast, status-based authority concerns not what you actually know, but 
what you should know, or are entitled to know, given your status (Drew, 1991: 
37ff.)” (ibid: 301, emphasis in the original).  
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This status asymmetry between the two carers visibly affects negotiations of 
changes for the better within the home care arrangement. As seen in lines 149 
to  163,  the  shared  experience  of  taking  Wilma  to  the  café  serves  to 
temporarily  create  common  ground  between  the  two  women.  That  such 
common ground is considered important by the two interlocutors is testified 
by Gudrun’s subsequent concession to Elisabeta’s point of view (line 159), 
where  she  acknowledges  that  Wilma  likes  meat,  too.  However,  Gudrun’s 
concluding remark about Wilma’s unaltered personality traits clearly signals 
that she is adamant about her original point of view. This shows that the two 
women are not equal partners who discuss Wilma’s eating habits, but hold 
different  positions  in  the  ‘home  care  hierarchy’,  with  Gudrun,  as  Wilma’s 
daughter and Elisabeta’s employer, being the head. 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
I argue that this chapter’s analyses allow for conclusions concerning the way 
participants  subjectively  frame  the  home  care  situation,  as  well  as  the 
interdependent,  situated  nature  of  memory  as  it  is  intersubjectively  re-
enacted in interactions. Analysis has shown that Gudrun and Elisabeta frame 
the live-in situation based on prior experiences. However, it can be argued 
that the updating and modifying of specific schemata is an on-going adaptive 
process that is closely linked with the progression of Wilma’s disease. From 
the point of view of subjective appraisal, I proposed that over the course of 
the sequences participants’ schema-consistent actions can achieve affective 
coherence regarding the individual’s own goals. However, as the context in 
which  this  happens  is  intersubjectively  co-constructed,  it  was  argued  that 
schema-related displays of emotion management potentially also impact in a 
visible way on the relationships between individuals.  
 
These events in turn allow insight into a possible relation between conflicting 
frames and dysfunctional communication. Here, a focus on story-telling has 
proven to be an appropriate way to analyse how memory is at the service of 
emotion management, which seems to be a highly interactional and adaptive   155 
phenomenon. In highlighting the spectrum of social and psychological factors 
that influence behaviour, it can be shown that emotion management takes 
place in a participation framework; it is distributed among co-participants, 
and  does  not  happen  (exclusively)  in  an  individual  mind.  Although  this 
chapter’s data analysis merely scratched the surface, I hope that its data not 
only made a strong point that  memory must be understood in terms of its 
contribution  to  situation-appropriate  behaviour  (Wilson,  2002),  but  that 
even in the advanced stage of the disease, Alzheimer’s disease does not entail 
a complete disruption of intersubjective memory.  
 
The following chapter will present data on interactions between Wilma and a 
nursing  service  employee  called  Edeltraud,  who  stays  with  Wilma  for two 
hours per week. This woman initially states that care work makes her happy. 
However,  analysis  shows  that  her  actions  are  grounded  in  fear  appraisal 
while  narrating  a  story  about  a  fearful  episode  she  has  experienced  with 
Wilma.  Focussing  on  the  intersubjective  experience  of  embodied  fear 
appraisal,  this  chapter  will  provide  evidence  that  Wilma  demonstrates 
through  her  visible  participation  an  on-going  analysis  of  the  emotionally 
charged context changes in the events she is engaged in. 
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Locked Doors 
 
The role of experiential cues in emotion management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  previous  chapter  provided  potential  answers  to  all  three  research 
questions. My analysis has shown that Gudrun and Elisabeta frame the live-
in situation and care of Wilma through their prior experiences. Both women 
instantiate schemata based on episodic memories. However, I argued that the 
updating of schemata is an on-going adaptive process. From the point of view 
of  subjective  appraisal,  I  proposed  that  over  the  course  of  the  sequences 
participants’  schema-consistent  actions  can  achieve  affective  coherence 
regarding the individual’s own goals. However, as the context in which this 
happens  is  intersubjectively  co-constructed,  I  claimed  that  schema-related 
displays of emotion management potentially also impact in a visible way on 
the relationships between individuals. This was discussed with a focus on the 
possible  relations  between  conflicting  frames  and  dysfunctional 
communication between the individuals involved in Wilma’s care. A focus on   157 
story-telling has proven to be an appropriate way to analyse how memory is 
at  the  service  of  emotion  management,  which  seems  to  be  a  highly 
interactional and adaptive business. The results of chapter 7 could show that 
emotion management does not happen (exclusively) in an individual mind 
but is distributed among co-participants.  
The current chapter will build on and expand on these results. Specifically, 
this chapter’s analysis will further explore the hypothesis outlined in chapter 
3, where it was discussed that emotions are complex events triggered by a 
number of stimuli, which participants’ verbal reports of their feelings may be 
unable to capture. This will be tested in the data below. While initially stating 
that eldercare makes her “happy”, analysis of interaction between the nursing 
service employee Edeltraud and Wilma reveals that Edeltraud’s actions can 
be grounded in fear appraisal events. Thus, the discussion of data aims for a 
deeper understanding of the complex  emotion processes at work, and the 
interrelation  with  cognitive  phenomena,  such  as  memory  and  attention. 
Focussing on two stories Edeltraud narrates upon arriving at Wilma’s flat, the 
data  analysis  will  trace  the  process  of  affective  adaptation  based  on  the 
experiential affective cues which both women establish as meaningful in their 
interactions. This is relevant as far as results suggest that emotion appraisal 
affects  Edeltraud’s  attention  to  such  an  extent  that  she  misses  Wilma’s 
emotional responses which are marked by a mutual feeling of fear. This in 
turn causes a conflictual situation that Edeltraud solves through the use of 
violence.  Since  she  leaves  without  reporting  this  to  Elisabeta  once  she 
returns, this chapter crucially confirms those conclusions in chapter 7 where 
a significant absence of organised communication flows in Wilma’s care was 
stressed. 
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Wilma and Edeltraud - the episode to be examined 
 
Since the end of May 2008, Edeltraud stays once a week on Thursdays for 
two hours with Wilma “so that Elisabeta can take some time off” (“damit die 
Elisabeta  frei  hat”).  In  the  beginning,  she  did  not  know  anything  about 
Wilma, and within the four months of her placement in August 2008, she had 
not met any of Wilma’s children. Prior to her employment with the nursing 
service,  Edeltraud  had  worked  for  35  years  at  a  butcher’s.  Once  she  had 
retired, a neighbour asked her if she would like to take care of her mother on 
three days a week for approximately six hours a day. Since she had known her 
neighbour’s mother for more than 50 years by that time she agreed: “She was 
like a substitute mother to me and a friend” (“Die war für mich Mutterersatz 
und Freundin”).  
 
This is how Edeltraud first met with the nursing service she is working for 
today. Every morning and evening a nurse helped her dressing and cleaning 
the woman. After her neighbour’s mother had died the company approached 
Edeltraud and offered her a job. She immediately accepted: “I enjoy helping 
old people so much! I really like doing it! To see the elderly satisfied. Unlike 
other people who are nagging and only pretend they are thankful. When you 
see how thankful they are it is real fun. To me this is really beautiful! I am 
really happy when I am able to help”14. She adds: “In general, I thrive in 
service  occupations  as  I  have  worked  at  a  butcher’s  before”  (“Ich  gehe 
generell  im  Dienst  am  Kunden  auf.  Ich  hab  ja  vorher  in  einer  Metzgerei 
gearbeitet“).  
 
Bearing in mind her proclaimed attitude to eldercare, in particular that care 
work  makes  her  happy,  her  actions  in  the  following  interaction  show  a 
remarkable incongruency once Edeltraud is in the flat together with Wilma 
and  me.  For  me,  it  is  the  first  time  I  have  met  Edeltraud  and  I  notice 
immediately that Wilma’s behaviour is unusual: “But, it seems that she finds 
it  suspicious  that  we  are  sitting  here  because  she  doesn’t  come  into  the 
                                                 
14 “Das ist so schön für mich alten Leuten zu helfen! Ich mach das so gerne! Die alten Leute 
zufrieden zu sehen. Die sind dankbar. Als wenn sie jetzt nur jemanden hätten der rumnölt 
und so tut. Wenn man sieht wie dankbar die alten Leute sind, das macht schon Spass. Für 
mich find ich das schön! Helfen zu können! Ich bin da richtig glücklich bei.“   159 
kitchen, right?” (“Aber ich glaub’ das scheint ihr nicht geheuer, dass wir zwei 
hier sitzen weil sie kommt gar nicht in die Küche, ne?“). Although Edeltraud 
initially confirms my assumption, she adds that Wilma in general cannot sit 
still,  but  constantly  walks  back  and  forth  in  the  flat.  She  concludes  that 
Wilma  always  stands  at  the  door  and  that  she  basically  always  wants  to 
leave15. Edeltraud then continues to give an account of how she remembers 
the first day she spent with Wilma. 
 
 
 
Kitchen – 21/8/08 – 4 pm - Wilma (W), nursing service employee Edeltraud (E) and 
I (I*) 
 
 
       
       > = direction of chair facing 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 “Nee. (.) Sonst setztse sich schon ma mit hier hin oder wir sitzen beide mal eben kurz im 
Wohnzimmer. (.) Lange bleibt se ja nich sitzen. (.) Wir gehen meistens hin und her. Se sitzt 
meistens hier eben auffe Kante und dann isse auch schon wieder auf. (.) Dann gehen wa 
schon ma nach draussen hinten hin. Aber da muss ich immer sehen dass ich se auch wieder 
zurückhole. Wie gesacht und eh (.). Ich hab se schon ma auf die Couch gekricht. Ich hab 
gesacht komm setz dich doch ma zu mir. Und da hab ich mich bewusst auch drauf gesetzt 
und ich sach komm. Ja dann hat se sich hingesetzt und dann hat se auch zum Fernseher 
geguckt. Aber sie versteht et ja nich un eh (.) aber wie gesagt also wenn se auch hier sitzt ne? 
Nur auf de Kante und dann wieder auf. Sie läuft permanent hin und her. (.) Und steht immer 
anne Tür. Sie will immer raus. (.) Sie will einfach immer raus.”   160 
1  E <stern, quiet>: Es war schwierig. Es war sehr schwierig am Anfang.  
           It was difficult. It was very difficult in the beginning. 
 
2  Weil sie (.) weil sie (.) hm auch nicht so MITMACHEN KANN (.) Ich bin dann mit 
     Because she, because she  hm can’t really participate. Then I also  
  
3  ihr  auch schon mal in die STADT geGANGEN (.) Dat war (.) erste Mal ne  
     went to town with her from time to time.                It was           the first time a 
 
4  KatasTROPHE (laughs) die Leute guckten schon alle. JA ich wollte mit der so ein 
     catastrophe                        people all started watching. Yes I wanted to go for 
    
5  bisschen spaZIEREN gehen weil das Wetter schön war und (.) eh am Anfang ging 
     a little walk with her because the weather was nice and eh in the beginning 
 
6  es auch ganz GUT und dann sacht ich komm wir gehen jetzt geradeAUS.  
     it was just fine and then I said come on let’s go straight on 
 
7  NEIN. NEIN. Also war NIX zu machen. Und ich sach nur ich hab se festhalten  
     No. No. It was pointless. And let me tell you I just wanted to restrain her 
 
8  wollen (sighs) (.) Sie hat sich UNHEIMLICH gesträubt.   
                 She didn’t want it at all. 
 
9 <very quiet> Un dann guckten die Leute schon alle so weil sie SCHLUG  
                And then people were all watching because she slapped me 
 
10  dann auch SO. Bis ich sie dann ein bisschen im Griff hatte. Dat ich se umdrehen  
       so hard. Until I finally got her a little under control again. So that I could turn her  
   
11  konnte (.) dann (.) gings dann. Ich hab versucht sie zu beruhigen. Ich hab gesagt: 
      around      then       it was fine. I tried to calm her down.                      I said  
 
12  Wir wollen doch nur spaZIEREN gehen. NEIN NEIN NEIN und et war eh ganz  
       We simply want to go for a walk. No No No and it was eh very 
 
13  schlimm. Und dann sind wir noch so eh (.) ne kleine Runde gegangen. AUF  
       terrible. And then we did another small walk. Making 
 
14  UMWEGEN DANN aber nach HAUSE. Ich hab gedacht (.) dat war mir eigentlich 
       detours we eventually reached home. I thought                      for me this was actually   
 
15  (.) ich muss se ja auch erstmal kennenlernen und (.) jede Situation.  
            and I have to get to know her first and                     each situation 
 
16  HEUTE kann et wieder ANDERS SEIN. Und morgen is et wieder anders. Es geht 
       today can be different again. And tomorrow it is different again. There’s 
 
17   nich anders. Die geht immer zu Tür (glances at W in the corridor). 
        no other way. She always goes to the door. 
  
18   W (in the corridor, eyes on E): Ja  
                           Yes 
 
19  E (sighs): (.) Da musste ich mit ihr (sighs) zur FUSSpfleGE 
    I had to go with her                    to the podiatry 
  
20  W (comes into the kitchen) <quiet>: xxx xxxxx xx  
  
21  =E: Weil das gerade in den Zeitraum FIEL. Und da hab ich gesacht macht nix. (.) 
              Because the appointment happened to be on that day. And I said no problem  
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22  Mach ich schon. 
       I will do it.  
 
23  W (standing in front of E) <loud>: xxxx xxx  Kumma DIE kannse DA 
             Look you can these there 
 
24  E: Dann 
            Then 
 
25  =W <loud>: Ich sprech da da neues van de diss. 
     I speak there there new van de diss. 
 
26  E<loud>: Die Türe ist ZU WILMA. 
             The door is locked Wilma. 
 
27  W: Ja 
             Yes 
 
28  E: Ich KANN die nich aufMACHEN. 
            I can’t open it.  
 
29  W: Ja ich weiss et nich. 
             Yes I don’t know. 
 
30  E <laughs> 
 
 
 
Just  like in the previous chapter, analysis  will begin with a focus on how 
participants signal that they have found “that part of ‘us’ that is involved in 
our  last  interaction”  (Sacks,  1992:  193,  Vol.1).  At  first  glance,  Edeltraud 
seems  to  narrate  two  thematically  distinct  stories:  ‘going  for  a  walk  with 
Wilma’ (lines 2 – 17), and ‘going to the podiatrist’s with Wilma’ (starts in line 
19 and finishes in line 54 in the second sequence). I claimed earlier that there 
is  a  significant  mismatch  between  Edeltraud’s  reported  subjective  feelings 
about eldercare and the memories she recalls within the first few minutes at 
Wilma’s flat. The mismatch occurs between the emotions Edeltraud reports 
to connect with her job and what she actually experienced on her first day 
with Wilma:  while she claims that eldercare makes her happy, we learn that 
it was “very difficult in the beginning” (line 1) and that Wilma even  “slapped” 
her (line 9).  
In  order  to  better  understand  how  Edeltraud’s  narratives  can  be  used  to 
understand, first of all, why she tells them so very early in the conversation 
and, secondly, how these stories can be used as a compass to understand her 
and Wilma’s subsequent behaviour, analysis follows to some extent Dalgleish 
and Power’s emotion  appraisal model since it has been suggested that an   162 
emotion process exhibits crucial information about the relationship between 
the present situation and an individual’s goals (Lazarus, 1991). According to 
Dalgleish  and  Power  (2007),  an  emotional  state  consists  of  the  following 
defining components: an event, an interpretation, an appraisal, physiological 
change, a propensity for action, and conscious awareness. They suggest that it 
is only really possible to reliably distinguish one emotion from another on the 
basis of the appraisal component, which can be thought of as a metacognitive 
strategy or how an individual monitors the progress towards his or her goal. 
However, the authors propose that emotional states often include reference 
to certain patterns of behaviour or action (see 2007: 132).  For example, fear 
is  associated  with  an  appraisal  of  physical  or  psychological  threat  (e.g.,  a 
clenched fist).  
Situations are appraised in terms of the content of the individual’s mind. That 
is,  the  individual’s  knowledge  of  the  world,  of  themselves,  of  previously 
similar  occasions,  and  so  forth.  Dalgleish  and  Power  distinguish  between 
three  main  domains  of  information:  knowledge  and  models  of  the  world, 
knowledge and models of the self, and knowledge and models of others. As 
cognitive psychologists, Dalgleish and Power argue that these are captured by 
analogical,  propositional,  and  schematic  model  representation  formats. 
Representations  of  information  in  memory  are  possible  in  all  three 
representational formats for all content types (see 2007: 148 ff).  Dalgleish 
and Power propose that, subsumed within the domains of knowledge and 
models of the self and of others, is information concerning an individual’s 
goals. Goals are defined as a way of talking about the temporal dimension of 
representations  and  plans  with  which  the  individual  operates  (see  2007: 
140).  
In a first step my analysis suggests the individual’s defining elements that 
according to Dalgleish and Power (2007) make up an emotional state in order 
to discuss this in a second step with regard to the social level of emotion 
experience. In the first narrative I propose that the event can be found in 
lines 6 and 7, when Wilma refuses to walk in the direction Edeltraud suggests 
(“and then I said come on let’s go straight on. No. No). The interpretation   163 
process  (line  7:  “It  was  pointless”)  results  in  an  appraisal  (line  9:  “she 
slapped me”) followed by a propensity for action (line 10: “Until I finally got 
hold  of  her  again.  So  that  I  could  turn  her  around.”),  and  conscious 
awareness  that  defines  the  emotion  as  ‘fear’  (line  12-13:  “it  was  eh  very 
terrible”).  Apart  from  the  appraisal  of  Wilma’s  threatening  behaviour,  a 
second  source  potentially  intensifies  and  simultaneously  confirms 
Edeltraud’s fear appraisal. She states in line 3 that this story is about the first 
time she went to town with Wilma. Bearing in mind that she did not know 
Wilma at all, lines 4 and 5 show that she expected a script-consistent event 
(“I wanted to go for a little walk with her because the weather was nice”, and 
also “properly go outside” in line 59). Contrary to her expectations, the walk 
turned into a “catastrophe” (line 4) and “people all started watching” (line 4). 
Sacks has argued that “people can become awfully nervous where they figure 
that  something  really  extraordinarily  notable  is  happening  but  nobody’s 
looking at it, they’re just passing along. And you get, then, a frantic attempt to 
get individual eyes, though you don’t know the individuals whose eyes you’re 
seeking,  to  have  them  tell  you,  ‘Yeah,  it’s  really  happening”  (1986:  136). 
Noticing the exchange of glances confirmed Edeltraud that Wilma’s and her 
behaviour was considered unusual in public and script-inconsistent.   
 
We can see in the transcript that Edeltraud glances at Wilma in line 17 while 
concluding her story about the first day saying that “she always goes to the 
door” (line 17). Having established eye contact something interesting follows: 
while Edeltraud begins to narrate her second story Wilma comes into the 
kitchen and stops right in front of the woman (lines 20 and 23). I argue that 
we can find evidence that the exchange of glances is crucially meaningful to 
the both of them. Once initiated, Wilma typically holds eye contact for a long 
time. Since she does not avert gaze from time to time her continuous stare 
made me feel very uncomfortable in the beginning of the observation. In the 
previous chapter, however, we have seen that Gudrun perceives Wilma’s gaze 
as  being  ‘attentive’.  Yet,  a  prolonged  stare  can  also  be  perceived  as 
threatening.  In  particular,  if  the  body  is  in  the  ‘proper’  state.  What  I  am 
suggesting is thus that through telling the first story Edeltraud re-creates the 
particular mood that was part of her emotional state at the time of encoding;   164 
that is, her first day with Wilma. According to Centerbar et al. (2008), this is 
reflected in two effects: mood congruence, whereby one remembers events 
that match the current mood, and mood dependence, which refers to the fact 
that remembering is easier when the mood at retrieval matches the mood at 
encoding.  Thus,  remembering  an  event  is  more  likely  if  one  evokes  the 
emotional state one was in at the time of experiencing the event. Centerbar et 
al. (2008) call this affective (in)coherence. Based on their study (2008) they 
suggest that coherence between affective concepts and affective experiences 
leads to better recall of a story than affective incoherence (see 2008: 560). 
The authors suggest that “the experience of such experiential affective cues 
serve as evidence of the appropriateness of affective concepts that come to 
mind” (ibid).  
Highlighting the crucial importance of ‘experiential affective cues’, I come 
back to my hypothesis that the exchange of glances between the two women 
is key. I will explain this in the following. Drawing on Dalgleish & Power’s 
model,  I  claimed  earlier  that  Edeltraud  recalls  an  event  that  happened 
roughly four months ago and that is marked by intense feelings of fear and 
public humiliation. While telling this particular story, Edeltraud’s gaze rests 
on  me  or  the  table  in  front  of  her.  She  does  not  look  once  in  Wilma’s 
direction. Thus the emotional distance she describes between her and Wilma 
is reflected in the distancing of her body (as she sits at the far end of the 
table),  as  well  as  it  is  matched  by  a  distancing  in  language.  She  uses  the 
definite article (‘die’) rather than the pronoun (‘sie’) when she concludes that 
“she always goes to the door” (line 17). In stating this she looks for the first 
time at Wilma who is in fact standing at the front door in the corridor. I claim 
that this visual cue ‘Wilma standing by the door’ is crucially relevant for the 
subsequent recall of the fear appraisal in the second narrative. In addition, 
when she comes into the kitchen, eyes fixed on Edeltraud, Wilma does not 
conform with this very behaviour the nursing service employee defined as 
‘normal’  in  her  (“she  always  goes  to  the  door”).  This  in  turn  confirms 
Edeltraud’s  perception  that  “each  situation,  today  can  be  different  again” 
(lines 15 and 16). Focussing on the transition between the first and the second 
story (lines 17-19), I suggest that we can single out the visual cues of ‘Wilma 
standing by the door’ and Wilma’s stare as those crucial cues that Edeltraud   165 
picks  up  on  in  creating  affective  coherence  and  from  a  psychological 
perspective  a  situation  that  she  perceives  as  potentially  dangerous.  As 
mentioned earlier, she believes that Wilma’s sole desire is to leave, and ever 
since she arrived Wilma has signalled this not only through standing by the 
door, but also verbally in line 18. In her first story, she gives an example of 
the  conflict  that  potentially  results  from  this  constellation:  Edeltraud 
describes Wilma’s behaviour as erratic, potentially violent and impossible to 
reason with (“can’t really participate”, line 2).  
Yet,  we  also  learn  from  Edeltraud’s  story  that  Wilma’s  behaviour  was 
mutually marked by a feeling of fear on that day. The simultaneous increase 
in voice in lines 25 and 26, as well as Edeltraud’s statements in lines 26/ 28 
that “the door is locked Wilma” and “I can’t open it” and Wilma’s reaction 
“yes I don’t know” (line 29) shift the focus on Wilma to which I will come 
back further down. Facing each other while Edeltraud narrates the second 
story, I argue that Wilma and Edeltraud establish in concert a set of cues 
which  analysis in this chapter cautiously treats as the  set of cues of their 
shared fear appraisal. As the interaction unfolds we will see that this becomes 
crucially meaningful once a conflict occurs.  
 
Significantly, Edeltraud marks the beginning of her second story with a sigh 
(line 19). This announces that the emotional value of what is about to follow 
potentially matches her first story: 
 
 
31  E: Und eh (.) ja (.) dann hat se mir erklärt daHINTEN (points) aber ich WUSSTE  
           And eh      yes     then she explained to me back there                 but I knew 
 
32  NICH da da is wohl eh Krankengymnastik und sowas (.) aber ich wusste nich  
       not there there is a physiotherapist and such like                 but I did not know 
  
33  W: Ja 
             Yes 
 
34  E: dass da auch medizinische FUSSpflege is.  
            that there is also a podiatry.  
 
35  W: Ja  
             Yes 
 
36  E: Ja ich bin jedenfalls mit ihr darunter gelaufen und jetzt sind die ja dahinten (points)  
            Yes anyway I went down there with her und now there are road works back there  
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37  die STRASSE am MACHEN (.) denk aber auch nich drüber nach und eh (.) JA Richtung 
                           am not thinking about it and eh                      yes direction 
38  DAHIN war dat erstens noch ZU wat ich nich wusste. Die machen erst um drei Uhr auf  
       there it was first of all still closed which I didn’t know. They only open at three pm 
  
39  und sie sachte um drei Uhr hab ich den Termin. Dann sind wir bis dahin (points)  
       and she said that I have the appointment at three. Then we walked up there 
 
40  geLAUFEN und ich hab nix gesehen von Fusspflege (.) Ich denk NEE kann nich richtig  
       and I can’t see the podiatry                                                   I think no can’t be right 
 
41  sein. Ich dann de Strasse entlang (.) eh wo da die Bauarbeiten is und da  
       I then follow the street                         eh where the road works are and there 
 
42  war es natürlich SEHR laut. Da kricht die Panik. 
       it was of course very loud. There she panics. 
 
43  <whispers>: Da wär se mir bald abgehauen (.)  
     She almost ran away from me  
                                 
44  <quiet>: und ich dann hinterHER bis ich se wieder eingeFANGEN HATTE.  
                        and I chased her until I finally recaptured her again. 
  
45  Dann sind wir wieder SO (points) an dem Haus vorbei und HINTENRUM (points) 
       Then we walked like this                  around the house and back there 
   
46  geguckt und dann sass da so ne Frau und war am telefoNIEREN. Und da hab ich  
       we had a look and there sat a woman and was on the phone. And then I 
 
47  gefragt ob sie mir sagen könnte wo hier die medizinische Fusspflege wäre. Ja hier bei X.  
       asked her if she can tell me where I can find the podiatry. Yes here at X’s. 
 
48  Ja machen die denn auch FUSSPFLEGE? JA. Machen die. JA. Dann ich wieder 
       Yes but is there also a podiatry? Yes. There is. Yes. Then I went again 
 
49  so RUM (points) und dann kriegte sie Panik wie ich dann wieder daHIN wollte, ne?  
       like this                and then she panicked when I wanted to go back there, right? 
 
50  W: Ja  
             Yes 
 
51  JA (.) und dann hab ich se dann 
       Yes    and then I 
 
52  <loud>: IRGENDWIE SCHAFFT MAN ET JA DANN DOCH wieder ne? Dann  
                       Somehow you always do manage right? Then  
 
53  sind wa da REIN. Wollte se sofort wieder RAUS. Und da hab ich sofort schnell die Tür 
       we walked in there. She wanted to go out immediately. And then I quickly  
 
54  zugeschlossen. Die KANNTEN se zum Glück da se schon oft da war. Ja, ich musste die  
       locked the door. Fortunately, they knew her because she’s been there quite often. Yes, I  
 
55  Tür zuschliessen sonst ist se WEG. Ne? (.) GING dann aber auch GUT. Wie die nächste  
       had to lock the door because otherwise she is gone. Right? (.) Went fine. When 
 
56  Patientin kam hab ich dann wieder AUFgeschlossen. (.) 
       the next patient arrived I unlocked the door.  
 
57  JA DAT SIND NATÜRLICH SO SITUATIONEN wo man dann (sighs) (.)  
       Yes these are of course the kind of situations where one then  
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58  <loud>: SELBER N BISSCHEN PANIK KRICHT WEIL MAN DAT NOCH NICH SO  
          panics a little bit oneself because one doesn’t know this 
 
59  KENNT NE? Ich hatte wohl schon ma ne Demenzkranke eh wo ich PRIVAT WAR. 
       yet right? But I have already cared for someone with dementia eh privately 
 
60  Aber da war, der hat sich in den ROLLstuhl setzen lassen. Ne? Dann haben wir den  
       But there was, you could put him in a wheelchair. Right? Then we  
 
61  auch angeschnallt und wir sind mit dem überall HINgeGANGEN. Ne?  
       also buckled him up and we walked everywhere with him. Right? 
 
62  Und SIE bleibt ja nich. Ne? Ich hab schon ma gefragt ob se nich ma im Rollstuhl sitzen  
       And she doesn’t stay. Right? I have asked if she could possibly sit in a wheelchair 
 
63  könnte (.) damit man auch ma (.) RICHTIG raus könnte. Wa? (sighs)  
                          so that one could            properly go outside. Right? 
 
64  <very quiet, concerned> Wär nich zu machen (.)  
               Can’t do it 
 
65  JA et gibt VERSCHIEDENE ARTEN DAVON. NE? (.) Und bei dem ich privat war den 
      Yes there are different kinds of this. RIGHT?                 And the one I worked for privately  
 
66  geh ich heute IMMER NOCH besuchen. Der liegt im KRANKENhaus. Ne? So ne Art 
       I still visit today. He is in hospital. Right? A kind of 
  
67  Pflegeheim is das (.) Aber eh dat is  
       nursing home.           But eh it is 
 
68  <loud>: DAT IS NE GANZ ANDERE DEMENZ wieder wie (.)  
                       It is a whole different kind of dementia than  
 
69  <quiet>: SIE hat. Ne? (.) Ich wusst auch nich dat es so viele verschiedene gibt. Ne?  
                        her’s. Right?      I didn’t know that there are that many different ones. Right? 
 
70  W<quiet>:  xxxxxx 
 
71  E<quiet>: Aber wenn man denen was SAGEN will 
                           But if you want to tell them something 
 
72  <loud>GeSACHT HAT 
                     have told 
  
73  Der hat immer zugehört. Der hat auch TEILS verstanden und TEILS NICH  
       He always listened. He also partly understood and partly didn’t 
 
74  verSTANDEN aber er war RUHIG. NE? (.) Aber SIE is einfach (.) (.) Hin HER  
       understand but he was calm. Right?              But she is simply                stop-go 
 
75  HER HIN. WA? Und wenn se DA (points to frontdoor) nich rauskommt dann 
      stop-go. Right? And if she can’t get out there  
 
76  versucht se Hinten (points to veranda door behind her) raus zu gehen. JA JA 
       she tries the backdoor. Yes yes  
 
77  da hab ich se schon ein paar Mal zurückholen müssen. Weil ich nie weiss is hinten die  
       I had to go get her a few times. Because I never know if back there  
 
78  Türe auf oder nich. Ne? Und wir dürfen ja nicht da hinten auf dem Rasen laufen.  
       the door is open or not. Right? And we are not allowed to step on the lawn back there. 
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79  Wilma <loud>: JA JA xxxx LÄUFT DAS (.) Dat SACH ich dir. 
                                    Yes yes       Does that go       I tell you. 
 
80 E: Ja (laughs) 
            Yes 
 
81 W: Von DOS. 
             Von DOS. 
 
82 I <loud>: Wat SACHse?  (.) (.) 
                         What are you sayin’? 
 
83 W: Hier (points at her blouse, then walks out of kitchen) 
             Here 
 
 
 
I propose that this second story exhibits the event in line 42/ 49 (“There she 
panics”) followed by the appraisal in line 43 (“She almost ran away from me”) 
and her conscious awareness in line 57 and 58 that defines the emotion as 
‘panic’ (“Yes these are of course the kind of situations where one panics a 
little  oneself).  In  contrast  to  the  first  narrative  which  described  “the 
beginning” (line 1; and “I have to get to know her first” in line 15), the second 
narrative contains information about a more recent event that happened a 
few weeks ago. The high frequency of instances where Edeltraud states that 
she “did not know” (lines 31/32: “but I did not know”, line 38: “which I didn’t 
know”, line 40: “I think no can’t be right”, line 57/ 58: “because one doesn’t 
know this yet”) first of all draws attention to the learning process that has 
happened. I have argued earlier that we can potentially draw the conclusion 
after her first story that Edeltraud is alert whenever she is with Wilma. Based 
on the two stories, I suggest now that Edeltraud learned the crucial lesson 
that she must be familiar with the environment because there is always the 
risk that Wilma tries to run away again.  
 
I suggest that her increased use of gestures in the second story supports this 
assumption. In lines 31, 36, 39, and 45, Edeltraud points into the directions 
while verbally supporting the explanation of the route to the podiatry. While 
the place-indexical terms can be seen as binding the story together in such a 
way that “whatever takes place in the course of the narrative is taking place in 
this story” (see Sacks, 1992: 179), Edeltraud at the same time literally shows 
me  that  she  now  knows  exactly  where  to  go.  Also  inside  the  flat  her 
conceptualization of space is based on Wilma’s potential actions. In lines 17,   169 
26, 28, and 75-79, she explains that she has to keep an eye on both doors and 
make sure that they are locked. Once she reached the podiatry with Wilma, 
she also immediately locked the door (“And then I quickly locked the door”, 
line 53/ 54). Focussing on doors or exits in general, it can be argued that she 
uses this as a strategy to mentally set up relevant places in such “a way that 
[they] could be remembered” (Sacks, 1992: 759, Vol. 2). In a way, it could 
then be suggested that the place-indexicals serve a double function in being 
crucially important in the encoding16 of spatial information while serving as 
emotion-inducing cues as I have claimed earlier. 
 
In line with  Dalgleish and Powers’ understanding that appraisals are made 
with  respect  to  mind  content,  one  could  conclude  so  far  that  Edeltraud 
crucially draws on prior fearful situations in order to identify situations as 
potentially threatening. Here, I mean threatening to Wilma’s health but also 
her  own.  Upon  our  second  meeting  Edeltraud  informs  me  that  she  still 
suffers from a hip surgery she had earlier that year and that walking is still 
painful. Thus, creating a bounded and therefore potentially secure place for 
the two of them is arguably among her priorities. Coming back to Dalgleish 
and  Power,  it  can  be  argued  that  her  conceptualization  of  Wilma  is 
represented across the different representational formats in the same way. 
‘Fear’ is generated via the activation of the analogous model level of meaning 
(the visual input ‘Wilma’ and ‘door’), the schematic level (the stories), and 
propositional level (the beliefs about dementia expressed in her third story 
“But  I  have  already  cared  for  someone  with  dementia”,  lines  59  –  74;  in 
particular line 60/ 61: “you could put him in a wheelchair. Right? Then we 
also buckled him up and we walked everywhere with him”).  
 
Interestingly, such an inherently cognitivist type of analysis puts to the fore 
the striking insight that ‘memory is for actions’ – the perspective promoted 
by proponents of an embodied and distributed view on cognition. The main 
hypothesis  of  an  embodied  cognition  framework  is  that  mind,  body,  and 
world mutually interact and influence one another to promote an organism’s 
adaptive success. Therefore, the  mind cannot be understood solely on the 
                                                 
16  Here,  I  do  not  mean  that  she  memorizes  the  actual  place-indexical  terms,  i.e.  verbal 
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basis of inner mental processes independently of the external environment. 
Glenberg’s  action-based  view  of  memory  (1997)  is  in  line  with  this 
understanding  in  that  he  proposes  that  “memory  evolved  in  service  of 
perception  and  action  in  a  three-dimensional  environment”  (1997:  1).  He 
argues that the traditional approach to memory as ‘for memorizing’ needs to 
be replaced by a view of memory as “the encoding of patterns of possible 
physical interaction with a three-dimensional world” (ibid). He suggests that 
the meaning of a situation is given by a “meshed pattern of possible actions, 
and  that  is  an  embodied  conceptualization”  (ibid).  Glenberg  gives  the 
example of a Coke bottle that can quench thirst, be used as a weapon, a door 
stopper,  or  a  vase  to  show  that  “[t]he  embodied  account  of  meaning  is 
situated so that action-oriented meaning can vary greatly with context” (1997: 
3). Meshing occurs not just in imagination, but in memory, comprehension, 
and perception: “We do not experience categories, but individual, particular 
events” (1997: 7).  
 
In his critique of Glenberg’s model, MacDorman (in Glenberg, 1997) stresses 
that  “memory  must  incorporate  internal  feedback  and  motivation  (…) 
because  we  cannot  settle  the  symbol  grounding  problem17  until we have 
explained  how  goals  arise”  (Glenberg,  1997:  29).  Echoing  Dalgleish  and 
Power’s position, he states that “an organism develops goals with reference to 
its conceptualisation (or perceptual world) under the influence of internal 
feedback” (ibid).  
 
Having established the psychological meaning of the present situation based 
on  the  two  stories  that  potentially  do  allow  to  some  extent  conclusions 
concerning Edeltraud’s internal feedback and goals, the stories also allow us 
to cautiously model Wilma’s multisensory encoding of the very same events. 
In particular in the second story, we learn about a stressful situation that 
Edeltraud describes as Wilma panicking (line 42 and 53). The crucial cues 
here seem to be the noise of the construction site (line 41), that Edeltraud 
                                                 
17 Glenberg thinks that his model can settle the debate: “This framework provides a way to 
address  meaning,  symbol  grounding,  recollective  and  automatic  uses  of  memory,  and 
language comprehension” (Glenberg, 1997: 17).   171 
chased and grabbed her when she ran away (line 44) and that she locked her 
up (line 54).  
 
Before coming back to this, however, it is crucial to draw the attention to the 
high number of tag questions that occur once Edeltraud talks about her prior 
experiences with another dementia sufferer (line 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 
69, 74, 75). Despite the high frequency, I refuse to signal agreement with her 
for two reasons. First of all, concerning the podiatry, I have been to this place 
with Wilma as well since she had a corn at that time and therefore several 
appointments  had  been  scheduled  in  the  weeks  prior  to  the  present 
interaction.  My  memory  of  this  situation,  however,  is  radically  different; 
marked by Wilma being very calm and Gudrun’s younger sister’s remarkable 
use of humour in managing ‘trouble’.  
 
Secondly, she uses the first tag question in line 51 where she implies that she 
used violence to get Wilma under control (“Yes and then I”) before she then 
continues to emphasize the abnormal nature of Wilma’s case in contrasting it 
with  the  other  dementia  sufferer  she  knows.  Here,  she  also  makes 
suggestions  how  Wilma  should  be  treated  and  presented  in  public,  i.e. 
strapped to a wheelchair (line 62). There was a similar instance to the one 
here in line 51 in the previous chapter where Gudrun did not finish a sentence 
when she talked about the similarity between herself and her father. Whereas 
a  corresponding  story  ‘popped’  into  my  head  then,  as  this  was  my  first 
meeting with Edeltraud I have no prior experiences with her. However, the 
fact  that  I  take  it  that  she  possibly  hit  Wilma  shows  that  I  am  biased. 
Paraphrasing Sacks here, in deliberately not offering a similar experience I 
run the risk of signalling disagreement. This is my intention in the present 
situation.  I  have  no  sympathy  whatsoever  for  her  behaviour  and  so  this 
second conflict is developing at the same time18.   
 
While Edeltraud’s attention rests on me, I frequently glance at Wilma who is 
in  the  corridor  again.  I  notice  that  she  picked  up  the  cordless  phone. 
                                                 
18 Witnessing other instances of violence towards Wilma ultimately led to an earlier end of 
participant  observation  than  originally  planned,  because  I  found  it  very  difficult  to 
understand, let alone accept this behaviour.    172 
Interpreting my unusual long glance appropriately, Edeltraud also turns her 
head in Wilma’s direction: 
 
 
84  E: Wat machse Wilma? 
            What are you up to Wilma? 
 
85  W<loud>: Ich hab NIX! 
                           I have nothing! 
 
86  E<caring>: ↑NEE. Du musst dat hier ↑DRAUF lassen. 
                                No. You have to leave it on here. 
 
87  W (clings to the phone, turns away from E.) <quiet>: xxx  
 
88  E <hectic>: ↑NEE pass auf ↑DAT GEHT KAPUTT! Da kann  
                                 No be careful you’ll break it! Then 
 
89  =W<loud>:                                                                     XXX  RAUS 
                                                   Out 
       
90  E <hectic>: keiner ANrufen! 
                             no one can call! 
 
91  W <agitated>: Mach ma los! (.) MANN (dial tone starts) 
                                   Open!                    man 
   
92  E <loud, shocked>: ↑Hör mal! Jetzt hast du ge↑WÄHLT? 
                                                Listen! Now you have dialled? 
 
93  W<loud>: JA (.) TU TU MA DU MUSS MUSSE FÜR DICH DEINE MANN. 
                           Yes     Do do ma you must must for you your man. 
 
94  E<quieter>: Nee, komm! 
                               No, come on! 
 
95  W<assertive>: NEIN (clings to phone) 
                                   No 
 
96  E<quieter>: Komm! Du hast ein Gespräch drauf! 
                               Come on! You have dialled! 
 
97  W <loud>: Sei ruhig und zeschlaf de Dreck. 
                           Be quiet and zeschlaf de dirt. 
 
98  Computer voice: Herzlich Willkommen beim Kundenservice der Telekom. 
             Welcome to the Telekom customer service. 
 
99  E <loud>: NA ↑GUCK MA DA du hast jetzt das Telefon. 
                                      Look you have the phone now. 
 
100  =W<loud>:                                       DAS HAB ICH NICH. 
                                                                    I have not. 
 
101  E<loud>: ↑KOMM du muss dat ↑DRAUF TUN! (.) 
                             Come on you must put it back on there 
 
102  W <quiet>: Met di gleech ich leg die dahin. 
                             Met di gleech I put them there.   173 
103  E<loud>: Nee. KOMM du musst das ZURÜCKlegen. 
                          No. Come you must put it back. 
 
104  W<loud>: Nee der kricht dat keiner. 
                           No no one gets it. 
 
105  E<begging>: DOCH! Wilma komm das kostet doch GELD! (grabs phone) 
                               Oh yes! Wilma come on this is expensive                                 
 
106  =W:                                                                     NEE 
                      NO 
 
107  E: Wir müssen das wieder da ↑DRAUF tun! 
              We have to put it back on there! 
 
108  =W:                            Das is aber auch was. 
                                              That’s something. 
 
109  E <very loud>: NEE das is NIX ANDERES. KOMM (.) KOMM. NEE. KOMM  
                                     No that is nothing different. Come         Come. No. Come 
  
110  <assertive>: DAS müssen wir jetzt drauf legen. (grabs phone) 
                                 This we have to put back on there. 
  
111  <loud, assertive>: NEIN! WILMA LASS ES SEIN! (.)  
                 No! Wilma let it be! 
 
112  <whispers>: Die hat Kraft (.)  
                                  She is strong 
 
113  <quiet>: Komm. Das GEHT nicht. (takes the phone away from her) 
                          Come on. You can’t do this. 
 
114  W: Da will et ma krijen. (.) Da stell hier mal hier hin. (points to charging point) 
               Da will et ma krijen.      Put it here. 
 
115  =E:                                                           NEE. Dat GEHT NICH. (takes the phone to the  
                                                                          No. You can’t do that.                                kitchen)   
   
116  E<indignant>: Dat hat se noch NIE gemacht! 
          She’s never done this before! 
 
117  W (follows her into kitchen): Jung, jung, nee. 
          Boy, boy, no. 
 
 
 
So far, I have suggested in this chapter that an analysis of Edeltraud’s stories 
can carve out a set of cues which tentatively have been established as crucially 
meaningful in how the two women ‘bring their minds to each other’ in the 
present  interaction.  While  grounded  in  the  recall  of  fear  appraisal  that 
happened at some point within the past four months, I claimed that we can 
find  and  verify  a  number  of  these  highly  meaningful  cues  in  the  present 
environment. Focussing on visual ones, I suggested that this input has an   174 
immediate  effect  on  Edeltraud  in  that  she  achieves  affective  coherence 
evoking the particular mood of the time when she encoded that event. I then 
suggested that if she defines the present situation as potentially dangerous 
and  is  hence  in  a  state  of  alarm,  this  affects  how  she  perceives  her 
environment. For instance, it is possible that she perceives Wilma’s stare as 
threatening. Having learned that these two women have at least twice shared 
a  fearful  experience,  analysis  of  the  present  sequence  follows  two  goals: 
Glenberg’s idea that memory evolves in the service of perception and action 
shall  be  considered,  while  analysis  aims  to  find  further  evidence  for  the 
hypothesis that mood and emotions affect and potentially guide behaviour.  
Having highlighted markers of distancing behaviour over the course of the 
interaction, the crucial change in this sequence now is that Edeltraud gets up 
from her chair and goes to Wilma. As they  stand close to each other, the 
quality of touch will be at the centre of interest in the following analysis. In 
the previous chapter it was shown that Gudrun employed different forms of 
touch (for instance hugs and kisses) which expressed a coherent quality in 
line with her proclaimed strategy of ‘calm and loving’ behaviour. Based on 
Edeltraud’s stories, we have learned that touch is crucial in their interactions 
as well; however, it usually occurs in highly stressful situations. This affects 
the nature of the touch: in the two stories Edeltraud refers to her own actions 
as ‘restraining’ (“ich hab se festhalten wollen” in lines 7/8), ‘get her under 
control’  (“bis  ich  sie  dann  ein  bisschen  im  Griff  hatte”,  line  10)  and 
‘recapturing’ (“bis ich se wieder eingeFANGEN HATTE”, line 44).  
At first glance, it seems to be Wilma who first signals a high level of arousal 
which is indicated by a sudden increase in voice in line 85.  This reaction 
occurs as soon as Edeltraud approaches her and is in turn met by a calm 
response of the younger woman (line 86). However, the transcript shows in 
the  following  lines  88  to  93  that  very  quickly  the  two  of  them  achieve  a 
synchrony in vocal affective reactions (E<hectic>, W <loud>, E<hectic>, W 
<agitated>,  E  <loud,  shocked>,  W  <loud>).  This  scene  is  remarkably 
different  from  the  instance  in  the  previous  chapter  where  Gudrun  also 
purposefully  approached  her  agitated  mother.  In  the  present  one,  Wilma 
instantly  reacts  verbally  impulsively  and  turns  away  her  body  (line  87).   175 
Considering the shared history of violent behaviour, I cautiously argue that 
Wilma’s  behaviour,  as  well  as  Edeltraud’s  immediate  change  in  tone 
(<hectic>, line 88) can be explained with the help of Glenberg’s theory. Since 
we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapter  that  this  behaviour  cannot  be 
considered to be Wilma’s usual reaction whenever somebody approaches her, 
she clearly signals that there is something special about her relationship with 
this  particular  woman.  We  know  from  Edeltraud  that  there  have  been 
instances  in  the  past  when  she  had  to  “recapture”  and  “restrain”  Wilma. 
While  Edeltraud’s  choice  of  words  already  expresses  that  someone  acts 
against someone else’s wishes, we also know from Edeltraud that her actions 
have frequently evoked resistance (“She didn’t want it at all”, line 8; “No No 
No”, line 12). Considering Edeltraud’s quick pace but neutral voice (line 84), 
on the one hand, and Wilma turning her back on her but with a quiet voice 
(line 87), on the other, it seems that both women select the body cues over 
the  vocal  ones.  I  suggest  that  this  is  so  because  in  both  cases  the  bodies 
express an action-readiness, or a follow-up action, which in Edeltraud’s case 
is  marked  by  dominant  and  in  Wilma’s  case  by  defensive  behaviour. 
Narrowing their attention to these cues could be treated as pointing in the 
direction Glenberg suggests, which is that perception affects remembering in 
such a way that the ‘survival-relevant’ information is prioritised. Both women 
seem to anticipate and at the same time embody in their action-readiness the 
conflict which is about to happen. The above-mentioned synchrony in vocal 
affective reactions shows that they immediately achieve the same high level of 
emotional arousal. 
A closer look at these lines 88 to 93 where a high level of arousal is clearly 
indicated in the tone of both women reveals something interesting. I have 
argued from the point of view of Edeltraud’s stories that both women signal 
clearly  within  the  first  seconds  of  the  present  interaction  that  their 
relationship is strained because of their shared fearful experiences. However, 
we  can  find  within  this  interaction  how  Edeltraud  and  Wilma  build  this 
conflict through unsuccessfully directing each other’s attention to what they 
perceive to be meaningful in this situation. I have proposed earlier that very 
early  on  both  women  provide  the  visual  cues  which  they  have  learned  to 
identify  as  trouble-indicating:  Edeltraud  quickly  approaching  Wilma  while   176 
the latter turns her body and signals non-compliance with whatever is going 
to follow. So, once Wilma turns around Edeltraud’s tone changes (<hectic>, 
line 88). The transcript shows that significantly her attention is focused on 
the phone. This is indicated through her gaze and on the verbal level as she 
expresses her concern that Wilma will break it (“You’ll break it!”, line 88). It 
also shows in the transcript that her turn overlaps twice now with Wilma’s. 
While Edeltraud continues to indicate that her attention is fixed on the phone 
(line 88 and line 92 where she wants to draw Wilma’s attention to the audible 
dial tone and the fact that she has dialled herself), Wilma says in a loud voice 
“out” (line 89) and a second time clearly agitated “open” (line 91). While the 
latter  coincides  with  the  dial  tone,  the  first  coincides  with  her  body 
movement and in both instances Edeltraud does not signal at all that she 
understood Wilma.  
A  possible  way  to  explain  this  is  with  regard  to  Easterbrook’s  (1959)  cue 
utilisation  theory  which  predicts  that  high  levels  of  arousal  will  lead  to 
attention narrowing. This is defined as a decrease in the range of cues from 
the  stimulus  and  its  environment  to  which  the  organism  is  sensitive. 
According  to  this  hypothesis,  attention  will  be  focused  primarily  on  the 
arousing  details  (cues)  of  the  stimulus,  so  that  information  central  to  the 
source of the emotional arousal will be encoded while peripheral details will 
not.  A  possible  reason  for  this  is  that  in  the  case  of  anxiety,  part  of  the 
working memory may be taken up with our awareness of fears and worries, 
leaving  less  capacity  available  for  processing.  In  support  of  this  theory, 
Kensinger & Corkin (2004) found that math-anxious people have working 
memory problems while doing maths.  
Also,  the  weapons  effect  experiment  which  I  summarised  in  chapter  3 
possibly sheds light on this situation. The insight from this experiment is that 
individual differences of several types (e.g., knowledge structures, levels of 
trait hostility) influence the interpretation of situational variables (e.g., the 
presence of guns) related to aggression. The interaction among these aspects 
of the internal state influences appraisal and decision-making processes (e.g., 
interpretations of intent to harm) that ultimately determine whether or to 
what extent an aggressive response will occur (see Bartholow et al., 2005:   177 
48–60).  It  can  be  concluded  that  evidence  hence  exists  that  emotional 
arousal has a selective effect on the particular stimuli one notices in times of 
stress. Coming back to Glenberg who proposes that attention may be thought 
of as a state of activity I have so far suggested that emotional arousal, or 
rather certain affective experiential cues, might have ‘triggered’ the attention 
of both women in the first place and that we can trace how emotional arousal 
modulates  it  over  the  course  of  this  sequence.  The  transcript  shows  that 
Edeltraud’s attention in this sequence is at all times fixed on the phone. This 
is expressed verbally, through her gaze, as well as gestures which she uses as 
different strategies to shift Wilma’s attention to the object in her hand. She 
verbally directs Wilma’s attention to the object she is holding in her hands 
(“<loud> LOOK you have the phone”, line 99) and we can see in line 86 that 
she furthermore shows and tells Wilma where it usually is and that she has to 
put it back on the charging point. Contrary to her belief stated earlier she also 
reasons with Wilma (“no one can call!”, line 89).  
In line 105, Edeltraud finally grabs the phone but she cannot get hold of it. 
She tries a second time in line 110 and this time she does not let go. As they 
wrestle she says under her breath “She is strong” (line 112). This gives us a 
crucial  hint  as  to  ‘where  her  mind  is’.  Treating  this  as  an  instance  of 
metacognition, our ability to direct the spotlight of our attention (see Lehrer, 
2009) to what is important in the situation at hand, Edeltraud signals that 
she shifted her attention from the phone to Wilma. More precisely, her focus 
is on Wilma’s physical strength which she can feel wrestling for the phone 
with  her.  Based  on  her  narratives  we  know  that  all  her  encounters  with 
Wilma  get  physical  at  some  point  and  that  Wilma  is  a  more  than  equal 
partner in conflicts. According to her, Wilma has slapped her before and we 
can see here that Wilma insulted her shortly before Edeltraud reaches out for 
the phone (“<loud> Be quiet and zerschlaf de dirt!”, line 97).  
I do not think that Edeltraud’s commentary (“she is strong”) was directed at 
me  and  therefore  a  cry  for  help.  I  am  too  far  away  and  she  is  almost 
whispering. Yet, I have a hard time not intervening, but I want to see how the 
two handle this conflict and in particular the resolution or what immediately 
follows. I have mentioned earlier that I frequently witnessed forms of violent   178 
conflicts between Wilma and nursing service staff. I once could not help but 
step  in  as  one  of  Edeltraud’s  colleagues  tried  to  force  pills  down  Wilma’s 
throat. This was at a later point with a different live-in who had only just 
arrived. In this situation I pushed away the nursing service employee and fled 
with a devastated Wilma into her bedroom where I tried to calm her down. 
This however was neither tolerated by the nursing service employee nor the 
live-in  and  they  kicked  me  out.  Shortly  after,  I  decided  to  stop  visiting 
Wilma19. In the present situation, I stay in the kitchen and merely watch the 
two women quarrelling in the corridor. However, once the two are back in the 
kitchen in the following sequence I do comment on Edeltraud’s behaviour.  
Edeltraud eventually manages to take the phone away from  Wilma in line 
107.  In  a  way  mirroring  each  other’s  earlier  actions  it  is  Wilma who  now 
points  to  the  charging  point  (line  114)  and  says  “Put  it  here”.  Instead  of 
performing what she wanted Wilma to do earlier, Edeltraud replies “No. You 
can’t do that!” (line 114) and comes back into the kitchen with the phone. I 
claimed that once Edeltraud resolved the conflicts with Wilma in the second 
story some sort of ‘punishment’ or sign of dominance follows (an unknown 
action after the second time Wilma panicked, line 51; she locked her inside 
the podiatry, line 53/ 54). In the present interaction Edeltraud comes back 
into  the  kitchen  where  she  immediately  places  the  phone  out  of  Wilma’s 
reach on the highest shelf. The initial focus in the following sequence is thus 
on further signs of dominance: 
 
118  E <imploringly>: Nee, Wilma, das GEHT NICH!  
                No, Wilma, you can’t do this! 
 
119  W <quiet>: xx 
  
120  E <pedantic>: DU DRÜCKST irgendwo drauf und dann  kostet das GELD!  
          You push some button and it costs money! 
 
121  W<whining>: Ja, dat will ich nich   (.) Will ich nich. 
         Yes, I don’t want this       Don’t want this. 
 
122  = E:                                                       na SIEHSE 
             See 
 
                                                 
19 However, as this was a very stressful time for the new live-in as well, we agreed that I 
would call her once week or every fortnight once I am back in England; which I did for the 
three months until Elisabeta returned from Poland and took over again.   179 
123  W<whining>: NEE NEE (.) Wo komm ich denn hier bei liss? 
          No No             How do I get to liss? 
 
124  = E<irritated>:                                                              Was denn? (.)  
                      What is it? 
 
125  Sollen wir denn nochmal nach DRAUSSEN gehen? 
        Shall we go outside once more? 
126  =W:                      JA                                Ja 
             Yes      Yes 
 
127  E: Sollen wir SPAZIEREN gehen? 
             Shall we go for a walk? 
 
128  W<quiet>: NEE (.) Ich glaub nich xxx (.) 
    No         I don’t think so xxx  
 
129  E: JA. ↑GLAUBEN heisst nicht WISSEN! (.) Wir können GERN spazieren. 
             Yes to think doesn’t mean to know! (.) I’d be happy to go for a walk with you. 
  
130  =W <louder>:                                        JA                           Ich hab ich ja gerade geweisst. 
          Yes        I have I just known. 
 
131  E<loud>: WAS DENN? 
               What is it? 
 
132  W<quiet>: Der hatte ja gar nich. 
    He didn’t have. 
 
133  E<quiet>: WAS hat der gar nich? 
                What does he not have? 
 
134  W<quiet>: Von FRÜher 
                               Back then 
 
135  E: JA? 
              Yes? 
 
136  W<quiet>: Ja (.) ja. (W turns around, makes a few steps towards the corridor) 
    Yes    yes. 
 
137  E: Wat machse denn jetz? 
             What are you up to now? 
 
138  W<quiet>: xxxx (turns around, eyes on E) 
 
139  =E:                    Und wat hat er gesacht? (.) (.) 
          And what did he say? 
 
140  W<quiet>: Da hab ich gar nich mitte gelost. 
    There I have not mitte gelost.  
 
141  E: Hm? 
 
142  W: Stehse? (.) (.) 
  Stehse? 
 
143  E: Ich hab dich jetz nich verstanden. 
              I didn’t understand you. 
 
144  W: Hasse nichn Barrett? 
  Don’t you have a Barrett?   180 
145  E: Ein Brett? 
              A board? 
 
146  W: So so ne Schxx 
 
147  E<loud>: N SCHLÜSSEL? 
               A key? 
 
148  W<quiet>: Hierhin (points on the floor in front of her) 
    Here 
 
149  =E<loud>:     NEE. Ich ich hab jetz keinen Schlüssel! (.)  
        No. I don’t have a key at the moment! 
 
150  Den krieg ich nachher ers. 
         I’ll only get it later. 
 
151  W<quiet>: Ja is gut. 
     Yes that’s fine. 
 
152  =E:                     NE? (.) Müssen wir eben warten. (.)  
           Right? (.) We have to wait a little. 
 
153  W: Ja 
  Yes 
 
154  E: KOMM. TU ma eben was TRINken. (points to glass of water) 
              Come here. Drink a little. 
 
155  W <quiet>: xxxx drin? (eyes on glass) 
       xxxx in there? 
 
156  E: KOMM wir müssen eben was trinken. 
             Come we must quickly drink something. 
 
157  W: Nee 
  No 
 
158  E: DOCH. Das ist GANZ WICHTIG! 
             Oh yes. This is really important! 
 
159  W<quiet>: Nee. Dat tu ich nich. (E goes and gets glass with tap water) 
    No. I won’t do it. 
 
160  Ich kann da doch nich raus! (E returns with glass) 
         I can’t get out! 
 
161  E<quiet>: Komm her. (.) xxx 
                Come here 
 
162  = W<scared>:   ↑NEE. Dat tun wa nich! (backs off). 
                No. We won’t do it! 
 
163  E <loud>: Sowat nich? (.) Wat willse? Willse Wasser haben? 
    Not that?           What do you want? Do you want water? 
 
164  =W <quiet>:            NEE 
      No 
 
165  W <quiet>: Nee 
     No 
   181 
166  E <loud>: Möchse denn WASSER haben?(turns head, looks at bottle of water) 
                Would you like some WATER? 
 
167  W: Ja (.) dat wollte ich. 
  Yes     that’s what I wanted. 
 
168  =E <assertive>: JA. Dann krichse Wasser (gets bottle of sparkling water) 
                                       Yes. Then you’ll get some water.  
 
169  W: Nee (.) Kannse mir ja geben (E fills glass, W behind her back, watching E) 
  No        You can give it to me. 
 
170  E: NA KOMM (turns around with glass, W backs off) 
             Come here 
 
171  W <scared>: Nich so VIEL 
        Not so much 
 
172  = E<loud>:                        NEIN. Nur ein paar Schluck. NE? (puts glass to W’s lips) 
                No. Only a few sips. Right? 
 
173  I*<harsh>: Sie kann alleine trinken 
                              She can drink on her own 
 
174  W: x 
 
175  E<loud>: Schön langsam (.) Schön festhalten (W drinks, holding the glass) (.)  
               Nice and slow        Hold on to it 
 
176  PRIma (.) GUT so, NE? DAT IS JA SCHON WAS  
        Great         Good, right? That’s an achievement/ We are getting there 
 
 
 
The transcript of the previous sequence shows that while both women come 
back into the kitchen they express their shock and exhaustion over what just 
happened (“E <indignant>: She’s never done this before!” in line 116 and “W: 
Boy, boy, no.” in line 117). The present sequence now shows the interactions 
once they are back in the kitchen. We can see that Edeltraud continues to 
signal dominant behaviour: She tells Wilma off which is expressed in her tone 
of voice as well as in describing the negative consequences of her behaviour 
to  Wilma  (“<imploringly>:  No,  Wilma,  you  can’t  do  this!”,  line  118  and 
“<pedantic>:  you  push  some  button  and  it  costs  money!”  in  line  119).  In 
contrast to her very high arousal earlier, we can see that Wilma’s mood has 
changed notably. She is no longer agitated and the information about her 
tone of voice in the transcript (<quiet> in line 119, <whining> in lines 121 and 
123) alongside her clearly audible agreement with Edeltraud in line 121 now 
indicate an opposite response to her earlier one when Edeltraud reasoned 
with her in a similar way while she still had the phone (“Wilma come on this   182 
is expensive”, line 105). She does not contradict Edeltraud like in line 106 
(“no”) and we can see in line 122 (“see”) that Edeltraud thus concludes the 
event  in  the  way  one  resolves  a  conflict  where  one  accepts  the  other’s 
expression  of  regret  as  an  indication  that  they  understand  that  they  were 
wrong.  
 
Yet, Wilma signals in her following turn in line 123 a misunderstanding (“no 
no.  How  do  I  get  to  liss?”).  For  the  first  time  in  the  whole  interaction 
Edeltraud now turns her attention to what it is that Wilma actually wants in 
asking her if she wants to go outside once more (line 125). Although Wilma 
reacts positively (twice in line 126) to her request Edeltraud rephrases the 
question and asks Wilma once more. We can see in line 127 that she made 
one change on the semantic level, replacing “go outside” with “go for a walk”. 
Something  interesting  happens  now.  Although  Wilma  emphasised  her 
agreement earlier in overlapping with Edeltraud’s turn and repeating “YES” 
twice,  she  declines  Edeltraud’s  offer  after  she  rephrased  it.  Based  on 
Edeltraud’s first story we have an idea of what potentially happens once the 
two women ‘go for a walk’. Although speculative, I suggest that Wilma also 
seems  to  signal  that  she  as  well  differentiates  between  the  two  scenarios 
Edeltraud suggests. 
 
Apart  from  drawing  on  the  background  knowledge  Edeltraud  provided 
through the stories, we can find in the transcript how Edeltraud potentially 
feels about her offer. I suggest that the two instances of emotion mismatch 
are significant. The first one occurs when Edeltraud first asks Wilma if she 
wants to go out but her tone notably indicates annoyance or anger (line 124/ 
125). The second instance can be found in line 129 where Edeltraud stresses 
that she would like to go for a walk with Wilma but contextualises this in a 
peculiar  way.  In  response  to  Wilma’s  change  of  mind  she  asserts  with  a 
patronizing voice that “to think doesn’t mean to know” (line 129). I propose 
that this can be understood in the following way. In the same way that there 
is a semantic difference between ‘to go outside’ and ‘to go for a walk’ there is a 
conceptual  difference  between  ‘to  think’  and  ‘to  know’.  Framing  her 
statement that she would like or enjoy to go for a walk with Wilma in such 
way is hence significant in that she emphasises that one has to be precise   183 
because  the  slightest  difference  changes  meaning.  Pointing  out  that  she 
would like to go for a walk shows us then that she has a clear definition of 
the event she is proposing; that is a script-consistent event, a ‘proper’ walk.  
 
Furthermore,  I  cautiously  argue  that  her  patronizing  behaviour  and  in 
particular the focus on precise and clear language is a continuation of the 
distancing behaviour she has signalled prior to the conflict. I claimed in the 
discussion of the previous sequence that from a psychological perspective her 
high level of emotional arousal may have affected her perception in such a 
way that she ignored or did not hear Wilma’s clearly audible utterances. In 
the  present  situation  I  suggest  now  that  we  find  something  Edeltraud 
frequently shows in this interaction and which I treat as an example of how 
hearing is also a socially organised activity in Garfinkel’s sense. He suggested 
that hearing (and also seeing) happens within a socially organised field of 
perception (1952/ 2008). Pronouncing the boundaries between herself whose 
expressions are clear and who can show that she is in full control of choosing 
what she perceives to be the most appropriate wording to express a certain 
concept, and Wilma whose speech is frequently marked by ‘mistakes’ on all 
linguistic levels, Edeltraud establishes her understanding of normal and sick 
behaviour.  
 
Coming  back  to  her  earlier  comment  that  Wilma  in  general  “cannot 
participate” (line 2) and the way she singled out decisive aspects of Wilma’s 
behaviour  as  ‘typical’  for  her  which  she  then  contrasted  with  the  other 
dementia sufferer she knows (lines 59-78), I propose that Edeltraud hears 
Wilma’s change of mind here (although not ungrammatical) in the biased 
way  just  described  and  which  is  not  unlike  the  dominant  Discourse  on 
Alzheimer’s disease I discussed in chapter 4. The consequence seems to be 
that she ignores both of Wilma’s replies and makes the decision herself to 
stay at home because as soon as Wilma moves towards the corridor (line 137) 
Edeltraud indicates that going for a walk now is no longer an option. Rather, 
in asking Wilma once again what she is up to now (line 137) she seems to 
anticipate  another  conflict.  Comparing  the  preface  to  the  conflict  in  the 
previous  sequence  with  Edeltraud’s  (verbal)  behaviour  in  the  present  one 
(line 137) can possibly justify this guess, however, I think that the remaining   184 
sequence offers evidence that mutual distrust does guide both Wilma’s and 
Edeltraud’s  actions  to  a  considerable  extent.  Distrust  is  usually  connected 
with unknown situations or strangers and it serves as a warning system for 
situations that could be harmful. Coming back to the opening interaction of 
this  sequence,  or  rather  the  immediate  actions  following  the  conflict,  I 
claimed that the way this was managed by both women indicates that despite 
Wilma’s agreement with Edeltraud which may have served as a temporary 
assurance,  these  two  do  not  trust  each  other  and  in  fact  their  individual 
concerns or fears become relevant immediately after. I have discussed this 
when Edeltraud asked Wilma earlier if she wants to go out/ go for a walk and 
I propose that we can find a crucially relevant situation beginning in line 144 
where Wilma asks Edeltraud a question that starts with “Don’t you have”. In 
lines 147, 148 and 149 we can see that both women come to an agreement 
that Wilma wants to find out if Edeltraud has the key to the front door. With 
regard  to  how  I  suggested  data  allows  for  conclusions  about  the  ways 
Edeltraud’s hearing is affected in interactions with Wilma, I first of all think 
that it is remarkable that Edeltraud did not just ignore Wilma. This possibly 
emphasises that it is in her own interest to help Wilma express that she is 
looking for the keys. There are other instances in this chapter (most notably 
the exchange between lines 154 and 176 that will be discussed further down) 
where Edeltraud has ignored unintelligible speech (line 23/ 24, line 69/ 70, 
line 119/ 120) and gestures (line 85), or laughs instead of replying (line 30, 
line 80).    
 
A possible explanation is certainly my presence. I said earlier that I find it 
increasingly difficult over the course of the interaction not to get involved. 
Once Edeltraud comes back into the kitchen she seeks eye contact which I 
return with a glare. Of course, this is highly speculative but this has to be 
taken  into  account;  especially,  since  we  can  see  for  the  first  time  that 
Edeltraud initiates a longer exchange with Wilma (line 131, 133, 135). Yet, 
coming back to the proposed relevance and signs of distrust, I argue that 
while Edeltraud may be concerned with her appearance in front of me, we 
can tell at the same time that co-constructing with Wilma her request for the 
key is coherent with Edeltraud’s belief that Wilma always wants to leave. On 
the  other  hand,  we  also  know  that  Edeltraud  has  locked  Wilma  in  at  the   185 
podiatry, and although Edeltraud tells her very early in the interaction that 
she does not have the keys and thus cannot open the door, the usual routine 
on  Thursdays  implies  that  Edeltraud  locks  the  door  of  Wilma’s  flat  once 
Elisabeta has left. I think that based on this chapter’s data we have enough 
proof to seriously question that Wilma ‘cannot participate’ on the grounds of 
presumed Alzheimer-related memory impairment. We do not know if Wilma 
is aware of the fact that Edeltraud had the key all the time and hence is lying 
to her for the second time. Yet, this might very well explain her increased 
signalling  of  distrust  in  the  following  lines  154  –  176.  Edeltraud  holds 
Wilma’s attention in telling her that she has to drink something now (line 
149).  
 
The transcript shows that Wilma consistently signals that she feels violated. 
She expresses verbally that she does not want to drink (“No”, line 157; “No. I 
won’t do it.”, 159) and more specifically that she does not want to drink from 
the glass Edeltraud is offering her (“xxxx in there?”, line 155; “no”, line 164; 
“no”, line 160). She backs off (line 162) when Edeltraud tells her to come 
closer. She wants Edeltraud to take the closed water bottle instead (line 167) 
and clearly audibly produces that she wants to do it herself (line 169) when 
Edeltraud turns her back on her to fill Wilma’s glass. As soon as Edeltraud 
turns around again, Wilma backs off (line 170) and her tone is notably scared 
(line 171) when Edeltraud approaches her with the glass. We can see in the 
transcript that Edeltraud does use her glance to suggest to Wilma the water 
bottle as an alternative to the glass she is offering her, but she ignores in a 
remarkable way that Wilma is not only clearly in distress but notably ‘lucid’.  
 
Hence, once Edeltraud reaches out her arm to put the glass to Wilma’s lips I 
tell her that Wilma does not require assistance to drink. This is the first time 
in  this  interaction  that  I  am  signalling  Edeltraud  that  I  do  have  prior 
experiences with Wilma. She does know this, though, since I told her about 
the project and asked for permission to record interactions. Yet, my harsh 
tone and the fact that I refused to comment on her methods earlier implies 
that I disagree. The following and final sequence now shows that as soon as 
Edeltraud admits that she has the key Wilma is not only co-operative but her   186 
and also Edeltraud’s mood brightens up remarkably. Yet, achieved consensus 
is fragile and only temporary as both women continue to signal distrust.  
 
Wilma drinks a few sips and then goes back to the front door where she turns 
around and watches us.  
 
 
177  E (goes to corridor) <loud>: KOMM wir ziehen mal SCHUHE an Wilma! JA? Dann 
                                               Come let’s put on your shoes Wilma! Ok? Then   
 
 
178  gehen wir ma gleich eben nach draussen. OK? (W stands in front of I*, not follow E)  
         we can quickly go outside. OK? 
      
179  E: KOMMse?  (W follows but stops in front of the front door, E is in the right  
             Are you coming?                                         corner in front of the shoe cabinet) 
 
180  E <assertive>: (.) Na ↑KOMM (.)  
               Come here 
 
181  <assertive>: ↑KOMMSE? 
          Come?  
 
182  <friendly>: Kurz eben Schuhe anziehen JA?(on her knees, holding shoes) 
    Just quickly put on the shoes yes? 
 
183  W: Ja (doesn’t move) 
  Yes 
 
184  E<friendly>: NA komma HER. 
       Come HERE. 
 
185  W <quiet>: Ich bin nich xxxx 
     I am not xxxx 
 
186  E: Nee wir müssen die Hausschuhe AUSziehen! So können wir nicht nach 
              No we have to take off the slippers! We can’t go outside like 
  
187  draussen (.) Wir wollen doch ein bisschen spazieren gehen.  
         that               We want to go for a little walk. 
    
188  W: Ja das stimm stump xx 
  Yes that stimm stump xx 
 
189  =E:                  JA  
        Yes 
 
190  W: Da beis das xlich. 
  There beis this xlich. 
 
191  E: Ja 
              Yes 
  
192  W: Ja 
  Yes 
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193  E<loud>: KOMMA bis hier 
               Come here 
 
194  W: NEE so kann ich doch nich sachen 
  No this way I can’t sachen 
 
195  =E <loud>:                           DOCH       Komma eben bis hier  
                   Oh yes    Come to me 
 
196  <friendly>: So können wir nich RAUS gehen. 
    We can’t go outside like this. 
 
197  =W:   NEE 
    No 
 
198  E<friendly>: So kannse doch nich LAUfen mit den Schuhen. (.) KOMMSE?  
        You can’t walk with these shoes. Are you coming? 
 
199  <irritated>: Dann können wir auch DIE TÜR gleich aufmachen.  
      And then we can open the door. 
 
200  Komma ersma Schuhe an (.) JA? 
         Let’s put on the shoes first     Yes? 
 
201  W: HASSE keinen SCHÜSSIS? (.) 
  Don’t you have a SCHÜSSIS? 
 
202  E<hesitating>: Doch (.) 
            I do 
  
203  <friendly>: Komm. Tu ma eben hier rein. (shows shoes, W comes) 
      Come. Put ‘em quickly in here. 
 
204  So JA. Tu ma eben HOCH. FUSS HOCH (.) Tu ma eben Fuss hoch! KOMM  
         Like this yes. Put ‘em up. Foot up                   Lift your foot! Come on 
 
205  HAUSSCHUH ausziehen! (.) SO. Und jetzt gehse hier REIN (.) WarTE! Geh ma rein (.)  
          Take off the slippers!  Ok. And now you go in here. Wait! Put ‘em in  
 
206  SO (.) GUT so? 
        Ok. Everything alright?  
 
207  W: Ja 
   Yes 
 
208  E<friendly>: Warte eben zumachen. (.) SO. Jetzt den anderen Fuss. (.) SUper.  
         Wait let’s quickly close it   OK. Now the other one. Super. 
 
209  W<loud>: ZWEI STIMMT isse toll gemacht. 
    Two is correct    isse well done. 
 
210  =E:                                       JA. HOCH den Fuss! (.) VORSICHT! (.) SO. (.) Warte eben  
                 Yes. Lift the foot!              Careful!                          Wait 
   
211  <groans>: SO. Jetz versuch ma! 
    OK. Try now! 
  
212  (W puts foot in the second shoe) JA! SUPER! Hm? 
 
213  W<quiet>: Ja 
     Yes 
   188 
214  E<happy>: KLASSE. GUCK jetz hasse die Schuhe an (.) Solln wa noch ne Jacke 
      Great. Look now you have both shoes on       Shall we also put on  
  
215  anziehen? (goes to coatrack) (.) Oder is et warm genuch? (takes a jacket) (.)  
          a jacket?              Or is it warm enough? 
 
216  Wir tun se ma drüber, wa? 
         We better put it on, eh? 
 
217  W<quiet>: Nee 
    No 
 
218  =E:                  Ja. KOMMA. (dresses her) (.) GUCK! Klappt doch alles wunderbar. (.) Ne? 
        Yes. Come here.                          Look! Everything’s working out fine. Eh?  
 
219  W: STECKEN dat dat de tus tus? 
  Put this this de tus tus? 
 
220  E: Was denn? 
  Sorry? 
 
221  W: Gehen bei de FREUndin herein. 
  Visit the friend 
 
222  E<loud>: Bei deine FREUNdin rein? 
               Visit your friend? 
 
223  W<loud>: JA SICHA. 
                Yes sure. 
 
224  E: Machen wa das. (comes into the kitchen, W stays in the corridor, but gaze follows). 
              Let’s do it. 
    
225  SO. Dann hol ich jetz die Schlüssel. Und dann sind wa soweit. 
         Alright. I go get the keys now. And then we’re ready. 
 
 
 
The first half of this final sequence shows some striking parallels with the 
conflict  earlier  on.  Although  both  are  in  the  corridor  now,  Edeltraud  and 
Wilma achieve maximum spatial distance through standing at either ends of 
the corridor. Once again Edeltraud modulates the affective quality of tone 
(<assertive>, line 180; <friendly>, line 184) to persuade Wilma to come over 
to her end. Furthermore, she justifies her request (“No we have to take off the 
slippers! We can’t go outside like that”, line 186/ 187) and reminds Wilma of 
the reason why they want to do it (“We want to go for a little walk”, line 187) 
which Wilma confirms (“Yes that stimm stump xx”, line 188). Yet, she does 
not co-operate.  
 
When Edeltraud states in line 199/ 200 that “we can open the door” after 
Wilma put on her shoes, however, something interesting happens. We can   189 
see in the transcript that Wilma asks Edeltraud in return “Don’t you have a 
Schüssis?” (line 201) which Edeltraud hesitantly confirms (“I do”, line 202). 
Contrary to the previous sequence, Edeltraud does not audibly repair Wilma’s 
utterance but must have ‘mentally corrected’ it in the fashion Sacks suggested 
in ‘Ken’s story’. This may be so because this time Wilma’s wording is much 
closer  to  what  is  considered  ‘normal’  speech  (from  “Schxx”  in  line  146  to 
“Schüssis” in line 201).  We can see in the following in line 203 that Wilma 
complies now that Edeltraud confirmed that she does have the key. In fact, a 
whole new emotional quality occurs in the following. Temporary trust seems 
to develop based on this moment of honesty which markedly affects both 
Edeltraud’s (<happy>, line 214) and Wilma’s (line 209) mood. For the first 
time  Edeltraud  expresses  an  interest  in  Wilma’s  opinion  asking  her  if 
everything is ok in lines 201 and 207 and in return Wilma praises her in line 
209 (“Two is correct isse well done”).  
 
In chapter 3, I referred to recent research in neuroscience which suggested 
that  the  emotions  aroused  make  certain  events  easier  to  remember. 
Emotional  memories  are  encoded  in  the  amygdala.  Its  function  has  been 
studied intensively, and findings suggest that the amygdala is responsible for 
the influence of emotion on perception since it is so critically involved in 
judging the emotional significance of events (see Anderson & Phelps, 2001). 
In  particular,  it  has  been  found  that  it  plays  an  important  role  in  the 
formation of fearful memories (see Chiao et al., 2008). Crucially, evidence 
exists that the amygdala shows relatively less decline with age than many 
other brain regions (Mather, 2004). I also discussed in chapter 3 that despite 
considerable  experimental  work  on  Alzheimer's  disease,  the  underlying 
cognitive mechanisms as well as the precise localization of neuropathological 
changes critical for memory loss are still mostly unknown (see Carlesimo & 
Oscar-Berman, 1993). Taking this into consideration, I argued in chapters 3 
and 4 that one has to be highly critical of studies that jump to conclusions 
despite the apparent lack of evidence. Haist et al. (2001), for instance, state 
as  a  fact  that  the  hippocampus  and  related  structures  where  short-term 
memory is processed are damaged early in the process of Alzheimer’s disease. 
Hence  they  conclude  that  these  findings  support  the  idea  that  those 
individuals  with  mild  Alzheimer’s  can  successfully  use  implicit  memory   190 
(which  is  memory  without  conscious  awareness)  to  support  recognition. 
Acknowledging this as a fact, Ally, Gold & Buson (2009) thus state that this 
may  point  to  new  strategies  for  dealing  with  their  memory  problems.  A 
review of psychological literature on memory deficits in Alzheimer’s patients 
in chapter 4 provided similar examples of research where memory loss is 
taken  to  be  the  default  position.  Hence,  it  was  suggested  that  individuals 
display a deficit of explicit memory, as well as a deficiency of implicit memory 
for  verbal  and  visuoperceptual  material.  This  is  usually  measured  by  the 
various priming methods to some of which I referred in chapter 4.  
 
There is a strong tendency to study cognition hand-in-hand with progress in 
the  neurosciences.  Yet,  an  increasing  number  of  psychologists  have 
recognised  that  cognitive  skills  are  often  difficult  to  assess  under  lab 
conditions (see Eysenck & Keane, 1995). The discrepancy between people’s 
routine  cognitive  achievements  in  everyday  life  and  their  often  poor 
performance under lab conditions is evidence of the fact that, as Norman 
(1993) puts it, “the power of the unaided mind is highly overrated” (Norman, 
1993:  43).  Accordingly,  there  is  an  increasing  awareness  that  laboratory 
studies  have  to  be  supplemented  with  studies  of  ‘cognition  in  the  wild’ 
(Hutchins,  1995)  as  these  are  typically  done  in  a  perceptually  poor 
environment, facilitating recall which is not relevant to the subject.  
 
In  fact,  here  neurosciences  provide  evidence  that  Sacks  was  right  in  his 
assumption that we (better) remember events that involve us as an actor or 
interested  observer.  Cabeza  et  al.  (2004)  found  that  compared  with  the 
controlled  laboratory  condition,  controlled  recall  of  autobiographical 
memories  elicits  greater  activity  in  regions  associated  with  self-referential 
processing,  visual/  spatial  memory  and  recollection.  According  to  the 
authors, greater activation of self-referential areas is plausible because people 
are  more  involved  in  their  own  autobiographical  memories,  while  greater 
activation of the visual and spatial areas supports existing evidence that we 
remember  events  that  happen  in  the  real  world  with  more  vivid  sensory 
recall. Over the course of the observation I tried several times together with 
Elisabeta to get Wilma to memorize words with the help of a memory game 
(our visual priming method). This was always unsuccessful. However, I argue   191 
that data in this chapter provides evidence that if recall is studied as it occurs 
within Wilma’s everyday life a whole different story can be told. 
 
Although highly speculative, I suggest considering an alternative story which 
could possibly be called ‘Wilma’s very elaborate yet ‘ordinary’ rescue plan’. 
When  Wilma  takes  the  phone  she  yells  at  Edeltraud  “open”  and  “out”. 
Concerning  the  first  utterance,  I  hope  that  this  chapter  has  established 
enough evidence that we can confidently trust Wilma that she knew all the 
time  that  Edeltraud  had  the  key.  In  this  regard  her  action  could  be 
interpreted as ‘blackmailing’ Edeltraud. To understand the possible double 
function of the latter one (“out”) it is necessary to have more background 
knowledge about Edeltraud. We can see in the transcript that while holding 
the phone Wilma tells her “Do do ma you must for your man” (line 93). I said 
in the beginning of this chapter that this was my first meeting with Edeltraud. 
However, in the following weeks I twice more had the opportunity to spend 
time with the two of them and on both occasions Edeltraud used Wilma’s 
phone to call her boss. Once because Elisabeta needed her to stay 30 minutes 
longer than they initially had planned and she wanted to inform him. The 
second  time  she  used  the  phone  for  a  reason  that  concerned  her  work 
schedule.  
 
So for all we know Wilma knows that Edeltraud can call a man who knows 
that she is at Wilma’s place on Thursdays. Although highly speculative, under 
‘normal’ circumstances one would think that Wilma tells Edeltraud to inform 
her  boss  that  she  is  coming  back  earlier  than  planned  because  Wilma  is 
throwing her out. Treating Wilma like any other ‘normal’ human being there 
appears  a  striking  logic  in  her  emotional  responses:  First,  Edeltraud 
completely ignores her, talking to me all the time. Once Wilma seeks contact 
she lies to her saying that she does not have the keys and on top of it does not 
show any interest in what it was Wilma actually wanted to tell her. Getting 
angry seems to me a ‘normal’ response, just like a notably depressed mood 
and increased signs of distrust once Edeltraud wrestles with Wilma to get 
back the phone without even once inquiring why she took the phone in the 
first place. We can see that only after Edeltraud admits that she does have the   192 
key and starts to show some respect and interest in Wilma’s needs her mood 
brightens up significantly and she co-operates with Edeltraud.  
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Chapter 8, first of all, pursued and stressed the relevance of internal feedback 
which was discussed in chapter 7 in the light of conscious achievement of 
intrapersonal affective coherence. In the case of the nursing service employee 
Edeltraud, I argued that there is a clash between her proclaimed motivation 
and her internal feedback. I proposed an analysis borrowing Dalgleish and 
Power’s appraisal model (2007) from psychology. This way it could be shown 
that memory plays a crucial role in emotion appraisal processes. In order to 
identify situations as potentially threatening we saw that Edeltraud draws on 
prior  fearful  experiences  with  Wilma.  Establishing  specific  affective  cues 
based on a neuropsychological discussion, I then transferred insights to the 
social level of interactions. This was relevant to the analysis in a twofold way: 
after having established potentially meaningful cues, we could then see when 
participants signalled recognition and when not. In particular in the latter 
case  I  argued  that  psychology  offers  extensive  research  on  selective 
perception  and  the  effects  of  emotions  on  attention.  I  argued  that  these 
insights, though firmly rooted in cognitive psychology, can be well discussed 
and adapted to an embodied and distributed understanding of cognition. In 
fact, I do not think that it could do without this. In particular if we want to 
understand cognition according to one of the main tenets of this perspective 
which promotes the view that cognition is action at the service of adaptive 
behaviour.  
 
Following  Glenberg’s  model  I  presented  evidence  that  memory  is  at  the 
service of perception and action in a three-dimensional world. Contrary to 
the previous chapter, where the focus was on how memory affects emotions, 
the present one emphasised the interplay between both. In this chapter it 
could be shown that both Edeltraud’s and Wilma’s distrust result from shared 
learning processes. One aim of this chapter was to highlight the crucial role of 
emotions in these processes. Both Edeltraud and Wilma have learned to treat   193 
each other with suspicion, which means that conflict is very likely to occur. 
Once  a  conflict  does  happen,  reactions  are  potentially  inappropriate  and 
border on violent behaviour.    
 
 Discussing this chapter’s findings in the light of the previous one, maybe the 
most  important  insight  again  is  dysfunctional  communication.  Edeltraud 
does not share her highly negative emotional experiences with Elisabeta or 
Gudrun. Hence, no one knows and thus no one can help her. At the same 
time we get a feeling for what it means when Elisabeta says that ‘every day is 
different’ with Wilma. Once Edeltraud has left without briefing her about the 
events of that day Elisabeta wants to feed Wilma dinner. She tries all the 
strategies she has displayed in chapter 7 to get Wilma to eat but she simply 
does not want to. With regard to the emotional costs of having spent two 
hours with Edeltraud loss of appetite does not really seem Alzheimer-related 
in this situation. 
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Discussion of Findings  
&  
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  this  age  of  demographic  change,  Germany,  as  well  as  many  other 
countries, faces the challenge of an increasing number of elderly people living 
alone and requiring domestic help and/ or care. This study was motivated by 
the growing number of households in Germany that choose the ‘migrant-in-
the-family model’ (Bettio et al., 2006) to realise home eldercare. This trend is 
documented and manifested on the Discourse level in a twofold way. On the 
economic side, the employment agencies’ web-based marketing strategically 
employs the stereotypical ‘Polish warm heart’ to frame female Polish live-ins 
as  helpers  who  ‘replace  absent  family  members’.  In  academic  Discourse, 
established terms, such as the  New Maid (Lutz, 2002) and the emotional 
proletariat (Ibarra, 2002) dominate the “knowledge regime” (Foucault, 1982: 
212). In chapter 2, a review of contemporary research with migrant live-ins   195 
highlighted  Arlie  Hochschild’s  influential  framework  for  the  analysis  of 
emotion  management  strategies  in  emotional  labour  jobs.  This  concept 
stresses  the  crucial  role  of  appropriate  emotional  displays  in  service 
professions  while  also  considering  the  emotional  costs  of  doing  so. 
Subsequently, two case studies were introduced (Ibarra, 2002 and Degiuli, 
2007) to identify the short-comings of applying such an approach to research 
on interactions in home eldercare.  
 
Despite a proclaimed interest in relationships, my discussion concluded that 
a  subjectivist  perspective  is  applied  to  communication,  emotion  and 
cognition, as data is collected exclusively in individual interviews with live-
ins. Data analysis in these two studies then maps interactions onto above-
mentioned Discourse metaphors (Zinken, 2008), isolating live-ins as fictive 
kin,  and  potentially  missing  out  the  interactional  nature  of  adaptive 
processes, as well as experiential differences of all the interacting individuals 
who make up a ‘migrant-in-the-family’ household. Thereby, a homogeneous 
and  potentially  stigmatising  picture  of  ‘migrant-in-the-family’  realities  is 
perpetuated that provides little insight into the actual interactions which are 
understood  to  be  emotion  management  strategies.  This  is  particularly 
problematic since studies like Ibarra (2002) and Degiuli (2007) derive a set 
of care practices from their data. In order to test this approach on the basis of 
interactional  data  this  thesis  proposes  an  ethnographic  study  which  was 
guided by the following research questions:  
 
1.  How  do  the  individual  participants  describe  subjective  emotion 
management? 
 
2. How are emotion management strategies embodied in interactions? 
 
3. What impact do these strategies have for the manner in which care 
is provided for an Alzheimer’s patient who is in the late stages of the 
disease? 
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9.1. Discussion of Findings 
 
Having  identified  the  dominant  Discourses  on  migrant  live-ins  and 
Alzheimer’s patients in chapters 2 and 4, the aim of this study was to discover 
participants’ emotion management strategies in relation to their own, and in 
particular  shared  experiences,  and  not  pre-figure  strategies  based  on  the 
images perpetuated on the Discourse level. This decision is first of all based 
on the discussion of Ibarra’s and Degiuli’s work in chapter 2. Both studies 
share the method of  approaching emotion management simultaneously as 
public,  problem-focused  and  internal,  emotion-focused  and  thus  treat  the 
observed  coping  strategies  of  live-ins  as  care  strategies.  I  criticised  that 
mixing both perspectives is difficult because the presented data first of all 
only  allows  for  emotion-focused  analysis;  that  is  intrapersonal  emotion 
regulation. Ibarra gave, for instance, the example of Mrs. Archuleta who tried 
not to show disgust while changing a diaper, and we learned that her coping 
is based on prior experience because this is not the first time she changed a 
diaper.  
 
Secondly, I argued with Bandura (1978) that the person, the environment, 
and the behaviour constitute a dynamic system in which each element is both 
a cause and an effect of the others (triadic reciprocality). This perspective was 
further developed and explained in chapter 3 where a review of a number of 
studies in psychology concluded that research on emotions necessarily needs 
to consider this triadic reciprocality; in particular since care work inevitably 
implies  face-to-face  interaction.  Hence,  the  present  study  set  out  to  also 
include those voices which are present in interaction, yet absent in Ibarra’s 
work. It was stressed in chapter 2 that Ibarra and Degiuli nevertheless put the 
focus on relationships in their studies and make statements about the nature 
of these, in particular about hostile relationships between migrant live-ins 
and family members of the person cared for. Taking on board an interactional 
and embodied perspective, this thesis approached emotion management not 
only as an individual’s cognitive achievement but also as distributed social 
practice. Therefore, this study aimed to gain insight into a) how participants 
subjectively  describe,  b)  how  they  interactionally/  intersubjectively  co-  197 
construct  emotion  management,  and  c)  in  which  ways  this  affects  their 
relationships. 
 
In the first step of analysis, results reproduced Ibarra’s findings concerning 
the role of prior experience. It has  been shown that participants draw on 
individual  prior  (personal  or  professional)  experiences  to  develop  care 
strategies.  Following  Bartlett’s  notion  of  schemata,  emotion  displays  and 
feeding  strategies  were  discussed  in  the  light  of  Gudrun’s  and  Elisabeta’s 
individual experiences and attitude, in order to understand to what extent 
these have been translated into specific behaviour. Borrowing the concept of 
affective coherence (Centerbar et al., 2008) from psychology, I argued that 
analysis in chapter 7 could show that the strategies both women use allow for 
conclusions about the extent to which their actions are specific to their own 
goals and the overall aim to achieve intrapersonal coherence.  
 
However, my observation and participation in their interactions over time 
revealed that schemata are not static but subject to an on-going interactive 
learning  process  which  can  be  traced  within  the  interactions.  This  was 
achieved with the help of Harvey Sacks’s framework for the analysis of story-
telling, which incorporates his approach to memory and how remembering is 
at the service of conversation. I argued that a focus on the tapping of stories is 
an  appropriate  way  of  showing  that  participants  share  the  experience  of 
interaction  and  meaning-making,  instead  of  exclusively  subjectively 
appraising it. My analysis of a conversation between Elisabeta and Gudrun 
about  Wilma’s  eating  habits  revealed  that  the  two  main  carers  achieve 
temporary  common  ground  based  on  their  shared  experience  of  taking 
Wilma to a café. This is reflected on the verbal level but also in the positive 
alignment  in  bodily  displays  which  includes  a  synchronization  of  feeding 
styles. Yet, the process of coming to an agreement is markedly affected by 
their  conflicting  frames.  By  the  time  Elisabeta  moved  in,  Wilma  already 
exhibited  a  number  of  behavioural  changes  typical  of  the  early  stages  of 
Alzheimer’s disease. Thus, based on her experience and the changes she has 
witnessed while living with Wilma, to her Wilma’s eating habits are a clear 
marker of the disease and are, therefore, a disorder. This is in conflict with 
Gudrun’s care strategy that draws on biographical knowledge of her mother’s   198 
eating  habits.  Consequently,  Elisabeta’s  apparent  lack  of  biographical 
knowledge  about  Wilma  and  Gudrun’s  limited  knowledge  concerning  the 
day-to-day  business  of  living  with  her  mother  provoke  a  relationship 
mismatch between the two carers. The two women are not equal partners 
who discuss Wilma’s eating habits, but they embody different positions in the 
‘home  care  hierarchy’,  with  Gudrun,  as  Wilma’s  daughter  and  Elisabeta’s 
employer,  being  the  head.  I  will  come  back  to  this  further  down  in  the 
conclusion. 
 
Chapter 8, first of all, pursued and stressed the relevance of internal feedback 
which was discussed in chapter 7 in the light of conscious achievement of 
intrapersonal affective coherence. In the case of the nursing service employee 
Edeltraud,  I  proposed  that  there  is  a  clash  between  her  proclaimed 
motivation and her internal feedback. Using Edeltraud’s story about the day 
she had to take Wilma to the podiatrist as a compass to understand how she 
perceives the present situation, an analysis inspired by Dalgleish and Power’s 
emotion  appraisal  model  (2007)  revealed  that  her  subsequent  actions  are 
grounded  and  significantly  affected  by  fear  appraisal.  In  particular,  my 
analysis in this chapter showed that Edeltraud’s attention is fixed on specific 
situational and highly personal fear-inducing cues.  
 
Focussing on Wilma’s position in Edeltraud’s story, we learn that the feeling 
of fear on that day at the podiatrist’s was mutual. With the two women facing 
each other while Edeltraud narrates how she recalls this specific day, Wilma’s 
reactions to the linguistic and visible cues Edeltraud provides build up a set 
of cues which I interpret as the set of cues of their shared fear appraisal. As 
the interaction unfolds that follows the conclusion of the story, my analysis 
hence  draws  on  the  meaning  attached  to  these  cues  by  participants 
themselves. This way my analysis suggested that the two women co-construct 
the highly emotional and stressful conflict that occurs within minutes after 
Edeltraud finished her story as a re-enactment of their shared fear appraisal. 
In  chapter  3,  in  particular  the  weapons  effect  experiment  was  a  striking 
example how emotions are necessary to identify the aspects of the situation 
that are most important for survival and learning (Duclos & Laird, 2001). 
While one major strand in chapter 7 was to trace the subjective perspective   199 
on the emergence of specific care practices, chapter 8 showed how emotion 
informs  knowledge  formation  and  how  one  particular  emotion  (fear)  can 
serve as a knowledge source. I will come back to this in the following.  
 
 
 
 
9.2. Conclusions 
 
I  argue  that  this  study’s  analyses,  on  the  one  hand,  allow  for  conclusions 
concerning the role of memory and emotion in the way in which participants 
subjectively and consciously frame the home care situation. On the other, I 
stressed the interdependent, situated nature of remembering. Data analysis 
has  shown  that  Wilma’s  two  main  carers,  her  daughter  Gudrun  and  the 
Polish nurse Elisabeta frame the live-in situation and their relationship to 
Wilma  through  different  experiences:  personal  experiences  and  childhood 
memories in the case of Gudrun, professional experiences and everyday care 
interaction in the case of Elisabeta. The frames they apply are a result of an 
on-going adaptive learning process that is closely linked with the progression 
of Wilma’s disease.  
 
Gudrun’s actions give insight into the way she frames the home care situation 
and  in  particular  to  what  extent  these  are  own-goal-specific  actions.  She 
prioritises the preservation of a ‘shell of normalcy’, restoring a past version of 
Wilma  in  her  interactions  with  Elisabeta  based  on  her  biographical 
knowledge. In fact, biographical knowledge seems to be her primary source 
which then in turn informs emotional behaviour. Here, we can see a parallel 
to how Mrs. Archuleta (Ibarra, 2002) describes her coping strategies. Yet, a 
focus on change of post-appraisal responses (e.g., change facial expression, 
suppress disgust) as in Degiuli (2007) and Ibarra (2002) is not enough since 
emotional  episodes  carry  valuable  information.  I  claimed  that  Edeltraud 
regulates  her  emotions  to  prevent  confrontation,  and  thus  possibly 
anticipates  an  emotion,  while  simultaneously  coping  with  her  assumed 
growing  anxiety  which  in  turn  is  a  response.  Although  very  speculative,  I 
argue that her responses include changing the situation, for instance when   200 
she changes her tone to a friendly voice after a conflict occurred. Also there 
were  several  instances  in  the  data  where  she  avoided  situations  that 
potentially  increase  her  anxiety.  One  strategy  of  avoidance  was  to  ignore 
Wilma’s trouble-indicating behaviour which was indicated by Wilma’s tone of 
voice or facial expressions. Gudrun, on the other hand, shifted her attention 
to  Wilma  every  single  time  she  signalled  a  change  in  mood.  Contrary  to 
Edeltraud who had spent only little time with Wilma and where the fearful 
experience  itself  seems  to  be  the  source  for  knowledge,  Gudrun  has  no 
problems  adapting  to  mood  swings  since  she  uses  her  biographical 
knowledge for ad hoc coping strategies. 
 
Finally, my analysis in chapter 7 showed that the distribution of knowledge 
between the two main carers, Gudrun and Elisabeta, is uneven. The apparent 
lack of communication of biographical knowledge about Wilma, on the one 
hand, and knowledge concerning the day-to-day business of living with her, 
on the other, provoke a relationship mismatch between Gudrun and Elisabeta 
that  affects  negotiations  of  changes  within  the  home  care  arrangement  in 
order to best meet Wilma’s needs. In the care of Wilma, Gudrun prioritises 
comfort  and  life  quality  in  her  mother’s  care,  but  a  certain  amount  of 
‘blindness to the facts’ makes her the one who potentially prevents changes 
which may improve Wilma’s quality of life. Gudrun is focused on who Wilma 
once was and rejects certain crucial changes that her disease entails. Being 
the one who lives with Wilma, Elisabeta’s opinions and views are therefore 
essential.  
 
Yet,  the  process  of  communicating,  negotiating  and  prioritising 
interpretations of Wilma’s behaviour in order to assure the best possible care 
is potentially problematic. Enfield (2011) explains this uneven distribution of 
knowledge in relation to power in the following way: “source-based authority 
concerns  actual  experience  and  what  it  enables  (…)  namely,  the  range  of 
things I can say or do as a result of that knowledge” (Enfield, 2011: 300). He 
continues that “by contrast,  status-based authority concerns not what you 
actually know, but what you should know, or are entitled to know, given your 
status (Drew, 1991: 37ff.)” (ibid: 301, emphasis in the original). We saw in 
chapter  7  that  this  status  asymmetry  between  Elisabeta  and  Gudrun  is   201 
apparent throughout the whole interaction. We learn from Ibarra (2002) and 
Degiuli  (2007)  that  relationships  between  migrant  live-ins  and  family 
members can become hostile. Yet, the difference in my study is that Wilma 
and all of her children live in the same town. I mentioned earlier that both 
her daughters visit her once a week. Whereas Mrs. Archuleta in Ibarra (2002) 
claimed the authority to make crucial decisions because family members did 
not  live  nearby,  Elisabeta’s  situation  is  completely  different.  We  saw  in 
chapter  7  how  she  tried  to  discuss  Wilma’s  eating  habits  from  a  medical 
perspective  with  Gudrun  who  in  turn  immediately  positioned  herself  as 
Wilma’s daughter who has known her mother’s eating habits for decades. 
Since Wilma was actually losing weight, Elisabeta reported Wilma’s eating 
habits  and  consequential  loss  of  weight  in  the  end  to  the  nursing  service 
employees who assist her twice a day. Gudrun then did consult the nursing 
service employees, who then, in turn, organised a regular weight check for 
Wilma together with Elisabeta. 
 
External nursing employees thus can function as mediators between migrant 
live-ins and the family members. However, in the case of Edeltraud it became 
apparent  that  a  structured  way  of  distributing  knowledge  between  all  the 
individuals involved in a home care system will not only help assess more 
appropriately the quality of life and needs of the person cared for, but also 
help  the  individuals  to  cope  emotionally.  Compared  with  Elisabeta  and 
Gudrun who got to know Wilma over the span of several years, Edeltraud has 
very  little  experience.  However,  since  she  neither  had  the  opportunity  to 
discuss  with  Gudrun  those  fearful  experiences  she  had  with  Wilma,  nor 
reported it to Elisabeta once she returned and took over again, she is isolated 
within the network in a way that is not only detrimental to her own wellbeing 
but also to Wilma’s.  
 
Essentially, family members must provide the live-ins and also the nursing 
service  employees  with  sufficient  biographical  information  about  the  care 
recipient and also essential information concerning the progression of the 
disease. At the same time live-ins and nursing service employees must keep 
the family and each other informed on a regular basis about their everyday 
life with the patient. A focus on shared care biographies should also help to   202 
avoid a generalisation of emotional episodes as Alzheimer-related personality 
changes, e.g., visciousness is a symptom of the disease. 
 
Contrary to the Discourse perpetuated by the employment agencies, migrant 
live-ins do not simply ‘replace’ absent family members. They fill a crucial gap 
in the provision of home eldercare. However, they rely on assistance and the 
organised distribution of knowledge in order to achieve – as part of a network 
– the best possible environment for the person in need of care. Applied to 
care work, it has been shown in chapter 2 that in outlining a set of strategies 
for the emotion work of live-in care workers, there is a risk of prioritising the 
positioning  of  one’s  research  along  the  lines  of  the  innateness  dilemma 
sketched out. I argued that in certain studies the symbols therefore attract a 
lot  more  attention  and  hence  analysis  is  preoccupied  with  the  discursive 
constructs and definitions (e.g., kinship term), and not reality itself. We need 
awareness  that  these  relationships  are  constant  learning  and  adaptation 
processes which have to be promoted through advice and moral support.  
 
 
 
 
9.3. Limitations & Implications for Future Research 
 
The  form  in  which  data  is  presented  in  this  study  highlights  a  significant 
problem.  On  the  one  hand,  a  sequential  order  of  events  is  useful  to 
understand contributions within a framework for the analysis of story-telling. 
Yet, this overly puts the focus on verbal language and potentially distracts 
attention from the multimodality participants make use of to create meaning 
and  understanding.  Therefore,  to  conceptualise  ‘remembering’  as  an 
utterance-by-utterance  phenomenon  inevitably  does  not  fully  capture  the 
intersubjective  understanding  of  emotions,  as  facial,  vocal  and  gestural 
responses happen within “temporal frames that are much shorter than those 
of  microsociological  interaction”  (Steffensen  &  Cowley,2010:  213).  Since  I 
was not allowed to film interactions and had to rely on my written notes on 
nonverbal behaviour and affective expressions, the findings and conclusions 
presented in this study remain tentative.    203 
 
Yet,  I  hope  that  this  study  despite  its  limitations  draws  attention  to  an 
alarming  lack  of  ethnographic  studies  in  the  field  of  health  care.  An 
increasing number of psychologists have recognised that cognitive skills are 
often difficult to assess under lab conditions (see Eysenck & Keane, 1995). 
The discrepancy between people’s routine cognitive achievements in everyday 
life and their often poor performance under lab conditions is evidence of the 
fact that, as Norman (1993) puts it, “the power of the unaided mind is highly 
overrated” (Norman, 1993: 43). Cognition thus needs to be studied ‘in the 
wild’ (Hutchins, 1995) with the methods of social scientists, since it involves 
language and social interaction.  
 
Based  on  ethnographic  methods  researchers  are  able  to  provide  a 
thoroughness and thickness of description of how meaning and remembering 
evolves  dialogically  rather  than  by  essentialising  the  self.  Kitwood  (1990) 
highlighted the importance of relationships with Alzheimer’s patients. Since 
in the advanced stage of the disease medication that aims to increase brain 
activity shows to-date little effect, it is crucial to produce further empirical 
data  on  the  lived  relationships  in  this  stage,  as  the  environment  and 
relationships become most important. At the same time, there is a need to 
produce more studies that stress the alternatives to verbal communication 
(e.g.,  touch,  olfactory  stimulation,  etc.),  because  these  studies  (and 
corresponding care practices) help restore the voice of those whose verbal 
language is long lost.  
 
Therefore,  my  goal  in  this  thesis  was  to  suggest  that  an  embodied  and 
distributed perspective on cognition and emotion potentially contributes to 
ethnographic  research  in  general,  and  the  study  of  multi-party  groups 
including  Alzheimer’s  patients  in  particular.  A  paradigm  that  no  longer 
assumes the independence of participant’s cognition, emotion and actions, 
will greatly contribute to far more heterogeneous research on ‘migrant-in-
the-family’ interactions, as well as research on interactions with Alzheimer’s 
patients. 
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[A] Appendix: Transcription conventions 
 
 
 
<word>  comment on articulation 
=    simultaneous talk; more than one person is speaking at a time 
(word)  body posture, activity, nonverbal communication 
(.)    micro pause, less than one second long 
wo: rd   lengthening of a syllable 
x    inaudible syllables 
↑    rising tone 
WOrd   stressed articulation 
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[B] Appendix: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Researcher:  Hilke Engfer, University of Southampton/ UK 
Ethics Number: RGORef5520 
 
Preliminary Study Title: Constructions of identities and mental borders between 
Female Polish care workers and elderly Germans in the German-Dutch. 
 
 
Please read this information carefully before deciding to take part in this 
research. If you are happy to participate you will be asked to sign a 
consent form. 
 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
 
-  I chose you because of your unique life history and experiences. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
-  We will agree together upon the length of the interview and whether there 
will be a follow up. The interview will be semi-structured, which means that I 
thought about questions prior to the interview. Many questions are very 
general so that there is enough space for spontaneity, and of course you also 
have the opportunity to ask me questions, to reject questions, to actively 
create the conversation and, of course, to end it at any time. If you agree, I 
will record the interview.   
 
Are there any benefits in my taking part? 
 
-  In this age of demographic change, Germany, as well as almost every other 
European country, faces the challenge of an increasing number of elderly 
people living alone and requiring domestic help and care. Considering the 
hundreds of thousands of households in Germany, where migrant care 
workers form the backbone of familial care, I think that it is most important   206 
and overdue to talk to those involved, and to get to know their various 
experiences, in order to stimulate and influence policy making processes. 
 
Are there any risks involved? 
 
-  I understand that discretion and anonymity are of most importance. I assure 
you that I will handle your data with greatest care and discretion. You will 
have to sign a consent form before we start the interview, but I will not ask 
you to give me detailed information about your date and place of birth, or 
your address in Germany or Poland. 
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
 
-  As stated above, I will guarantee your anonymity. There are clearly defined 
rules – the Data Protection Act/ University policy - concerning the storage of 
your data. I will code your data, which means that I will change your name 
and place names in order to make it impossible for third persons to draw any 
connections between you and my notes. Furthermore, data will be kept on a 
password-protected computer. If we agree to record the interview on mini 
discs, I will delete the recordings as soon as I transcribed the interview.  
 
What happens if I change my mind? 
 
-  You have the right to withdraw at any time and without explaining the 
reasons for your withdrawal. 
 
If you have any other questions please ask me! 
 
If you are interested in the results of my study, we could arrange a presentation or I 
could send you a copy / short version of my dissertation. But you have to be patient: 
I have just started! 
 
Thank you very much for your help! 
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[C] Appendix: Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Name: 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Name of Researcher: Hilke Engfer, University of Southampton/ UK 
Ethics Reference: RGORef5520  
 
Preliminary  Study  Title:  Constructions  of  identities  and  mental  borders 
between female Polish care workers and elderly Germans.  
 
I  have  read  and  understood  the  information  sheet  and  have  had  the 
opportunity to ask questions about the study.  
 
I understand my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time 
without my  
legal rights being affected.  
 
I agree to take part in this research project and agree for my data to be used 
for the purpose of this study. I understand that my data will be anonymised. 
 
I understand that the interview will only be tape recorded if I agree. 
 
I received of a copy of this consent form. 
 
 
 
Date                                                     Signature of Participant 
 
Date                                                     Signature of Researcher 
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[D] Appendix: Consent Form – German version 
 
Einverständniserklärung 
 
Von:_________________________________________________ 
 
zur  Teilnahme  an  der  Studie  von  Hilke  Engfer  im  Rahmen  ihres 
Dissertationsprojekts an der Universtät Southampton: 
 
Constructions of identities and mental borders between female Polish care workers 
and elderly Germans.  
 
Ich wurde von der verantwortlichen Person vollständig über Inhalt, Bedeutung und 
Tragweite des Projekts aufgeklärt. Ich hatte die Möglichkeit Fragen zu stellen und 
habe  die  Antworten  verstanden  und  akzeptiere  sie.  Ich  bin  über  die  mit  der 
Teilnahme an der Studie verbundenen Risiken und auch über den möglichen Nutzen 
informiert.  Ich  hatte  ausreichend  Zeit,  mich  zur  Teilnahme  an  dieser  Studie  zu 
entscheiden und weiß, dass die Teilnahme daran freiwillig ist. Ich weiß, dass ich 
jederzeit und ohne Angabe von Gründen diese Zustimmung widerrufen kann, ohne 
dass sich dieser Entschluss nachteilig auf mich auswirken wird.  
 
Mir ist bekannt, dass meine persönlichen Daten in verschlüsselter Form  gespeichert 
werden. Die Interviews werden in einem geschützten Rahmen stattfinden und alle 
Informationen werden mit größter Sorgfalt und Diskretion behandelt. Somit kann 
kein Rückschluss auf die TeilnehmerIn oder die Institution gezogen werden.  
 
Bei  Interesse  können  die  Ergebnisse  der  Studie  von  den  TeilnehmerInnen 
eingesehen  werden.  Sofern  Aufnahmegeräte  während  der  Interviews  benutzt 
werden, bedarf das meiner zusätzlichen Zustimmung.  
 
Ich  habe  eine  Kopie  dieser  Einwilligungserklärung  erhalten  und  erkläre  hiermit 
meine freiwillige Teilnahme an dieser Studie. 
 
Ort und Datum                      Unterschrift des/ der Mitwirkenden an der Studie  
 
Ort und Datum                      Unterschrift  der Projektverantwortlichen  
   209 
Bibliography 
 
 
Adelmann, P. K. (1995): Emotional labor as a potential source of job stress. 
In S. L. Sauter & L. R. Murphy (Eds.), Organizational risk factors for job 
stress, Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, pp. 371 – 381. 
Anderson,  B.  (2000):  Doing  the  Dirty  Work?  The  Global  Politics  of 
Domestic Labour, London and New York: Zed Books. 
 
Anderson,  B.  &  Phizacklea,  A.  (1997):  Migrant  domestic  workers  -  A 
European perspective, Report to the Equal Opportunities Unit, EU, Brussels. 
 
Anderson,  C.  A.  &  Bushman,  B.  J.  (2002):  Human  Aggression,  Annual 
Review of Psychology, 53, pp. 27-51. 
 
Anderson,  A.K.,  &  Phelps,  E.A.  (2001):  Lesions  of  the  human  amygdala 
impair enhanced perception of emotionally salient events, Nature, 411, pp. 
305-309. 
 
Antaki,  C.,  Billig,  M.,  Edwards,  D.,  Potter,  J.  (2003):  Discourse  analysis 
means  doing  analysis:  A  critique  of  six  analytic  shortcomings,  Discourse 
Analysis Online, 1 (1).  
 
Appell, J., Kertesz, A., Fishman, M. (1982): A study of language functioning 
in Alzheimer’s patients, Brain and Language, 17, pp. 73-91. 
 
Armbruster, H. & Laerke, A. (Eds.) (2008): Taking Sides: Ethics, Politics, 
and Fieldwork in Anthropology, Berghahn Books. 
 
Ashforth, B. E., & Humphrey, R. H. (1993): Emotional labor in service roles: 
the influence of identity, Academy of Management Review, 18(1), pp. 88-115. 
 
Baltes, P. B., & Mayer, K. U. (Eds.) (1999): The Berlin Aging Study: Aging 
from 70 to 100, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baltes, P. B. & Smith, J. (2003): New frontiers in the future of aging: From 
successful  aging  of  the  young  old  to  the  dilemmas  of  the  Fourth  Age, 
Gerontology, 49 (2), pp. 123-135. 
 
Bandura, A. (1978): The self system in reciprocal determinism, American 
Psychologist, 33, pp. 344-358. 
   210 
Basting, A. (2003): Looking back from loss: views of the self in Alzheimer’s 
disease, Journal of Aging Studies, 17, pp. 87-99. 
 
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., Burrows, L. (1996): Automaticity of Social Behavior: 
Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation of Action, Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, (2), pp. 230-244. 
 
Barsalou,  L.  W.  (2008):  Grounded  Cognition,  Annual  Review  of 
Psychology, 59, pp. 617-645. 
 
Barsalou, L. W., Niedenthal, P. M., Barbey, A., Ruppert, J. (2003): Social 
embodiment. In Ross, B. (Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 
Vol. 43, San Diego: Academic Press Inc., pp. 43-92. 
 
Bartholow,  B.  D.,  Anderson,  C.  A.,  Carnagey,  N.  L.,  Benjamin  Jr.,  A.  J. 
(2005):  Interactive  effects  of  life  experience  and  situational  cues  on 
aggression: The weapons priming effect in hunters and nonhunters, Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, pp. 48-60. 
 
Bartlett,  F.  C.  (1920):  Experiments  on  the  Reproduction  of  Folk-Stories, 
Folklore, 31(1), pp. 30-47. 
 
Bartlett, F. C. (1932): Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social 
Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Bassett,  R.,  Graham,  J.  (2007):  Memorabilities:  Enduring  Relationships, 
Memories and Abilities in Dementia. Ageing & Society, 27, pp. 553 – 554. 
 
Bateson, G. (1967): Cybernetic Explanation, American Behavioral Scientist, 
10(8), pp. 29–32. 
 
Becker, J. (2010): Erdbeerpflücker, Spargelstecher, Erntehelfer. Polnische 
Saisonarbeiter  in  Deutschland  –  temporäre  Arbeitsmigration  im  neuen 
Europa, Bielefeld: transcript. 
 
Bender, M. P., Cheston, R. (1997): Inhabitants of a Lost Kingdom: A Model 
of the Subjective Experiences of Dementia, Ageing & Society, 17, pp. 513 – 
532. 
 
Bettio, F., Simonazzi, A., Villa, P. (2006): Change in care regimes and female 
migration: the care drain in the Mediterranean, Journal of European Social 
Policy, 16(3), pp. 271-285. 
   211 
Blackman, D. K., Howe, M., Pinkston, E. M. (1976): Increasing participation 
in social interaction of the institutionalized elderly, The Gerontologist, 16, pp. 
69-76. 
 
Blommaert,  J.  (2005):  Bourdieu  the  ethnographer:  The  ethnographic 
grounding of habitus and voice, The Translator, 11(2), pp. 219-236.  
 
Blommaert, J., Huang, A. (2009): Historical bodies and historical spaces, 
Journal of Applied Linguistics, 6(3), pp. 267-282. 
 
BMFSFJ (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend): 
Alter und Gesellschaft. Fünfter Bericht zur Lage der älteren Generation in 
Deutschland, Berlin: BMFSFJ, 2005. 
 
Böck,  M.  (2004):  Family  snaps:  Life  worlds  and  information  habitus, 
Journal of Visual Communication, 3(3), pp. 281–293. 
 
Bolton, S. C., Boyd, C. (2003): Trolley dolly or skilled emotion manager? 
Moving on from Hochschild’s Managed Heart, Work, Employment & Society, 
17, pp. 289-308. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1977): Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1990): The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Bourgeois,  M.  S.  (1990):  Enhancing  conversation  skills  in  patients  with 
Alzheimer’s  disease  using  a  prosthetic  memory  aid,  Journal  of  Applied 
Behavior Analysis, 23(1), pp. 29-42. 
 
Brown, R. W. (1973): A first language: The early stages, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Buck, R. (1980): Nonverbal behaviour and the theory of emotion: the facial 
feedback hypothesis, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38, pp. 
811-824. 
 
Cabeza, R., Prince, E. E., Daselaar, S. M., Greenberg, D., Budde, M., Dolcos, 
F., LaBar, K. S., Rubin, D. C. (2004): Brain activity during episodic retrieval 
of  autobiographical  and  laboratory  events:  An  fMRI  study  using  a  novel 
photo paradigm, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, pp. 1533-1594. 
 
Cañamero,  L.  &  Murphy,  H.  (2010):  Robots  That  Develop  Emotions  in 
Interaction with Humans, Press release 12/08/2010,   212 
http://www.herts.ac.uk/news-and-events/latest-news/Robots-That-Develop-
Emotions-in-Interaction-with-Humans.cfm 
last accessed 13/04/2011. 
 
Cantor, N. & Kihlstrom, J. F. (Eds.) (1981): Personality, cognition, and social 
interaction. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Carlesimo,  G.  A.  &  Oscar-Berman,  M.  (1993):  Memory  deficits  in 
Alzheimer’s disease: A comprehensive review, Neuropsychology Review, 3, 
pp. 119-169. 
 
Carstensen,  L.  L.  &  Erickson,  R.  E.  (1986):  Enhancing  the  social 
environments  of  elderly  nursing  home  residents:  Are  high  rates  of 
interactions enough? Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 19, pp. 349-355. 
 
Centerbar, D. B., Clore, G. L., Schnall, S., Garvin, E. D. (2008): Affective 
Incoherence:  When  Affective  Concepts  and  Embodied  Reactions  Clash, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(4), pp. 560-578. 
 
Cheston, R. & Bender, M. (1999): Understanding Dementia: The Man with 
the Worried Eyes, Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley. 
 
Chiao,  J.  Y.,  Iidaka,  T.,  Gordon,  H.  L.,  Nogawa,  J.,  Bar,  M.,  Aminoff,  E. 
(2008): Cultural specificity in amygdala response to fear faces,  Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, pp. 2167-2174. 
 
Clark, A. (1999): Embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. In Betchel, 
W., Graham, G., A Companion to Cognitive Science, Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, pp. 506-518. 
 
Clarke, C. & Keady, J. (2002): Getting down to brass tacks; a discussion of 
data  collection  with  people  with  dementia.  In  Wilkinson,  H.  (Ed.),  The 
Perspectives of People with Dementia, Research Methods and Motivations, 
London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, pp. 25-47. 
 
Clore, G. L., Wyer, R. S., Dieners, B., Gapser, K., Gohm, C., Isbell, L. (2001): 
Affective feelings as feedback: Some cognitive consequences. In Martin, L. L. 
& Clore, G. L. (Eds.), Theories of mood and cognition: A user’s handbook. 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 27-62. 
 
Clore,  G.  L.  &  Schnall,  S.  (2005):  The  influence  of  affect  on  attitude.  In 
Albarracín,  D.  &  Johnson,  B.  (Eds.),  Handbook  of  attitudes  and  attitude 
change: Basic Principles, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 437-489.  
   213 
Cohen,  D.  (1991):  The  subjective  experience  of  Alzheimer’s  disease:  The 
anatomy  of  an  illness  as  perceived  by  patients  and  families,  American 
Journal of Alzheimer’s Care and Related Disease and Research, 6(3), pp. 6-
11. 
 
Cohen, D. & Eisdorfer, C. (1986): The loss of self, New York: Norton and 
Company. 
 
Colombetti,  G.  &  Thompson,  E.  (2007):  The  feeling  body:  Towards  an 
enactive approach to emotion. In Overton, W. F., Müller, U. & Newman, J. 
(Eds.),  Developmental  perspectives  on  embodiment  and  consciousness. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 45-69. 
 
Comer, R. R. F. (1979): Cue utilization in the self-attribution of emotions 
and attitudes, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5, pp. 320-324. 
 
Coulter, J. (1999): Discourse and Mind, Human Studies, 22, pp.168-181.  
 
Coupland,  N.,  Nussbaum,  J.  F.,  Grossman,  A.  (1993):  ‘Introduction: 
Discourse, selfhood, and the lifespan’. In Coupland, N. & Nussbaum, J. F. 
(Eds.), Discourse and lifespan identity, Newbury Park, California: Sage, pp. 
x-xxvii. 
 
Cowdell,  F.  (2006):  Preserving  personhood  in  dementia  research:  a 
literature review, International Journal of Older People Nursing, 1(2), pp. 
85-94. 
 
Cowley,  S.  (2006):  Bridges  to  history:  biomechanical  constraints  in 
language. In Love, N. (Ed.), Integrational linguistics and history, London: 
Routledge, pp. 200-223. 
 
Cowley,  S.  (2007):  How  human  infants  deal  with  symbol  grounding, 
Interaction Studies, 8(1), pp. 81-104. 
 
Cowley, S. & Love, N. (2006): Language and cognition, or, how to avoid the 
conduit metaphor. In Duszak, A. & Okulska, U. (Eds.), Bridges and Walls in 
Metalinguistic Discourse, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 135-154. 
 
Crisp,  J.  (1999):  Towards  a  partnership  in  maintaining  personhood.  In 
Adams,  T.,  Clarke,  C.  L.  (Eds.):  Dementia  Care,  Harcourt  Brace  and 
Company Limited, pp. 95-121. 
 
Dalgleish, T. & Power, M. J. (2007): Cognition and Emotion: from order to 
disorder. Taylor & Francis e-Library. 
   214 
Damasio, A. R. (1994): Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human 
brain, New York: Avon.   
 
Damasio, A. R. (2003): Looking for Spinoza, Orlando: Harcourt.  
 
Damasio,  A.  R.  &  Damasio,  H.  (1992):  Brain  and  language,  Scientific 
American, 267, pp. 88-95. 
 
Davis, M. H. (1983): Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence 
for  a  multidimensional  approach,  Journal  of  Personality  and  Social 
Psychology, 44, pp. 113-126. 
 
Degiuli, F. (2007): A Job with No Boundaries. Home Eldercare  Work in 
Italy, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 14, pp. 193-207. 
 
Deleuze, G. (1988): Foucault, London: Athlone Press.  
 
Destatis (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland): Durchschnittliche 
Kinderzahl 2008 in den neuen Ländern angestiegen, Pressemitteilung Nr. 
034 vom 27.01.2010. 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Pre
sse/pm/2010/01/PD10__034__12641,templateId=renderPrint.psml  
last accessed on 13/04/2011. 
 
Dijk van, T. (1977): Context and Cognition: Knowledge frames and speech 
act comprehension, Journal of Pragmatics, 1, pp. 211-232. 
 
Dijk van, T. (2008): Discourse and Context: A Socio-Cognitive Approach. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Downing,  G.  (2000):  Emotion  theory  reconsidered.  In  Wrathall,  M.  & 
Malpas, J. (Eds.), Heidegger, coping, and cognitive science: Essays in honor 
of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Volume 2, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 245-270. 
 
Drew, P., Heritage, J. (Eds.) (1992): Talk at work, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Duclos,  S.  E.  &  Laird,  J.  D.  (2001):  The  deliberate  control  of  emotion 
ecperience through control of expressions, Cognition and Emotion, 15(1), pp. 
27-56. 
 
Duncan, S. D. & Fiske, D. W. (1977): Face-to-face inter action: Research, 
methods, and theory, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Dupuis,  S.  L.,  Norris,  J.  E.  (1997):  A  multidimensional  and  contextual 
framework  for  understanding  diverse  family  members’  roles  in  long-term 
care facilities, Journal of Ageing Studies, 11, pp. 297-325.   215 
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959): The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the 
organization of behaviour, Psychological Review, 66, pp. 183-201. 
 
Edwards, D. (1997): Discourse and Cognition. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage. 
 
Edwards,  D.  (2006):  Discourse,  cognition  and  social  practices:  the  rich 
surface of language and social interaction, Discourse Studies, 8(1), pp. 41-49. 
 
Edwards, D. & Potter, J. (1992): Discursive Psychology, London: Sage. 
 
Ekman,  P.  &  Friesen,  W.  V.  (1976):  Pictures  of  facial  affect,  Consulting 
Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA. 
 
Ekman,  P.  &  Friesen,  W.  V.  (1982):  Felt,  false,  and  miserable  smiles, 
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 6, pp. 238-252. 
 
Enfield,  N.  J.  (2011):  Sources  of  asymmetry  in  human  interaction: 
Enchrony,  status,  knowledge  and  agency.  In  Stivers,  T.,  Mondada,  L.  & 
Steensig, J. (eds.), The morality of knowledge in conversation, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 285-312. 
 
Engfer, H. (2009): Polnische Betreuerinnen in der häuslichen Altenpflege in 
Deutschland – eine interdiskursive Perspektive. In Röskau-Rydel, I., Fischer, 
P., Kerski, B., Ruchniewicz, K., Krzoska, M., Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft 
Bundesverband  e.V.    (Eds.),  Inter  Finitimos  –  Jahrbuch  zur  deutsch-
polnischen Beziehungsgeschichte, 6, Osnabrück: fibre Verlag, pp. 291-294. 
 
Engfer, H. (2011): Cake or Meat? A Case Study on Dinner Conversations in a 
German  Migrant-in-the-Family  Household,  in  Backhaus,  P.  (Ed.), 
Communication  in  Elderly  Care:  Cross-cultural  approaches,  London: 
Continuum, pp. 112-129. 
 
Eysenck, M. W. & Keane, M. T. (1995): Cognitive Psychology: A Student’s 
Handbook (3rd Edition), Lawrence Erlbaum. 
  
Fazio,  R,  H.,  Chen,  J.,  McDonel,  E.  C.,  Sherman,  S.  J.  (1982):  Attitude 
accessibility, attitude – behaviour consistency, and the strength of the object 
– evaluation association, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18, pp. 
339-357. 
 
Feil, N. (1999): Current Concepts and Techniques in Validation Therapy. In 
Duffy,  M.  (Ed.),  Handbook  of  Counseling  and  Psychotherapy  with  Older 
Adults, New York: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 590-613. 
   216 
Finali, G., Piccirilli,  M., Oliani, C., Piccinin, G. L. (1992): Alzheimer-type 
dementia and verbal memory performances: influence of selegiline therapy, 
Italian Journal of Neurological Sciences, 13(2), pp. 141-148. 
 
Fiske, A, P. (1992): The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a 
unified theory of social relations, Psychological Review, 99, pp. 689-723. 
Foucault,  M.  (1982):  The  Archaeology  of  Knowledge,  London:  Tavistock 
Publications. 
 
Freedman, J. L. & Fraser, S. C. (1966): Compliance without pressure: The 
foot-in-the-door technique, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 
pp. 195-202. 
 
Fussek, C. & Loerzer, S. (2005): Alt und abgeschoben. Der Pflegenotstand 
und die Würde des Menschen, Freiburg: Herder. 
 
Fussell,  S.  R.,  Krauss,  R.  M.  (1992):  Coordination  of  knowledge  in 
communication: Effects of speakers’ assumptions about what others know, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, pp. 378-391. 
 
Garfinkel,  H.  (1963):  A  conception  of,  and  experiment  with  “trust”  as  a 
condition of stable concerted actions. In Harvey, O. J. (Ed.), Motivation and 
Social Interaction, New York: The Ronald Press Company, pp. 187-283. 
 
Garnefski,  N.,  Teerds,  J.,  Kraaij,  V.,  Legerstee,  J.,  Kommer  van  den,  T. 
(2004): Cognitive emotion regulation strategies and depressive symptoms: 
differences  between  males  and  females,  Personality  and  Individual 
Differences, 36, pp. 267-276. 
 
Gee, J. P. (1990): Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology in Discourses, 
New York: Falmer Press. 
 
Gentry, R. A. & Fisher, J. E. (2007): Facilitating Conversation in Elderly 
Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease, Clinical Gerontologist, 31(2), pp. 77-98. 
 
Gibbs,  R.:  The  Poetics  of  Mind,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
1994. 
 
Givens,  D.  (2005):  Love  Signals:  A  Practical  Field  Guide  to  the  Body 
Language of Courtship, New York: St. Martin’s Press.   
 
Givens,  D.  (2008):  Crime  Signals:  How  to  Spot  a  Criminal Before  You 
Become a Victim, New York: St. Martin’s Press.   
   217 
Givens, D. (2009): Office Signals: What Corporate Walls Would Say If They 
Could Talk, New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
 
Glenberg, A. (1997): What memory is for, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
20, pp. 1-55. 
 
Glucksmann, M. & Lyon, D. (2006): Configurations of Care Work: Paid and 
Unpaid  Elder  Care  in  Italy  and  the  Netherlands,  Sociological  Research 
Online, 11(2). 
 
Golander,  H.  &  Raz  A.  E.  (1996):  The  mask  of  dementia:  Images  of 
demented residents in a nursing home, Ageing and Society, 16(3), pp. 269-
285. 
 
Golper, L. A. C. & Rau, M. T. (1983): Systematic analysis of cuing strategies 
in aphasia: Taking your ‘cue’ from the patient. In Brookshire, R. H. (Ed.), 
Clinical Aphasiology Conference Proceedings, 13, Minneapolis: BRK, pp. 52-
61. 
 
Goffman, E. (1959): The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York: 
Anchor Books. 
 
Goffman, E. (1967): On face-work: An analysis of ritual elements in social 
interaction. In Goffman, E. (Ed.), Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face 
Behavior, New York: Anchor Books, pp. 5-46. 
 
Goodwin,  C.  (1981):  Conversational  organization:  Interaction  between 
speakers and hearers, New York: Academic Press. 
 
Goodwin,  C.  (1992):  Professional  Vision,  American  Anthropologist,  New 
Series, 96(3), pp. 606-633. 
 
Goodwin,  C.  (1995):  Co-Constructing  Meaning  in  Conversations  with  an 
Aphasic Man, Research on Language and Social Interaction, 28(3), pp. 233-
260. 
 
Goodwin,  C.  (2000):  Action  and  embodiment  within  situated  human 
interaction, Journal of Pragmatics, 32, pp. 1489-1522. 
 
Goodwin, C. (2002): Conversational Frameworks for the Accomplishment 
of  Meaning  in  Aphasia.  In  Goodwin,  C.  (Ed.),  Conversation  and  Brain 
Damage, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 90-117. 
 
Goodwin,  M.  H.  (1982):  “Instigating”:  Storytelling  as  Social  Process, 
American Ethnologist, 9(4), Symbolism and Cognition II, pp. 799-819.   218 
Goodwin, M. H. & Goodwin, C. (2000): Emotion within Situated Activity. In 
Budwig, N., Uzgris I. C., Wertsch, J. V. (Eds.), Communication: An Arena of 
Development, Stamford CT: Ablex, pp. 33-55.  
 
Graham, J. E., Bassett, R. (2006): Reciprocal relations: The recognition and 
co-construction of caring with Alzheimer’s disease, Journal of Aging Studies, 
20, pp. 335 – 349. 
 
Grandey, A. (2000): Emotion Regulation in the Workplace: A New Way to 
Conceptualize Emotional Labor, Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 
5(1), pp. 95-110. 
 
Grandey, A. (2003): When ‘the show must go on’: surface acting and deep 
acting  as  determinants  of  emotional  exhaustion  and  peer-rated  service 
delivery, Academy of Management Journal, 46, pp. 86-96. 
 
Green,  G.,  Linsk,  N.  L.  &  Pinkston,  E.  M.  (1986):  Modification  of  verbal 
behaviour  of  the  mentally  impaired  elderly  by  their  spouses,  Journal  of 
Applied Behavior Analysis, 19, pp. 329-336. 
 
Gross, J. J. (1999): Emotion Regulation: Past, Present, Future, Cognition & 
Emotion, 13(5), pp. 551-573.  
 
Gross,  J.  J.  &  Levenson,  R.  W.  (1995):  Emotion  elicitation  using  films, 
Cognition and Emotion, 9, pp. 87-108. 
 
Gross, J.  J.  & John, O. P. (2003): Individual differences in two emotion 
regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, pp. 348-362. 
 
Guderian,  S.  Schott,  B.  H.,  Richardson-Klavehn,  A.,  Düzel,  E.  (2009): 
Medial  temporal  theta  state  before  an  event  predicts  episodic  encoding 
success in humans, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 
106, pp. 5365-5370. 
 
Haig, M. (2001): The E-marketing Handbook, London: Kogan Page Limited. 
 
Haist,  F.,  Bowden  Gore,  J.,  Mao,  H.  (2001):  Consolidation  of  human 
memory over decades revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
Nature Neuroscience, 4, pp. 1139-1145. 
 
Hamilton, H. (2011): At the Intersection of Art, Alzheimer’s Disease, and 
Discourse:  Talk  in  the  Surround  of  Paintings.  In  Backhaus,  P.  (Ed.), 
Communication  in  Elderly  Care:  Cross-cultural  approaches,  London: 
Continuum, pp. 166-193.    219 
Harris, R. (1981): The Language Myth, London: Duckworth. 
 
Harris, R. (1996): The Language Connection, Bristol: Thoemmes. 
 
Harris, R. (2003): Nagarjuna, Heracleitus and the problem of language. In 
Davis, H. G., Taylor, T. J. (Eds.), Rethinking Linguistics, London: Routledge, 
pp. 171-188. 
 
Harrison, B. E., Son, G.-R., Kim, J., Whall, A. (2007): Preserved Implicit 
Memory  in  Dementia:  A  Potential  Model  for  Care,  American  Journal  of 
Alzheimer’s Disease and other Dementias, 22, pp. 286-293. 
 
Heritage,  J.  (2007):  Intersubjectivity  and  progressivity  in  person  (and 
place)  reference. In Enfield, N.  J.  & Stivers T. (eds.), Person  reference in 
interaction:  linguistic,  cultural,  and  social  perspectives,  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hepburn, A. & Wiggins, S. (Eds.) (2007): Discursive research practice: New 
approaches to psychology and interaction, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Hess, S. (2000): Globalisierte Hausarbeit. Au Pair als Migrationsstrategie 
von Frauen aus Europa, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
 
Higgins,  E.  T.,  King  G.  A.,  Mavin,  G.  H.  (1982):  Individual  construct 
accessibility and subjective impressions and recall,  Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 43, pp. 35-47. 
 
Himmelweit,  S.  (1999):  Caring  Labor,  The  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 561, pp. 27-38.  
 
Hochschild Russel, A. (1983): The Managed Heart: the Commercialization 
of Human Feeling, University of California Press. 
Hochschild Russel, A. (2002a): Love and Gold. In Hochschild Russel, A., 
Ehrenreich, B. (Eds.), Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in 
the New Economy, Granta Books, 2002, pp. 15-31. 
 
Hochschild  Russel,  A.  (2002b):  The  Commerzialisation  of  Intimate  Life: 
Notes from Home and Work, San Francisco and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Hochschild  Russel,  A.,  Ehrenreich,  B.  (Eds.)  (2002):  Global  Woman: 
Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy, Granta Books.   220 
Hodge, R. & Kress, G. (1988): Social Semiotics, London: Polity Press. 
Hoffmann, E. & Nachtmann, J. (2007): Alter und Pflege. GeroStat Report 
Altersdaten 03/ 2007. Berlin: Deutsches Zentrum für Altersfragen. 
Holodynski, M. & Friedlmeier, W. (2006): Development of emotions and 
emotion regulation, New York: Springer. 
Hondagneu-Sotelo,  P.  (2001):  Doméstica:  Immigrant  Workers  Cleaning 
and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence, University of California Press. 
Howard,  A.  (1982):  Interactional  Psychology:  Some  Implications  for 
Psychological  Anthropology,  American  Anthropologist,  New  Series,  84(1), 
pp. 37-57. 
 
Hubbard, G.,  Downs,  M.,  Tster,  S. (2002):  Including  the  perspectives  of 
older people in institutional care during the consent process. In Wilkinson, 
H. (Ed.), The Perspectives of People with Dementia, Research Methods and 
Motivations, London: Jessica Kingsley, pp. 63-81. 
Hutchins, E. (1995): Cognition in the Wild, MIT Press. 
Ibarra, M. (2002): Emotional Proletarians in a Global Economy: Mexican 
Immigrant Women and Elder Care Work, Urban Anthropology and Studies 
of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development, 31(3-4), pp. 317-351. 
Irek,  M.  (1998):  Der  Schmugglerzug.  Warschau-Berlin-Warschau. 
Materialien einer Feldforschung, Berlin: Hans Schiler. 
Janoschka, A. (2004): Web Advertising: New Forms of Communication on 
the Internet, John Benjamins. 
Jefferson, G. (2004): Glossary of transcript symbols with and Introduction. 
In  Lerner,  G.  H.  (Ed.),  Conversation  Analysis:  Studies  from  the  first 
generation, Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 13-23. 
Johnson, M. (1987): The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination and Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
Jones, E. G. & Mendell, L. M. (1999): Assessing the Decade of the Brain, 
Science, 284(5415), pp. 739. 
Kaltreider, L. B., Munro Cullum, C., Lacritz, L. H., Brewer, K., Filley, C. M. 
(1999): Brief Recall Tasks and Memory Assessment in Alzheimer’s Disease, 
Applied Neuropsychology, 6(3), pp. 165-169.   221 
Karakayali, J. (2010): Transnational Haushalten: Biographische Interviews 
mit „care workers“ aus Osteuropa, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Karner, T. (1998): Professional Caring: Homecare Workers as Fictive Kin, 
Journal of Aging Studies, 12(1), pp. 69-82.   
Kellerman,  J.  &  Laird,  J.  D.  (1982):  The  effect  of  appearance  on  self-
perception, Journal of Personality, 50, pp. 296-315. 
Kelly, F (2007): Well-being and expressions of self in dementia: interactions 
in  long-term  wards  and  creative  sessions,  unpublished  Ph.D.  Thesis. 
University of Stirling. 
Kemper,  S.,  Anagnopoulos,  C.,  Lyons,  K.,  Heberlein,  W.  (1994):  Speech 
Accomodations to Dementia, Journal of Gerontology, 49(5), pp. 223-229.  
Heilman, K. M., Drago, V., Foster, P. S., Chanei, L., Rembisz, J., Meador, K., 
Finney, G. (2010): Emotional indifference in Alzheimer’s disease, Journal of 
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 22(2), pp. 236-242. 
Kensinger, E. A. & Corkin, S. (2004): Two routes to emotional memory: 
Distinct  neural  processes  for  valence  and  arousal,  Proceedings  of  the 
National Academy of Sciences, USA, 101(9), pp. 3310-3315. 
Kitwood, T. (1993): Towards a theory of dementia care: The interpersonal 
process, Ageing & Society, 13, pp. 51-67. 
Kitwood,  T.  &  Bredin,  K.  (1992):  Towards  a  theory  of  dementia  care: 
personhood and well-being, Ageing & Society, 12, pp. 269-287. 
 
Kollak,  I.  (ed.)  (2001):  Internationale  Modelle  häuslicher  Pflege:  eine 
Herausforderung und verschiedene Antworten, Frankfurt am Main: Mabuse 
Verlag. 
 
Kontos,  P.  (2003):  ‘The  painterly  hand’:  embodied  consciousness  and 
Alzheimer’s disease, Journal of Aging Studies, 17, pp. 151-70. 
 
Kontos, P. (2004): Ethnographic reflections on selfhood, embodiment and 
Alzheimer’s disease, Ageing & Society, 24, pp. 829 – 849. 
 
Kontos, P. (2005): Embodied Selfhood in Alzheimer’s disease: Rethinking 
person-centred care, Dementia, 4 (4), pp. 553-570. 
Kontos,  P.  (2006):  Embodied  Selfhood:  An  Ethnographic  Exploration  of 
Alzheimer’s  Disease.  In:  Leibing,  A.  &  Cohen,  L.  (Eds.),  Thinking  about   222 
Dementia: Culture, Loss, and the Anthropology of Senility, New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, pp. 195–217.  
Koenig  Coste,  J.  (2004):  Learning  to  speak  Alzheimer’s,  New  Tork: 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 
 
Kovacs,  M.  &  Beck,  A.  T.  (1978):  Maladaptive  cognitive  structures  in 
depression, The American Journal of Psychiatry, 135, pp. 525-533. 
 
Krasner, D. (2000): Method Acting Reconsidered: Theory, Practice, Future, 
New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Kramer, J. H., Delis, D. C., Blusewicz, M. J., Brandt, J., Ober, B. A., Strauss, 
M.  (1988):  Verbal  memory  errors  in  Alzheimer’s  and  Huntington’s 
Dementias, Developmental Neuropsychology, 4, pp. 1-15. 
 
Kress,  G.  (1998):  Visual  and  Verbal  Modes  of  Representation  in 
Electronically  Mediated  Communication:  the  Potentials  of  New  Forms  of 
Text. In: Snyder, I. (Ed.): Page to Screen: Taking Literacs into the Electronic 
Era, London: Routledge, pp. 53-80. 
 
Kruml, S. M., Geddes, D. (2000): Exploring the Dimensions of Emotional 
labor:  The  Heart  of  Hochschild’s  Work.  In:  Management  Communication 
Quarterly, 14, pp. 8-49. 
 
Lamura, G., Döhner, H., Kofahl, C. (Eds.) (2008): Family carers of older 
people in Europe – A six-country comparative study, Berlin: LIT Verlag. 
 
Lan, P.-C. (2001): Among Women: Migrant Domestics and their Taiwanese 
Employers across Generations, Berkeley University Press. 
 
Langacker, R. W. (1987): Foundations of Cognitive Grammar. Volume 1. 
Theoretical Prerequisites, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Lanzieri, G.: Population and social conditions, Eurostat Statistics in focus 
81/ 2008. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-
081/EN/KS-SF-08-081-EN.PDF  
last accessed on 13/04/2011. 
 
Larson, E. B. & Yao, X. (2005): Clinical empathy, emotional labor and acting 
in  the  patient-physician  relationship,  Journal  of  American  Medical 
Association, 293(9), pp. 1100-1106. 
   223 
Lazarus, R. S. (1994): Emotion and adaptation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lehrer,  J.  (2007):  Proust  was  a  Neuroscientist,  New  York:  Houghton 
Mifflin. 
 
Lehrer, J. (2009): How we decide, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.  
 
Leira,  A.  (1994):  Concepts  of  Caring:  Loving,  Thinking,  and  Doing,  The 
Social Service Review, 68(2), pp. 185-201. 
 
Levelt, W. (1983): Monitoring and self-repair in speech, Cognition, 14(1), 
pp. 41-104. 
 
Levinson, S. (1983): Pragmatics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lutz, H. (2002a): In fremden Diensten. Die neue Dienstmädchenfrage in 
Europa als Herausforderung für die Migrations- und Geschlechterforschung. 
In Gottschall, K., Pfau-Effinger, B. (Eds.), Zukunft der Arbeit und Geschlecht, 
Opladen: Leske und Budrich, pp. 161-182.  
Lutz, H. (2002b): Transnationalität im Haushalt. In Gather, C., Geissler, B., 
Rerrich,  M.  S.  (Eds.),  Weltmarkt  Privathaushalt,  Münster:  Westfälisches 
Dampfboot, pp. 86-102. 
Lutz,  H.  (2007):  Vom  Weltmarkt  in  den  Privathaushalt.  Die  neuen 
Dienstmädchen im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 
 
Lutz, H. & Koser, K. (Eds.)  (1998): The New Migration in Europe. Social 
Constructions and Social Realities, Basingstoke und London: MacMillan. 
 
Lutz,  H.,  &  Lenz,  I.  (Eds.)  (2002):  Crossing  Borders  and  Shifting 
Boundaries. Gender, Identities and Networks, Opladen: Leske und Budrich. 
 
Lynch,  M.  (2006):  Cognitive  activities  without  cognition? 
Ethnomethodological investigations of selected ‘cognitive’ topics. Discourse 
Studies, 8(1), pp. 95-104.  
 
Lynch, M. & Bogen, D. (1996) The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text and 
Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings, Durham, NC: Dunke University Press. 
 
Lyons, I. M., Mattarella-Micke, M., Cieslak, M., Nusbaum, H. C., Small, S. 
L.,  Beilock,  S.  L.  (2010):  The  role  of  personal  experience  in  the  neural 
processing of action-related language, Brain and Language, 112(3), pp. 214-
222. 
   224 
Malcolm,  W. M.  & Greenberg,  L.  S.  (2000):  Forgiveness  as  a  process  of 
change in individual in psychotherapy. In McCullough, M. E., Pargament, K. 
I., Thoresen, C. E. (Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, research, and practice, New 
York: Guilford Press, pp. 179-202. 
 
Mann,  C.  &  Stewart,  F.  (2000):  Internet  Communication  and  Qualitative 
Research, Sage Publications. 
 
Mather,  M.,  Canli,  T.,  English,  T.,  Whitfield,  S.,  Wais,  P.,  Ochsner,  K., 
Gabrieli,  J.  D.  E.,  Carstensen,  L.  L.  (2004):  Amygdala  responses  to 
emotionally  valanced  stimuli  in  older  and  younger  adults,  Psychological 
Science, 15, pp. 259-263. 
 
Mead, G. H. (1934): Mind, self, and Society, Chicago: Chicago  University 
Press. 
 
Meagher,  G.  (2006):  What  can  we  expect  from  Paid  Carers?,  Politics 
Society, 34, pp. 33-53. 
 
Merleau-Ponty,  M.  (1962):  Phenomenology  of  Perception.  London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Milton,  K.  &  Svaŝek,  M.  (Eds.)  (2005):  Mixed  Emotion:  Anthropological 
Studies of Feeling, Oxford: Berg. 
 
Mischel, W. (1968): Personality and Assessment, New York: Wiley. 
 
Mischel, W. (1973): Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization 
of personality. Psychol. Rev., 80, pp. 252-283. 
 
Mischel, W. (2004): Toward an Integrative Science of the Person, Annual 
Review of Psychology, 55, pp. 1-22. 
 
Mischke,  M.  (2008):  Die  ‚24-Stunden-Betreuung’  älterer  Menschen  in 
deutschen Privathaushalten durch Migrantinnen aus Ost(mittel)europa. Eine 
Transnationalisierung von Pflegearbeit, unpublished M.A. Thesis. 
 
Momsen,  J.  H.  (Ed.)  (1999):  Gender  Migration  and  Domestic  Service, 
London, New York: Routledge. 
 
Müller, N.,  Guendouzi, J.  A. (2002): Transcribing  discourse:  interactions 
with  Alzheimer’s  disease,  Clinical  Linguistics  &  Phonetics,  16(5).  pp.  345-
359. 
   225 
Näring, G. & van Droffelaar, A. (2007): Incorporation of Emotional Labor in 
the  Demand-Control-Support  Model:  The  relation  with  Emotional 
Exhaustion  and  Personal  Accomplishments  in  Nurses.  In  Ashkanasy,  N., 
Härtel,  C.,  Zerbe,  W.  J.  (Eds.),  Research  on  Emotion  in  Organizations, 
Volume 3, Functionality, Intentionality and Morality, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
pp. 223-238. 
 
Neuhaus,  A.,  Idfort,  M.,  Weidner,  F.  (2009):  Situation  und  Bedarf  von 
Familien mit mittel-und osteuropäischen Haushaltshilfen, Köln: Deutsches 
Institut für angewandte Pflegeforschung e.V. 
 
Niven, K., Totterdell, P., Holman, D. (2009 a): A classification of controlled 
interpersonal affect regulation strategies, Emotion, 9, pp. 498-509. 
 
Niven, K., Totterdell, P., Holman, D. (2009 b): Affect regulation and well-
being  in  the  workplace:  An  interpersonal  perspective.  In  Antoniou,  A., 
Chrousos, G., Cooper, C., Eysenck, M., Spielberger, C. (Eds.), Handbook of 
Occupational Health Psychology and Medicine, Elsevier. 
 
Niven,  K.,  Totterdell,  P.,  Holman,  D.  (2010):  Our  emotional 
neighbourhoods:  How  social  networks  can  regulate  what  we  feel,  The 
Psychologist, 23, pp. 474-477. 
 
Norman, D. A. (1993): Cognition in the head and in the world, Cognitive 
Science, 17, pp.1-6. 
 
Normann,  H.  K.,  Norberg,  A.,  Asplund,  K.  (2002):  Confirmation  and 
lucidity during conversations with a woman with severe dementia, Journal of 
Advanced Nursing, 39, pp. 370-376. 
 
O’Shaughnessay, J. & O’Shaughnessay, N. J. (2003): The Marketing Power 
of Emotion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Odierna, S. (2000): Die heimliche Rückkehr der Dienstmädchen, Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich. 
 
Parkinson  B.  &  Totterdell,  P.  (1999):  Classifying  Affect-regulation 
Startegies, Cognition and Emotion, 13, pp. 277-303. 
Parreñas,  R.  (2001):  Servants  of  Globalization:  Women,  Migration  and 
Domestic Work, Stanford University Press. 
Parreñas, R. (2005): Children of Global Migration: Transnational Families 
and Gendered Woes, Stanford University Press.   226 
Pearce, W. B., Cronen, B. (1980): Communication, action and meaning. New 
York: Praeger. 
Pepin, E. P. & Eslinger, P. J. (1989): Verbal memory decline in Alzheimer’s 
disease: A multiple-process deficit, Neurology, 39, pp. 1477-1482. 
Pfau-Effinger,  B.  (2005):  Welfare  state  policies  and  care  arrangements, 
European Societies, 7(2), pp. 321-347. 
Piaget, J. (1954): Intelligence and affectivity: Their relationship during child 
development, Palo Alto, CA: Annual Review, Inc.  
Pomerantz,  A.  (1984):  Agreeing  and  disagreeing  with  assessment:  Some 
features  of  preferred/  dispreferred  turn  shapes.  In  Atkinson,  J.  M.  & 
Heritage,  J.  (Eds.),  Structure  of  social  action:  Studies  in  conversation 
analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57-101. 
Post, S. G. (2000): The Concept of Alzheimer Disease in a Hypercognitive 
Society.  In  Whitehouse,  P.  J.,  Maurer,  K.,  Ballenger,  J.  F.,  Concepts  of 
Alzheimer Disease. Biological, clinical and cultural perspectives. Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 245-257.  
Potter, J. (2006): Cognition and conversation, Discourse Studies, 8(1), pp. 
131-140. 
Pratt, R. & Wilkinson, H. (2001): ‘Tell me the thruth’: the effect of being told 
the diagnosis of dementia from the perspective of the person with dementia, 
London: Mental Health Foundation.  
Prinz,  J.  J.  (2004):  Gut  reactions:  A  perceptual  theory  of  emotion,  New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Rappold, E. (2001): Intentionale Eß- und Trinkstörung bei fortgeschritten 
Demenzkranken, Ernährungsmedizin, 3, pp. 22-25. 
Reimer,  S.  &  Merold,  A.  (2008):  Änderungen  der  sozialen 
Pflegeversicherung durch das Pflegeversicherungs-Weiterentwicklungsgesetz 
– Überblick und ausgewählte Rechtsfragen, Die Sozialgerichtsbarkeit, 7, pp. 
381-388. 
Robinette,  S.,  Lenz,  V.,  Brand,  V.  (2000):  Emotion  Marketing:  The 
Hallmark Way of Winning Customers for Life, The McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Roseman,  I.  J.  &  Smith,  C.  A.  (2001):  Appraisal  Theory.  In  Scherer,  K., 
Schorr, A., Johnstone, T. (Eds.), Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, 
Methods, Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-20.   227 
Rumelhart, D. E. & Ortony, A. (1977): The representation of knowledge in 
memory. In Anderson, R. C., Spiro, R. J., Montague, W. E. (Eds.), Schooling 
and the acquisition of knowledge, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Rüßler,  H.  (2007):  Polnische  Pflege-MigrantInnen  in  deutschen 
Pflegehaushalten, Migration und Soziale Arbeit, 3/4, pp. 252-260. 
Russell, J. A. (1980): A circumplex model of affect, Journal of Personality & 
Social Psychology, 39, pp. 1161-1178. 
Ryan, E. B. & Schindel Martin, L. (2011):  Using Narrative Arts to Foster 
Personhood in Dementia. In Backhaus, P. (Ed.), Communication in Elderly 
Care: Cross-cultural approaches, London: Continuum, pp. 193-218. 
Sabat, S. & Harré, R. (1992): The construction and deconstruction of self in 
Alzheimer’s disease, Ageing & Society, 12, pp. 443-461. 
Sacks, H., ed. by Jefferson, G. (1986): Some considerations of a story told in 
ordinary conversation, Poetics 15, pp. 127-138. 
Sacks,  H.  (1992):  Lectures  on  Conversation,  Vol.  1  &  2,  edited  by  Gail 
Jefferson, Oxford & Cambridge (USA): Blackwell. 
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G. (1974): A simplest systematics for 
the organization of turn-taking in conversation, Language, 50, pp. 696-735. 
Savundranayagam, M. Y., Ryan, E. B.,  Anas, A. P. & Orange, J. B. (2007): 
Communication and Dementia, Clinical Gerontologist, 31(2), pp. 47-63. 
Scarmeas, N., Brandt, J., Blacker, D., Albert, M., Hadjigergiou, G., Dubois, 
B.,  Devanand,  D.,  Honig,  L.,  Stern,  Y.  (2007):  Disruptive  behaviour  as  a 
predictor in Alzheimer disease, Archives in Neurology, 64(12), pp. 1749-1754. 
Scollon, R. & Scollon, S. W. (2003): Discourses in Place: Language in the 
material world, London: Routledge. 
Scoville  Beecher,  W.  &  Milner,  B.  (1957):  Loss  of  recent  Memory  after 
bilateral  hippocampal  Lesions,  Journal  of  Neurology,  Neurosurgery  & 
Psychiatry, 20, pp. 11-21. 
Schank,  R.  C.  &  Abelson,  R.  P.  (1977):  Scripts,  plans,  goals,  and 
understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Schegloff, E. A. (1997): Whose text? Whose context?, Discourse & Society, 
8, pp. 165-187.   228 
Schegloff,  E.  A.  (2006):  Interaction:  The  Infrastructure  for  Social 
Institutions, the  Natural  Ecological  Niche  for  Language,  and  the  Arena  in 
which  Culture  is  enacted.  In  Enfield,  N.  J.,  Levinson,  S.  (Eds.),  Roots  of 
Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition and Interaction, London: Berg, pp. 70-
96. 
Schegloff,  E.A.,  Jefferson,  G.  Sacks,  H.  (1977):  The  Preference  for  Self-
Correction in the Organisation of Repair in Conversation, Language, 53, pp. 
361-382. 
Scherer, K., Schorr, A., Johnstone, T. (Eds.) (2001): Appraisal Processes in 
Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schnall,  S.  &  Clore,  G.  L.  (2004):  Emergent  meaning  in  affective  space: 
Congruent  conceptuals  relations  and  spatial  relations  produce  positive 
evaluations. In Forbus, K., Gentner, D., Reiger, T. (Eds.), Proceedings of the 
Twenty-Sixth  Annnual  Conference  of  the  Cognitive  Science  Society,  pp. 
1209-1214. 
Schneider, F., Habel, U., Wagner, M., Franke, P., Toni, I., Salloum, J. B., 
Shah, N. J., Sulzbach, C., Hönig, K., Maier, W., Gaebel, W., Zilles, K. (2001): 
Subcortical  correlates  of  craving  in  early  abstinent  alcoholic  patients.  Am 
Journal Psychiatry, 158, pp. 1075-1083. 
Small, J. A., Geldart K., Gutman, G., Scott, M. A. M. (1998): The discourse of 
self in dementia, Ageing & Society, 18, pp. 291-316. 
Small, J. A., Gutman, G., Makela, S., Hillhouse, B. (2003): Strategies used by 
caregivers  of  Persons  with  Alzheimer’s  Disease  during  Activities  of  Daily 
Living, Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 46, pp. 353-
367. 
Small, J. A., Perry, J., Lewis, J. (2005): Perceptions of family caregivers’ 
psychosocial  behaviour  when  communicating  with  spouses  who  have 
Alzheimer’s  disease,  American  Journal  of  Alzheimer’s  Disease  and  other 
Dementias, 20, pp. 280-289. 
Smith, C. N. & Squire, L. R. (2009): Medial Temporal Lobe Activity during 
Retrieval of Semantic Memory is Related to the Age of Memory, The Journal 
of Neuroscience, 29(4), pp. 930-938. 
Spayd, C. S. & Smyer, M. A. (1988): Interventions with agitated, disoriented, 
or depressed residents. In Smyer, M. A., Cohn, M. D., Brannon, D. (Eds.), 
Mental  health  consultation  in  nursing  homes,  New  York:  New  York 
University Press.   229 
Steffensen, S. V. & Cowley, (2010): Signifying bodies and health: a non-
local aftermath. In Cowley, S., Major, J. C., Steffensen, S. V., Dinis, A. (Eds.), 
Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction and Health. Braga: The Faculty 
of Philosophy of Braga, Portuguese Catholic University, pp.331-357. 
Strasberg, L. (1988): A Dream of Passion. The Development of the Method, 
New York: Penguin. 
Tapert, S., Brown, G., Baratta, M., Brown, S. (2004): fMRI BOLD response 
to alcohol stimuli in alcohol dependent young women, Addictive Behaviors, 
29, 33-50. 
Tappen, R. M., Williams, C., Fishman, S., Touhy, T. (1999): Persistence of 
self  in  advanced  Alzheimer’s  disease,  Image:  Journal  of  Nursing 
Scholarship, 31, pp. 121-125. 
Taylor,  R.  (2007):  Alzheimer’s  -  from  the  inside  out,  Baltimore:  Health 
Professions Press. 
Tießler-Marenda,  E.  (2002):  Die  neue  Zuwanderungsregelung  für 
Haushaltshilfen  in  Haushalten  mit  Pflegebedürftigen,  Zeitschrift  für 
Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik, 22(7), pp. 233-237. 
 
Timonen,  V.  &  Doyle,  M.  (2009):  In  Search  of  Security:  Migrant  Care 
Workers’ Understandings, Experiences of the Multicultural Care Workforce, 
Ageing and Society, 29(3): 337-350. 
 
Tirassa,  M.,  Bosco,  F.  M.  (2008):  On  the  Nature  and  Role  of 
Intersubjectivity  in  Human  Communication.  In  Morganti,  F.,  Carassa,  A., 
Riva,  G.  (Eds.):  Enacting  Intersubjectivity:  A  Cognitive  and  Social 
Perspective on the Study of Interactions, Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp. 81-95. 
 
Tomasello, M. (1999): The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Harvard: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Travis, D. (2000): Emotional Branding: How Successful Brands Gain the 
Irrational Edge, New York: Crown Business. 
 
Trevarthen, C. (2004): Brain development. In Gregory, R. L. (Ed.), Oxford 
Companion to the Mind (2nd Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
116-127. 
 
Trevarthen, C. (2010): What is it like to be a person who knows nothing? 
Defining the active intersubjective mind of a newborn human being, Infant 
and Child Development, Special Issue: The Intersubjective Newborn, 20(1), 
pp. 119-135.    230 
Trevarthen,  C.  &  Aitken,  K.  (2001):  Infant  Intersubjectivity:  Research, 
Theory  and  Clinical  Application,  Journal  of  Child  Psychology  and 
Psychiatry, 42, pp. 3-48. 
 
Trevarthen,  C.  &  Hubley,  P.  (1978):  Secondary  intersubjectivity: 
confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year. In Lock, A. (Ed.), 
Action, gesture, symbol, New York: Academic Press, pp. 183-229. 
 
Tsotra,  D.,  Janson,  M.,  Cecez-Kecmanovic,  D.  (2004):  Marketing  on  the 
Internet: A Semiotic Analysis, Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference 
on Information Systems, New York, pp. 4210-4220. 
 
Ungerson, C. (1997): Social politics and the commodification of care, Social 
Politics, 4(3), pp. 362-381. 
 
Ungerson,  C.  (2005):  Care,  Work  and  Feeling,  The  Sociological  Review, 
53(2), pp. 188-203.  
 
Varela,  F.  J.,  Thompson,  E.  &  Rosch,  E.  (1991):  The  embodied  mind, 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
 
Watson, C. M., Chenery, H. J., Carter, M. S. (1999): An analysis of trouble 
and  repair  in  the  natural  conversations  of  people  with  dementia  of  the 
Alzheimer’s type, London: Taylor & Francis. 
 
Werner, K. H., Roberts, N. A., Rosen, H. J., Dean, D. L., Kramer, J. H., 
Weiner,  M.  W.  (2007):  Emotional  reactivity  and  emotion  recognition  in 
frontotemporal lobar degeneration, Neurology, 69(2), pp. 148-155. 
 
Wharton,  A.  (1993):  The  Affective  Consequences  of  Service  Work,  Work 
and Occupations, 20, pp. 205-232. 
 
Wiggins, S. (2002): Talking with your mouth full: Gustatory Mmms and the 
Embodiment of Pleasure, Research on Language & Social Interaction, 35(3), 
pp. 311-336. 
 
Wiggins, J. S. (1995): Interpersonal Adjective Scales: Professional Manual, 
Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. 
 
Wilcox, K. & Laird, J. (2000): The impact of media images on women’s self-
esteem:  identification,  social  comparison,  and  self-perception,  Journal  of 
Research in Personality, 34(2), pp. 278-286.  
 
Wilkinson, H.: Including people with dementia in research, methods and 
motivations.  In:  Wilkinson,  H.  (Ed.):  The  Perspectives  of  People  with   231 
Dementia,  Research  Methods  and  Motivations,  London:  Jessica  Kingsley 
Publishers, 2002. 
 
Williamson, J.: Decoding Advertisements, Marion Boyers Publishers Ltd, 
1994. 
 
Wilson, M. (2002): Six Views of Embodied Cognition, Psychonomic Bulletin 
& Review, 9(4), pp. 625-636. 
 
Yanofsky, C. S. (2001): Memory and Alzheimer’s disease. 
http://www.pneuro.com/publications/alzheimer/Memory%20and%20Alzhei
mer.htm 
last accessed on 13/04/2011. 
 
Yeates,  N.  (2004):  Global  Care  Chains:  Critical  Reflections  and  Lines  of 
Inquiry, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 6(3), pp. 369-391. 
 
Zaitchik, D. & Albert, M. S. (2004): Cognition and emotion, In Morris, R., 
Becker,  J.  (Eds.),  Cognitive  Neuropsychology  of  Alzheimer’s  Disease  (2nd 
edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Zinken, J., Hellsten, I, Nerlich, B. (2008): Discourse metaphors, In Dirven, 
R., Frank, R., Ziemke, T., Zlatev, J. (Eds.), Body, Language, and Mind. Vol.2: 
Sociocultural Situatedness, Berlin: Mouton, pp. 363-385.  
 